Legenio manus erit et cervix cesa
Cicero
TULLYS OFFICES
in 3 Books.
Turn'd out of Latin
into English.
By
ROGER L'ESTRANGE.
LONDON Printed
for Charls Broome.

TULLY'S OFFICES.

IN

Three Books.

Turned out of

LATIN

INTO

ENGLISH.

By Ro. L'Estrange.

The Third Edition Corrected.

LONDON,

Printed for *Charles Brome*, at the Gun in St. *Paul's* Church-Yard, 1684.

TO THE READER.

TIS hard, me thinks, that a Man cannot Publiſh a Book, but he muſt preſently give the World a Reaſon *for't; when yet there's not* One *Book of* Twenty *that will* bear *a* Reaſon; *not* One Man *of a* Hundred, *perhaps, that is able to* Give *One; nor* One Reaſon *of a* Thouſand *(when they* are *given) that was the* True Reaſon *of Doing it. The* True Reaſon *(I ſay) For there's a great Difference, many times, betwixt a* Good Reaſon, *for the doing of a thing, and the* True Reaſon *why the thing was done. The* Service *of* God *is a very* Good Reaſon *for a Man's going to* Church; *and yet the meeting of a* Miſtris *There, may, perchance, be the* True Reaſon *of his* Going. *And*

ſo likewiſe in Other Caſes, where we cover our Paſſions *and our* Intereſts *under the Semblances of* Virtue, *and* Duty. *But however, ſince* Cuſtom, (*the* Plague *of* Wiſe Men, *and the* Idol *of* Fools) *ſince* Cuſtom (*I ſay*) *will have it ſo, that a Man had as good go to* Court *without his* Gravat, *as ſhew himſelf in* Print *without a* Preface; *I ſhall even Content my Self to play the Fool too, in ſo* Much, *and in ſo* Good *Company*, (General Dedications *being no Other, than* Faſhionable Foppe-ries.) *For what can be more* Ridiculous, *than for a Man to Treat* Princes, *and* Tinkers; Coxcombs, *and* Philoſophers; *Men of* Honour, *and* Raſcals, *promiſcuouſly*, all in a Stile?

Now as it is no Eaſie Matter to give a Good Reaſon *for* Writing at all; *ſo it is yet more Difficult to give* That Reaſon *in an* Epiſtle; *which, at beſt, ſtands in need of* another very good Reaſon, *for* its own ſupport. *But* Prefaces, *at the Ordinary rate of*

Pre-

Prefaces, *are wholly* Inexcuſable; *Only an Idle Deal of* Fiddle-Faddle *betwixt the* Writer *and the* Reader, *made* worſe, *by* Care, *and* Peins; *and Digeſted, out of* Vulgar *and* Pedantique Common-Places, *into one Maſs of* Putid *and* Elaborate Folly. *This Liberty of* Prefacing *againſt* Prefaces, *may ſeem a little* Unreaſonable; *but* Common Scriblers *are allow'd the Priviledges of* Common Strumpets. *One of the Frankeſt* Proſtitutes *that ever I knew ſince I was born, had Theſe Words the oftener in her Mouth:* Lord! (*ſays ſhe*) to ſee the Impudence of ſome Women!

To come now to the Reaſons *that induced me to the* Tranſlating *of* This Little Book; *I ſhall* Begin *with the* Excellency *of the* Work it ſelf; *which has ever been Eſteemed, both for the* Method *and* Matter *of it, as one of the moſt Exact Pices of the Kind that ever was written, and the moſt* Inſtructive *of* Human Life. *In ſo much*

that Cicero himself *valu'd himself upon This Tract of* Morals, *as his* Masterpiece, *and accordingly recommended the Study of it to his Beloved Son, under* That *Illustrious Character.* Secondly, *as it was Composed in a* Loose, *and* Troublesome Age, *so was it accommodated also to the Circumstances of* Those Times; *for the asserting of the* Force, *and* Efficacy *of* Virtue *against the utmost* Rigour, *and* Iniquity *of* Fortune. *Upon which Consideration likewise, I have now turn'd it into* English, *with a regard to a* Place, *and* Season, *that extremely* needs *it, I do not speak This, as if at any time it would have been Superfluous; but that* Desperate Diseases *require the most* Powerful Remedies.

To give you the Sum of it in a few Words; It is a Manual of Precepts *for the Government of our selves, in all the Offices, Actions, and Conditions of Human Life; and tending, not only to the Comfort of Men in* Society, *but to the*

Con-

Conducting of Particulars *alſo, into a State of* Felicity, *and* Virtue. *It is a Leſſon that ſerves us from the very* Cradle, *to the* Grave. *It teaches us what we Ow to* Mankind; *to our* Country; *to our* Parents; *to our* Friends; *to our* Selves; *what we are to do as* Children; *what, as* Men; *what, as* Citizens: *It* ſets, *and it* keeps *us* Right *in all the Duties of* Prudence, Moderation, Reſolution, *and* Juſtice. *It Forms our* Manners; *Purges our* Affections; *enlightens our* Underſtandings; *and leads us, through the* Knowledge, *and the* Love *of* Virtue, *to the* Practice, *and* Habit *of it.*

This Treatiſe of Offices, *I find to be one of the Commoneſt* School-Books *that we have*; *and as it is the* Beſt *of* Books; *ſo it is apply'd to the* Beſt *of* Purpoſes; *that is to ſay, to the Training up of* Youth, *in the* Study *and* Exerciſe *of* Virtue. *The* Foundations *of an* Honourable, *and a* Bleſſed Life, *are laid in the very* Cradle; *and we ſuck in*

the

the Tincture of Generous, *or* Perverse Inclinations, *even with* our Mothers Milk: *Insomuch that we may date the greater part of our greatest Miscarriages, from the* Errors, *and* Infelicities *of our* First Institution, *and* Education. *But tho', upon the whole matter, I do highly approve of the* Usage *of* This Book *in* Schools, *I must confess yet, with Submission, that I am not at all satisfy'd in the* ordinary way *of using it. For the cutting of it out into* Particles, *here and there a* Chop, *makes it a* Lesson, *to the Boys, rather of* Syntax, *than* Morality; *beside the* prejudice *that it suffers under the Trivial name of a* School-Book; *and the* disgust *which naturally continues with us, even when we are* Men, *for that which we were* whipt *for, when we were* Boys.

Now the Matter *of this Book being so* Excellent; *and truly the* Latin *of it hardly* Ciceronian; *it should be our business rather to inculcate the* Doctrine

than

than the Stile; *and yet in* ſuch manner *too, that the* One *may be* Attended, *without* Neglecting *the* Other. *And This may be effected to the Common Benefit of the* Scholar, *in* Both Kinds; *by, Firſt*, Reading, *and* Expounding *Theſe Offices*, Whole *to him, in* Engliſh, *before he be put to Hack, and Puzzle upon them by* Snaps *in the Original*; *the* One Facilitating, *and* Preparing *him for the* Other. *Let him be*, Firſt, *and in his* Mother-Tongue, *inſtructed in the* Principles *of* Moral Duties; *and he ſhall then with the more* Eaſe, Profit, *and* Delight, *take the ſame Notions down in* Latin, *and Digeſt them. Whereas in beginning with the* Latin, *the* Pupil *has little more to do, than to bring together the* Nominative Caſe *and the* Verb, *without either* Underſtanding, *or* Heeding *the main* Scope, *and* Intent *of the* Book.

I might here entertain the Reader with Twenty Stories of the Interruptions *I have met with, in the Courſe of* This Tranſla-

Translation; *how it has been only the Work of* Broken Hours; *and I might plead* These Distractions *in excuse of all its* Inequalities, *and* Defects. *But such as it is,* Plain, *and* Simple, *I do here present it to the* Publique, *without either* Vanity, *or* Complement: *and, I hope, without giving unto any sort of* Reader *any Just Cause of* Complaint. *For* He that does not like it, may let it alone; *and there's no Hurt done.*

TULLY's

TULLY's OFFICES.

The First BOOK.

ALTHOUGH, after Twelve Months ſpent in the School of *Cratippus*, and That at *Athens* too, you cannot (my Son *Marcus*) but be abundantly inſtructed in the Precepts and Inſtitutions of Philoſophy, by reaſon of the Great Authority of the *Maſter*, as well as of the *Place*; the One, for *Erudition*, the Other for *Example*: I am yet of Opinion, that you ſhall do well, nevertheleſs, to take the ſame Courſe in *Your* ſtudies, that I have done in *Mine*, and to mingle your *Latin* with your *Greek*; as a Method which I have ever found very much Conducing to the Bus'neſs, both of an *Orator*, and of a *Philoſopher*: Beſide, that it will give you the Command, indifferently, of Both Languages. In this Particular, I am perſwaded that I have done my Countrey-men no ſmall Service; and that not only thoſe who have no Skill at all in *Greek*, but even the Learned Themſelves will acknowledge, that I have in ſome ſort Contributed to the Advantage, both of their *Eloquence*, and *Judgment*.

'Tis a great advantage, Good Inſtitution, *and* Good Example.

Greek, *and* Latin, Rhetorick *and* Philoſophy, *do well together.*

Where-

Wherefore, as you have the greatest Philosopher of this Age for your Master, you shall also Learn of him as long as you please: and so long, certainly, you ought to desire to learn, as you find your self the Better for it. Upon the Reading of my Writings, you will see a great deal in them of the *Peripatetique*, (for I am a Follower of *Socrates*, and of *Plato* both.) As to the Matter it self, you are at liberty to use your Own Judgment; but yet the Acquainting of your self with my Stile, will undoubtedly be of some Use toward the Improvement of your *Latin Tongue*. And let me not in This be thought arrogant neither; For, allowing my self the meanest of many *Philosophers*, I have yet some Right, me thinks, after an Age spent upon This Study, to value my self upon all the Parts of an *Orator*; as *Propriety*, *Perspicuity*, and the *Flowers*, and *Ornaments* of *Well-speaking*. Wherefore I must Earnestly recommend unto you the Perusal, not only of my *Orations*, but likewise of my *Philosophical Discourses*, which are now swell'd almost to the Bulk of the Other: and that you will read them with Intention and Care: for tho' there may be, in the Other, a greater Force, and Dignity, yet This smooth, and temperate Mixture is not to be neglected. Among the *Greeks*, I have not found any Man that has Successfully apply'd himself to the Language of the *Bar*, and to this gentle way of *Argumentation*, both at once; unless I should reckon *Demetrius Phalereus* for one: who was indeed a *subtle Disputant*, no very powerful *Orator*; but then such a Vein of Sweetness with him, that a Body might imagine *Theophrastus* had been his Tutor. For my own part I have labour'd in Both These Kinds;

Cicero half a Peripatetique.

A better Orator, than Philosopher.

None of the Greeks Excellent in Both Kinds.

Kinds; and with what Effect, let the World judge. *Plato*, I believe, would have made a *Ready*, and a *Weighty Pleader*, if he had bent his Mind to't: And *Demosthenes*, a *Queint*, and a *Polite Philosopher*, if he would but have treated of, and stuck to what he had from *Plato*. And This was the Case also, of *Aristotle*, and *Isocrates* they were both of them fond of their Own Way, and slighted one another.

His Reasons for the Choice of This Subject.

BUT being resolved to Write somewhat to you at present, and more, hereafter; I have made it my Choice to begin upon that Subject, which I look upon to be most accommodate to your *Age*, and best becoming the Authority of a *Parent*. There are many Profitable, and Important Points in Philosophy, which have been accurately, and copiously handled by divers Learned Men: But that which I take to be of the Greatest Latitude, falls under the Head of *Offices*, or *Duties betwixt Man and Man*; whereof we have many *Precepts* and *Traditions* transmitted to us from our Fore-fathers. For there is no Condition of Life, either *Publick*, or *Private*; from *Courts of Justice*, to *Particular Families*; either *Solitary*, or in *Society*; but there is still a place for *Humane Duty*: And it is the *Well*, or *Ill discharging of This Office*, that makes our *Character* in the World, either *Glorious*, or *Shameful*. And this is the Common Theme too of all Philosophers; for who shall dare to Usurp that Sacred Name, that never prescrib'd Rules for the Government of Life? But there are some Doctrines yet, that render these Offices wholly vain and Useless; upon a Mistake concerning the *Ends* of *Good*, and

He taxes the Epicureans.

and of *Wicked men*: For whosoever fancies any possibility of separating the *Supreme Good*, from *Virtue*, that Man can never be either a *Friend*, or a *Just*, or a *Generous Person*, upon *That Foundation*. (That is to say, so long as he agrees with himself, and without attending to the Dictate of a better Nature.) Can any man be *Brave*, that makes *Pein* the worst of *Evils*? or *Temperate*, that makes *Pleasure* the *Sovereign Good*? This is so clear, that it is not worth a Dispute; beside that I have expressly discours'd upon it in another place. The Patrons of these Positions must Contradict themselves, if they will pretend, in any sort, to intermeddle in This matter: For there can be no Sound, Stable, and Natural Principle of Duty erected upon any other Foundation, than This; That *Virtue is Only, or, at least, Chiefly desirable, for its proper self.* Wherefore the *Stoicks*, *Academicks*, and *Peripateticks*, were much in the Right, in This Particular; as the Whimsies of *Aristo*, *Pyrrho*, and *Herillus*, are long since out of Doors: Not but that They had as much Right as Other People, to a Freedom of *Debate*, if they had but left us in a State, or Capacity of *Election*; without Cutting off the very Means of any Correspondence at all with *Humane Duties*. Therefore at This Time, and in This Question, I shall follow the *Stoicks*; not as an *Expositor*, but (after my Usual Custom) I shall draw as much Water at their Well as I think fit, and then make use of it according to my own Discretion.

Nothing desirable for it self but Virtue.

BEING in this Book to treat of the Offices or Duties of Mankind, it will be proper, in the First place, to define what is intended by the Word

Word *Office*; (a thing omitted by *Panætius*, which I wonder at :) For *all Reasonable Propositions ought to be introduced by a Definition*; for the better understanding of the Point in Debate.

All disputes should begin with a Definition.

OF *Duties*, or *Offices*, there are *Two Kinds*; the *One* respects the *Ends of good men*; the *Other* consists in certain *Rules*, and *Precepts* to be apply'd to the *Use*, and *Conduct of Humane Life*. Under the Former, are These Questions: *Whether all Offices be perfect or not? Whether one Office be Greater, or less than Another*? And *What Offices are found to be of the same Sort, and Degree?* But those Offices which are deliver'd to us by Precept, tho they have a regard also to the Life of Good Men, yet it does not so much appear; because they seem to be rather a Provision for the Ordering of Life in *Society*. These are the Offices which we shall Discourse of in this Book. There is also *another Division* of *Offices*; some are call'd *Middle*, and *Imperfect*, others *Perfect*; We may call the *Latter*, a *Right*, (according to the *Greek* word Κατόρθωμα) and the *Other*, a *Common Office*, (Καθῆκον) defining *That* to be *Perfect* which they call *Right*, and *That* to be a *Middle Office*, *when a Man may give a Reasonable Account for the doing of it.*

A Division of Offices.

IT is Natural to *Deliberate*, before we *Resolve*; and *Panætius* reduces the subject matter of *Deliberation* into *Three General Heads*. The *First* Question is, Whether the thing *deliberated* upon, be *Good*, or *Evil*? Wherein several Men are many times of several Opinions. The *Second* Enquiry or Consult refers to the *Ease*, *Pleasure*, or *Convenience* of *Life*; as *Estate*,

Deliberation according to Panætius, *under three Heads.*

for the purpoſe; *Wealth*, or *Power*; by which we are enabled to be helpful, both to our ſelves, and our Friends: Whether the Matter in debate be *convenient*, or *not?* And this Queſtion is carry'd by the Appearence of *Profit*. The *Third* Point of *Deliberation*, lies in a Caſe, where the *Honeſt* and the *Profitable* come in *Competition*. For when *Utility* drives *One way*, and *Virtue* invites us *Another*, there follows a *Diſtraction of* Mind, and a dubious *Anxiety* of *Thought*. It is a great failing to leave out any thing in a Diviſion; and yet there are Two things omitted in This. For the queſtion is not only, Whether a thing be *Honeſt*, or *not*; but where there are *Two things Honeſt*, before us, which is the *Honeſter?* and of *Two Profitables*, whether is the more *Profitable?* So that his *three Branches* muſt be *extended* to *Five*: *Firſt*, the *Concurrence* of *Two Good Things*; *Secondly*, that of *Two Profitables*; and *Laſtly*, *Both* of them in *Compariſon*. Of which in Order.

Cicero *makes five.*

Self-love is Natural.

ALL Living Creatures are Originally mov'd by a Natural Inſtinct, toward the means of *Self-preſervation*: As the *Defence* of their *Lives*, and *Bodies*; the *Avoidance* of things *hurtful* to them; the *ſearch*, and *proviſion* of all *Neceſſaries* for Life; as *Food*, *Shelter*, and the like. It is likewiſe Common to them All, the Appetite of Propagating and Continuing their *Kind*; with a certain Care, and Tenderneſs for their *Iſſue*.

The Difference betwixt Inſtinct and Reaſon.

Now betwixt a *Man*, and a *Brute*, there is eminently this Difference. The *One* is carry'd on by *ſenſe*, and to That only which is *preſent*; with little or no regard to what is either *paſt*, or to *come*: whereas the *Other*, by the Benefit of

Reaſon,

Reason, sees the *Consequences* of Things; their *Rise*, and their *Progress*; and couples together, *Causes* and *Effects*; compares *Resemblances* of *Times*, *Actions* and *Events*; tacks the *Present*, to the *Future*, and so taking in his whole Life at a View, he prepares all things for the Use, and Comfort of it.

The Seeds of Justice.

It is by force of the same *Reason*, that *Nature* makes one Man a *Friend* to another; that she moves us to the Love of *Communication*, and *Society*; that she implants in us a particular *Affection* to our *Children*, and dictates to us the *Necessity* of *Communities*, and *Councils*. This is it that puts us upon providing for Food, and Clothing; and not for our selves alone, but for our Wives, our Children, our Friends, and for all those that are under our Protection. This Impression raises great Thoughts in us; and fits us for Action: but there is nothing so *Appropriate*, and *Peculiar* to *Mankind*, as the *Love*, and *Faculty* of Tracing out the Truth. Insomuch, that we are no sooner at Liberty from Common *Cares*, and *Business*, but our Heads are presently at work upon something to be either *seen*, or *heard*, or *understood*: accounting upon the knowledge of things *wonderful*, and *hidden*, as a *necessary Ingredient* into a *Happy*, and a *Virtuous Life*. From whence may be drawn this Conclusion, That *whatsoever is* True, Simple, *and* Sincere, *is most congruous to the Nature of Man.* This love of *Truth* is accompany'd with a desire of *Rule*; so that a *Generous and Well-qualified Mind*, will never be brought into *Subjection*, unless either for *Learning*, or *Instruction* sake; or in Submission to a *Just*, and *Lawful Governour*, for the *Common Good*. This Elevation begets a

Liberality.

Prudence.

Magnanimity.

Contempt of Fortune, and a Dignity of Spirit. And it is no ſmall matter neither, the power of Reaſonable Nature even in This reſpect; that *Man alone* underſtands *Order*; the Bounds of *Decency*, in *Words*, and *Actions*, and the Terms of *Moderation*: That *only Man* is affected with the *Beauty*, the *Gracefulneſs*, and the *Symmetry* of *Viſible Objects*. Now if *Nature*, and *Reaſon*, take ſuch Care to convey the *Images*, even of *Senſible Things*, from the *Eye*, to the *Mind*; how much a greater Value muſt ſhe ſet upon the *Grace*, and *Conſtancy* of our *Manners*; and the keeping ſuch a guard upon all our *Words*, and *Deeds*, that no *Unmanly* thing, not a *looſe Syllable*, or *Thought* eſcape us? This is the Compoſition of that *Honeſty* we look for, which is never the leſs Venerable, for being little Eſteem'd: For without any approbation from *abroad*, the whole Earth cannot yet hinder it from being praiſe-worthy in its own Nature. Oh! my Son, *Marcus*, we may faſhion to our ſelves ſome faint *Idea* of *Virtue* or *Wiſdom*; but if it could be preſented to our *Eyes* in its *Genuine Luſtre*, how ſhould we be *tranſported* (ſays *Plato*) with the Love of it?

Modeſty and Temperance.

The Four Cardinal Vertues. and the ſubject-matter of each.

THERE is not any Virtue whatſoever but ariſes from *One*, or *Other*, of *theſe four Heads*; and conſiſts either, Firſt, in the *ſearch*, and *perception* of the *Truth*; or, Secondly, in the Conſervation of *Humane Society*; giving every man his *due*, and *keeping faith* in all *Promiſes*, and *Contracts*; or, Thirdly, in the *Greatneſs*, and *Force*, of a *Brave*, and *Invincible Courage*; or, Fourthly, in the *Order*, and *Meaſure* of all our *Words* and *Actions*; according to the Rules of *Modeſty*, and *Temperance*. NOW

NOW though these *four Virtues* may be *Complicate*, and *Linkt* together, there are yet certain *distinct Duties*, that issue severally from each of them: As the Scrutiny and Bolting out of a *Truth*; from *Prudence*, which is a *Faculty* particularly appertaining to *That Virtue*: For he that makes the best judgment of the *Truth* of Things; he that most readily finds the *way* to't; and gives the best account of the *Reason* of it, we conclude him, without all dispute to be the wisest Man. So that effectually, the proper *Subject* of This Virtue, is *Truth*: But the Business of the *Other three Virtues*, is, To procure and maintain *Necessaries*, for the Commodity of *Life*; the upholding of *Communities*, and *Society*; and to shew the Dignity of the *Mind*, as well in the *Communicating* of our *Fortunes*, as in the *Acquiring of them*; and more yet (if there shall be occasion) in the *despising* of them. But *Order*, *Constancy*, *Moderation*, and the like, require something of *Action*, in concurrence with the Operations of the *Mind*: And he that would acquit himself in the Course of his Life, with *Reputation* and a good *Grace*, must observe *Order*, and *Measure*.

Distinct Duties in a Complication of Virtue.

Prudence searches the Truth of Things.

Justice shews it self in Society.

Fortitude in the Contempt of difficulties.

Temperance in Order and Measure.

A decorum in the Congruity of all.

OF these *Four Parts*, into which we have divided the *Nature*, and the *Power* of *Virtue*; that which concerns the disquisition of *Truth* holds most affinity with the *Soul* of *Man*. We are all of us, both *drawn*, and *led* to a desire of *Knowledg*; and every man values himself upon being *wiser* than his *Neighbor*; but on the other side, to *Fail*, to *Wander*, to be *Ignorant*, and to be *deceived*, we look upon as a wretched, and a reproachful thing.

Prudence is a Natural Virtue.

Have a care of two mistakes. Credulity, and

IN the pursuit of this most Natural Virtue, we must take heed of *Two Mistakes*: *First*, the taking up of Things upon *Trust*; and flattering our selves, that we *know more*, than effectually we *do*. He that would keep clear of this Rock, (as every man should endeavour it) must diligently attend his Business, and allow himself time to consider of it. The *Other* is the bestowing of more *Pains* and *Study* upon things that are *obscure*, *hard*, and *superfluous*, than the Matter is *worth*: whereas by avoiding these Errors, and employing the same application upon profitable Knowledge, and the study of Virtue, a Man gains to himself deserved Commendation. We have heard of *Cajus Sulpitius*, for his *Astrology*; of *Sextus Pompeius*, for his *Geometry*; and of other persons eminent for *Logique*; and *Civil Law*; which Sciences are all of them exercised in the Investigation of *Truth*; and yet for a man to divert himself, by these Studies, from *Common Offices*, and *Business*, is against the *Nature* of *Humane Duty*. For the Excellency of virtue lies in *Action*; but yet not without Intervals, for we must Work, and Rest, by Turns. Not that the *Mind* is ever *Idle*; but still in a Constant Agitation of *Thought*, even when the *Body* is most at *Repose*: and all the *Motions* of it are apply'd either to the *deliberating*, and advising upon things *Honest*, and tending to a *good* and *happy life*; or upon the Acquiring of *Wisdom*, and *Knowledge*. And so much for *Prudence*, which is the *first Fountain* of *Virtue*.

Curiosity.

Justice and Liberality.

OF the *Other Three Virtues*, we find That to be of the largest extent, which directs the Ordering

dering of Men in *Society:* and in a kind of *Community* of Life. Of This, there are *Two parts*; *Justice*, which is the more *Glorious Virtue*, and entitles us to the very Name, and Character, of *Good men*; and *Beneficence*, which we may otherwise call *Liberality*, or *Bounty*. The first Duty of *Justice* is *This*; *That we hurt no man*, unless provoked to it by an *Injury*, and in our Own *Defence*. We are then to *distinguish* betwixt things *Common*, and *Particular*; and to use them accordingly: Not that any thing is *Private* in its *Own Nature*; but as it becomes so, either by *Ancient possession*, as *appropriated* by the *first Occupant*, or by *Conquest*, upon the right of *Arms*; or else by *Law*, *Agreement*, *Condition*, or *Lot*. From hence comes the Field *Arpinas*, to be called *Arpinatium*, and *Tusculanum*, to be called the Field of the *Tusculanes*; and in like manner is it of *Private Possessions*. Now since *Custom* and *Usage*, have rendred many things *Private*, which *Nature* made *Common*; let every man quietly enjoy his *Lot*; and be reputed an Enemy to the *Publique*, if he attempt any thing *beyond* it. But because (as *Plato* says singularly well) *we are not born for our selves alone, but for our Country, our Parents, and our Friends:* and with the *Stoiques*, that the *Earth*, and all the *Productions* of it, were Created for the Use of *Man*; and *Man* only for *Mans sake* begotten; that one might be helpful to another: What can we do better than to *follow*, where *Nature* is our *Guide?* To lay *Common Benefits* in *Common*; and by an *Intercourse* of *Good Offices*, as *Giving*; and *Receiving*; by *Arts*, *Industry*, and all our *Faculties*, to Incorporate *Mankind* into One *Society*.

The duties of Justice.

The bounds of it by the Civil Law.

Fidelity

THE Foundation of *Juſtice*, is *Faith*; That is to ſay, a *Firmneſs*, and *Truth* in our *Words*, *Promiſes*, and *Contracts*. The *Stoiques*, that are great *Etymologiſts*, will have *Fides* to be as much as *Fiat*. And that it is therefore called *Faith*, *quia fit quod dictum eſt*; becauſe that which is ſaid, is done. This may ſeem to be far fetch'd; but however we have taken the Freedom to apply it.

A forced Etymology of Fides.

Two ſorts of Injuſtice.

THERE are Two ſorts of *Injuſtice*: *One* is the *Immediate* doing of an *Injury*; and the *Other* is, the *not protecting*, or *defending* the *Injur'd perſon*; for ſo much as in us lies. For he that *Injuriouſly* offers Violence to any man, either in his *Rage*, or any other Paſſion whatſoever, may be taken to be in ſome degree, conſtructively, *a Murtherer*; and he that does not his beſt, to *ſave* his Neighbor from *harm*, and to keep off the *Blow*, is as well to blame (tho' not ſo much) as the Deſerter of his *Parents*, his *Friends*, his *Country*, or his *Companions*. Now there are many *Injuries* done us upon *Set purpoſe* to *hurt* us, which ariſe yet from Fear; as when he that watches to do another man miſchief, does it upon prevention, for fear the Other ſhould hurt him. But the greater Part of Injuries are done with a deſign to compaſs ſomething we have a mind to: wherein *Avarice* has a very great ſhare. As to the Matter of *Riches*, they are deſir'd, partly for our *Neceſſities*, and partly for our *Pleaſures*. The deſire of *Money* in *great Minds*, is to make an *Intereſt* by it: and to get into our Power, the means of obliging. It was the ſaying of *Craſſus*, that *He that would be Uppermoſt in a Commonwealth, could never have money enough, till he Was*

The injurious Aggreſſor.

And the Deſerter.

An injury out of fear.

Avarice.

Magnificence.

Ambition.

able

able to maintain an Army at his own Charge. There is a *pleasure* also, in a *Splendid*, and *Magnificent Appearance*; *Rich Furniture*; and Men take delight to live in *Reputation*, *Glory*, and *Plenty*: which begets an Insatiable Thirst of *Mony* to *maintain* it. And yet we are not forbidden to *advance*, or *encrease* our *Fortunes*; provided it be done without *wrong* to *Another*; and by *Fair means*. But men are apt to forget the *Rules*, and *Measures* of *Justice*, when they come once to be transported with the desire of *Empire*, *High Places*, and *Titles*. It goes a great way, that saying of *Ennius*, *There is no Faith, or Fellowship in Empire.* 'Tis a hard matter to preserve *Friendship*, and *Agreement*, in a Case where there are *many Competitors*, and but *one* can *succeed*: which manifestly appeared in that Tempest which *C. Cæsar* lately brought upon the Government: who confounded Heaven and Earth, and overturn'd all Laws Divine, and Humane, for the compassing of that Power which he vainly propounded to get wholly to himself. And great pity it is, that this inordinate desire of *Honor*, *Dominion*, *Power*, and *Glory*, does for the most part infest the most Famous Wits, and the largest Minds: so that an Error in this Case, is the more to be avoided. *Luxury.*

NOW in all *Injuries*, there is a great difference betwixt that which is done upon the *Sudden*, and in *Hot Bloud* (which is Commonly but Short, and Transient) and that which is done upon *fore thought*, and *Council*, for those in a *heat*, are much lighter than those upon *preparation*, and this shall suffice of *Injuries*, *offer'd*, or *done*. *Difference of injuries.*

NOW

Injuries of Omiſſion; and the Cauſes of them. Expence. Fear. Sloth. Buſ'neſs.

NOW why do we not *Protect* and *Defend* the *Oppreſſed*, but abandon our *Duties*; there may be ſeveral Reaſons. We are not willing to be at the *Charge*, or *Trouble*: we are loth to make *Enemies*; or it may be, we are *negligent*, *lazy*, *ſluggiſh*, taken up with *particular Studies*: or hinder'd by *Buſ'neſs*, and This makes us leave thoſe expos'd to Ruine, whom it is our Duty to preſerve. Wherefore we muſt take heed, not to reſt upon that which *Plato* obſerves of the *Philoſophers*: as if the *ſtudying* and *endeavoring* to find out the *Truth*, the *vilifying* and *deſpiſing* of the things that moſt Men vehemently *deſire*, and *quarrel about*, entitled them preſently to the Character of *Honeſt Men*: Not conſidering, that while they are ſo *juſt* on the *One ſide*, as to *wrong no Body*, *themſelves*: they are yet ſo *unjuſt*, on the *Other*, as to leave *Other people* to *do* it: And ſo rather than quit their *ſtudies*, they forſake their *Duties*, and their *Friends*, whom they ought to defend. And therefore (ſays he) they would have nothing to do with the *Community* it ſelf, if they were not compell'd by Force: A thing which ought rather to be done, by *Good Will*, and by *Choice*. For it is not the *Quality* of the *Act*, let it be never ſo *right*, but the *Intention* of it, that makes the *Virtue*. There are ſome, that either for *ſaving* of their *Own ſtake*, or out of an *Averſeneſs* even to dealing with *Mankind*, cry, *Let every Man look to his Own Buſ'neſs*; *I meddle with no Body*: And all this, to get the Reputation of *Harmleſs people*. Theſe Men, while they *ſhun One Injuſtice*, they fall into *Another*. For he that contributes neither *Study*, *Labor*, nor *Fortune*, to the *Publique*, is a *Deſer-*

ter

ter of the *Community*. Now these *Two sorts* of *Injuries* being laid down, together with the *Causes* of them; and having stated, beforehand the *Bounds* of *Justice*, it will be no hard matter to assign unto every *Person*, and *Occasion*, its *proper Duty*, if we be not over-partial to our selves: but in another bodies Case, it is quite Another matter: Although *Terence*'s *Chremes* will have every *Individual* to be concern'd in the *Common Interest* of *Mankind*: But yet being more sensible, and quicker sighted in our Own Concerns, than for the Good, or Evil that befals others; (which we look upon as more Remote) we pass upon the One, and the Other, (tho' in the very same Case) a quite Different Judgment. It is good advice therefore, to forbear coming to a *Resolution*, where we *doubt* whether the thing be *good* or *bad*. For the *Right* is as Clear as the *Sun*; but a *wavering* implies the *deliberation* of an *Injustice*.

Do nothing with doubting.

BUT it often falls out, that the same thing which at *one time* would become a Man of *Honour*, and *Justice*, would at *another time* not only vary, but prove the Clear *Contrary*. As the delivering up of a *Trust* to a *Mad man*; or keeping *promise* with him: nay in matters of *Faith*, and *Truth*, it is *just*, in some Cases to *deny*; and in others, not to keep *Touch*; for all must refer to those Fundamentals of *Justice* already propounded. As *First*, to *wrong* no Man; and *secondly*, in all Cases to consult the *Common Good*. So that the *Duty* is not always the *same*; but changes with the Occasion. Suppose such a Promise or Contract past, as if it were performed, would manifestly tend to the damage, either

Faith is not always to be kept.

The Duty changes with the Occasion.

of

of the Party promiſing, or of the perſon to whom the Promiſe was paſſed to have it perform'd. If *Neptune* (as it is in the *Fable*) had not made good his Promiſe to *Theſeus*, his Son *Hippolytus* had been ſav'd. The Story goes, that of *Three wiſhes*, the *Laſt* was in his *Paſſion* the *deſtruction* of *Hyppolitus*: and the *Grant* of that requeſt, caſt him into Inconſolable Sorrows. So that neither are we to *keep* thoſe *Promiſes* that are *unprofitable* to the *Promiſed*: or *more hurtful* to the *Promiſer*, than *advantageous* to the *Other*. Of *Two Evils*, we are to chuſe the *Leſs*: As if I promiſe to plead any mans Cauſe, and in the *Interim*, my Son falls dangerouſly Ill; it is no Breach of Faith, or Duty in me, not to appear, but rather the contrary: and it were yet worſe, in him to whom the Promiſe was made, to complain of ſuch a diſappointment. And now in matters where a man is under *Violence*, or over-aw'd by *Fear*, or *out-witted*, and *over-reach'd* by *Fraud*, every body knows that *Thoſe promiſes* are not *Binding*: many of them being diſcharg'd in Form, by the *Prætors* Court: and ſome by the very *Law it ſelf*.

Of Two Evils the Leſs.

Injuries of Fraud and Cavil.

THERE are ſeveral *Injuries*, that are meerly matter of *Cavil*, and only advantages taken, by a *Crafty* and *malitious Interpretation* of the *Law*. From whence comes that ſaying, *Extreme Right, is Extreme wrong*. The Proverb is now worn Threed bear. Of This Sort, there have been many Practices, even upon a Publique Score: One agreed upon a *Truce* with the Enemy for 30 *days*, and afterward made Incurſions upon him, and deſtroyed his Country by *night*: becauſe the Ceſſation was for *days*, not

not *nights*. Neither can I justifie our Countryman, if it be true: *Q. Fabius Labeo*, or some body else (for I have it only upon *Hearsay*) was by the Senate Constituted *Arbitrator* of the *Boundaries* of *Nola* and *Naples*. When he came to the place, he took the Commissioners apart, and advised them in private, not to do any thing greedily, or to press too much; but rather to abate of their Pretensions, than to demand more: and prevailed so far upon them, that there was a good space of ground left betwixt them; so that when they had marked out their Bounds, according to Agreement, that which was left in the middle, was adjudg'd to the *Romans*. This was rather a *Cheat* than a *Judgment*; and this Indirect, and Crafty way of Imposing, should be avoided in all Cases. There are certain *Duties* to be observ'd also, even to those that do us the greatest *wrong*; for there must be a *Meane* in the very *Punishment*, and *Revenge*: and I do not know, whether it may be sufficient, for the *Aggressor* barely to *Repent* of his Injury, without some *Penalty* over and above: both for his *Own Amendment*, and the *Terror*, and *Example* of *Others*.

The Rules of War.

THE Laws of *War*, among all Nations, should be strictly and Punctually observ'd. For since there are but *Two ways* of *Contending*, the *One*, by *Dispute*, the *Other*, by *Force*; the *One*, *Humane*, and the *Other Brutal*: we must of necessity have recourse to the *Latter*, where the *former* will not take place. Wherefore the end of *War* is to secure our selves from *Violence*, in a state of *Peace*: and, in case of *Victory*, we should preserve those that behaved themselves

The End of War

The Roman Generosity to their Enemies.

ſelves with *Honor*, and *Generoſity* in the *Action* of the *War*: As our Anceſtors receiv'd into the very *Priviledges* of the *City*, the *Tuſculans*, the *Æqui*, the *Volſci*, the *Sabines*, the *Hernici*: but *Carthage*, and *Numantia*, they wholly *ras'd*. I could wiſh they had ſpar'd *Corinth*: but they had a reſpect, I ſuppoſe, to the ſtrength, and ſituation of the Place, and ſo deſtroy'd it: that for the future it might not, ſome time or other, prove an Encouragement to a Revolt. In my Opinion, *Peace* ſhould be always conſulted, where it may be had without *Treachery*: and if my advice had been hearkned to in This matter, we might yet at this day, have had *ſome* ſort of a *Republique*, though not the Beſt; whereas now we have juſt none at all. We ſhould provide likewiſe, not only for thoſe that are *Overcome* in the *Field*, but for thoſe alſo that threw down their Arms, and caſt themſelves upon the Faith of the General. Nay I would have an Enemy receiv'd, even after the *Battery* is begun, and the *Breach* made; In which point, we have been ſo ſcrupulouſly Juſt, that according to the Cuſtom of our Predeceſſors, thoſe that took Cities, or Nations, conquer'd in War, into the *Roman Allegeance*, were made *Patrons*, and *Protectors* of what they took. And the Rights of *War* are ſet forth with exact ſolemnity in the Proviſions of the *Fœcial Law*; wherein we are given to underſtand that no *War* can be *Juſt*, and *Warrantable*, unleſs it be grounded upon ſome matter of *Claim*, or *denounced* beforehand, by *Proclamation*. *Pompilius* the (General) held a Province: and a Son of *Cato*'s liſted himſelf a Soldier under his Command. *Pompilius*, finding it convenient to diſcharge *one Legion*, *Cato*'s Son

And to thoſe that yielded.

Upon what Terms to undertake a War.

A Conſcientious inſtance.

Son serving in *That Legion*, was also dismist; but he continuing still in the Army, out of a love of action, his Father wrote a Letter to *Pompilius*, *Requesting him, that if his Son continu'd with him in Arms, he would give him the* Military Oath, over again, *because his former Sacrament being dissolv'd, he could not otherwise justifie his putting himself into the Quarrel.* Such was the Reverence they bare, even to the *Conscience* of *making War!* There is extant, an *Epistle* of *Marcus Cato* the *Elder*, to his Son *Marcus*, when he was a Soldier in *Macedonia*, in the *Persian War*. Wherein he tells his Son, that *he heard the Consul had dismist him; and charges him not to engage in any Combat, as a thing unlawful for him, that was no longer a Soldier to fight an Enemy.* It is remarkable, the changing of the word *Perduellis* (a *publique Enemy*) into *Hostis*; to sweeten the Foulness of the Thing, by the softness of the Term. For *Hostis* (with our Forefathers) was as much as *Peregrinus*, (a Stranger) as appears by the *Twelve Tables*. *Aut status dies cum Hoste.* And then, *Adversus Hostem Æterna Authoritas.* What can be Gentler, than to Treat an Enemy in this easie Language? Although *Custom*, I must confess, has made it *harsher*, by transferring the signification of it, from That of a *Stranger*, to the proper Denomination of one that *bears Arms against us*. Nay in the Case of a War for *Honor*, or *Dominion*, there must yet be the same *Causes*, and *Grounds* beforementioned, to make it Just: but still all Contests of This kind must give fairer Quarter: for (as in *ordinary differences*) we distinguish betwixt an *Enemy* and a *Rival*, our *Title*, and *Dignity* lies at Stake in the *One Case*; but

but our *Life* and *Reputation*, in the *other*. The War we had with the *Celtibe i*, and the *Cimbri* (the *Spaniards*, and *Danes*) was a War of *Enmity*: and the queſtion was not, who ſhould *Govern*, but who ſhould *Live*. With the *Latines*, the *Sabines*, the *Samnites*, the *Carthaginians*: and with *Pyrrhus*, the quarrel was *Empire*. The *Carthaginians* were *perfidious*; *Hannibal* was *cruel*; but the Reſt more Honourable. It was a Glorious Declaration, that of *Pyrrhus*, about the diſcharge of ſome Priſoners, as we find it in *Ennius*.

A Brave Reſolution of Pyrrhus

Let Mercenaries Truck, *and Treat for Gold*;
Honour's a thing not to be Bought or Sold.
Courage *and* Steel *muſt end this Glorious Strife*:
And in the Caſe of Victory, *or Life*,
Fortune's the Judge. We'll take the Chance of War:
And what Brave man ſoever ſhe ſhall ſpare
With Life; *depend upon't*; *I'll ſet him* Free:
Let him but Own the Gift, to the Great Gods, and Me.

This was a Royal Speech, and Reſolution, and well becoming the Bloud of *Æacus*.

Faith muſt be kept with an Enemy. A noble example of Regulus.

BUT even in the Caſe of a private promiſe: and upon what pinch, or neceſſity ſoever; Faith is yet to be kept, even with an Enemy. When *Regulus* was taken Priſoner in the firſt *Punique War*, and ſent to *Rome* to ſolicite the exchange of ſome Priſoners, upon his Oath to return: ſo ſoon as ever he came There, he adviſed the Senate againſt himſelf;

himself; and that they should not agree to the *Exchange*. His Friends, and Relations prest him extremely against going back again; but he chose rather to return to the Torture, than to stay and break his Faith to an Enemy. In the *second Punique War*, after the Battel of *Canne*, *Hannibal* sent ten Prisoners to *Rome*, under an Oath of returning; unless they could obtain the Liberty of such and such Prisoners in Exchange. They were no sooner out of the Camp, by *Hannibal*'s permission, but one of them found out a shift to evade the Oath: and presently went back under colour of something left behind him, and then returning, went his way, as if the Obligation of the Oath had been discharg'd. And so it was in *Words*, but not in *Effect*: for in all *promises*, the *Intention* is to be consider'd, not the *Letter*. The *Censor* set a Fine during life, upon all their Heads that were forsworn: and upon His, among the rest, that invented this *shift*. But the more Generous Instance of *Justice* to an *Enemy*, was that of our Ancestors in the Case of *Pyrrhus*: There was a Fugitive that made a Proposal to the Senate, for the Poysoning and dispatching of *Pyrrhus*: but the *Senate*, and *Fabritius* deliver'd up the Traitor to his Master: Such was the detestation they had for Treachery, that they would not make use of it, tho' to the destruction of a Powerful and an Invading Enemy. And so much for *Military Duties*.

A glorious piece of Justice.

The Romans *a generous Enemy.*

WE must not forget neither, that toward the meanest of men also, there is a Justice to be observ'd; even in the Condition, and Fortune of Slaves: and it is good Counsel, to advise the using of them as *Hirelings*: and for their *Work*;

Of Justice to Inferiors.

to allow them their *Reward*. Now there are *Two ways* of doing a man an *Injury*: the *one* is by *Force*, the *other* by *Fraud*. The *One* is the quality of the *Fox*, the *Other* of the *Lion*. They are neither of them proper for a *Man*: but yet *Fraud* is the more *Odious* of the Two, and *of all Injuſtices, That is the moſt Abominable, and Capital, which impoſes upon us, under the colour of* Kindneſs *and* Good meaning: and this ſhall ſuffice for *Juſtice*.

Of Liberality.

TO purſue my purpoſe, I ſhall now handle the Point of *Liberality*, or *Bounty*: than which there is nothing more accommodate to the Nature of man: But it falls under many Limitations.

How to give, How much and to Whom.

It ſhould be our *firſt* Care to ſee, that what we *Give*, may not be to the diſadvantage of the perſon we would *oblige*, or of any other body: and that it be not above our *Proportion*. *Secondly*, that it be ſuited to the *Dignity* of the *Receiver*, for This is the Foundation of Juſtice, to which all the Circumſtances of it are to be referr'd. He that pretends to gratifie any man with that which is rather to his *damage*, than to his *Benefit*, is ſo far from deſerving the Reputation of being *Liberal*, or *Bountiful*, that he is to be accounted as the moſt pernicious of Flatterers. And Thoſe alſo that Rob one man, to give to another, are guilty of the ſame Injuſtice, with them, that take Mony out of their Neighbours Pockets, to put into their Own. There are many people that look big, and ſet up for men of Honor, that yet have this humour of *taking* from *one*, and *giving* to *another*; and reckon upon it, as a high piece of *Bounty*, if they can but advance the Fortunes of a Friend, upon what

Terms

Terms soever. But This is so far from a *Good Office*, that it is the clear *Contrary*. Let us therefore so govern our Favours, that we may oblige those we love, and yet hurt no body. Shall we call it *Liberality*, in *L. Sylla*, and *C. Cæsar*, the Translation of so many Estates from the Right Owners, into the possession of Strangers? There can be no *Liberality* in a Case of *Injustice*. The *Second Caution* is the keeping of our Bounty within *Compass*: and not to *give* beyond our *Ability*: for they that extend their Kindnesses beyond this Measure, wrong their Relations, by transferring those Bounties to *Strangers*, which they should rather have communicated, or left to their *Friends*. This humour of *Liberality*, is commonly accompanied with a certain *Greediness*, that makes no Scruple of getting any thing, though by *Rapine*, or Injury, so they may but have wherewithal to supply a mistaken Bounty. Nay, there are many that give largely, merely to be *Thought Bountiful*; and This, only upon a Score of Vanity, without any Frankness of Heart; which is rather a flash of *Ostentation*, than an act of *Gentility*, and *Virtue*. The *third Caution* is, the making Choice of a worthy Person: wherein we should consider the *Morals* of the Man that we would oblige; his particular disposition towards us; our entercourse with him in a Community, and Society of Life, and the good Offices he hath already done us. It would be well, if we could find a Concurrence of all these: but if not, the more Inducements we have, and the greater they are, the more is their weight,

Whom to Oblige.

Give in Proportion

Consider the intent of the Giver.

Th: Choice of the Person.

There is no Stoical Perfection.

HOWBEIT, since we do not live with Men absolutely *Perfect*, either for *Virtue*, or *Wisdom*; but with those that acquit themselves very well, if they can but arrive at some faint resemblances of Virtue: let This be also taken into Consideration, that no Man whatsoever is to be neglected, in whom there appears the least sign or Glimmering of Goodness. But still we are to set the greatest Value upon him, that we find best endow'd with the soft, and gentle Virtues of *Modesty*, *Temperance*, and that *Justice*, of which we have already spoken at large. For a *Bold*, and *Manly Courage*, in a Man that is neither *Good*, nor *Wise*; is commonly more *forward*, and *eager*, perhaps, than is *Convenient*. The *Other* are more properly the Virtues of a *Good Man*. And so much for our *Manners*.

Whom to value most.

How to return Benefits.

TOUCHING the *Good Will* that any Man bears us: it is, *First*, our Duty to do *much Good*, where we are *much Belov'd*: but then we are not to express that Affection, in a Childish Ardour, and Fondness of Passion: but in a Constancy, and Firmness of Mind.

Benefits to be repaid with interest.

IN the Case of an *Antecedent Merit*, where we are not now to *Enter* into an *Obligation*, but to *Acknowledge*, and *Requite* it: there must be a more than Ordinary Care taken. For *Gratitude is the most Indispensable of all Duties*. If *Hesiod* bids us, *Restore what we borrow*; *if we can, in a Larger Measure*: what ought we to do in the Case of a *Prior Obligation*? Are we not to imitate Fruitful Lands, that still Return more

more than they Receiv'd? We are ready enough to oblige those that we hope to be the better for hereafter. How should we behave our selves then, toward such as we are the Better for already? Since so it is, that there are *two sorts* of *Liberality*, the *One*, of *Bestowing* a Benefit, and the *Other* of *Returning* it: it is at our Choice, whether we will *Give*, or no: But an Honest Man is not at Liberty in the point of *Returning* it: provided that it may be done without Injury. And yet we are to distinguish also betwixt *Benefits Receiv'd*: and the *Greater* the *Benefit*, the *Greater* is the *Obligation*. Now the *Obligation* is to be valu'd according to the *Mind*, the *Intention*, and *Good Will* of the *Giver*: For many People do many things *rashly*, without either *Judgment*, or *Measure*. They Squander away their Donatives, indifferently upon all; carry'd on by sodain, and impetuous Passions, as if they were driven by the Wind. Now these Benefits are not so much to be esteem'd, as those that are conferr'd with Steadiness, and Consideration. As to the Placing of our Bounties, and Returning of Acknowledgments, (supposing other things to be Equal) it is our Duty to help him *First*, that is most in *Want*; tho' most People do the Contrary. For they are there most Officious, to offer their Service, where they hope for most again; tho' in cases, where their help was not at all needful.

Rash Bounties.

Whom to Requite first.

FOR the Preservation of *Society*, and good Correspondence among Men, we should do well to proportion our *Bounties* to our *Relations*: and to give *most* to those that are *our nearest Friends*. But for those principles of Nature,

which regard *Communities*, and *Humane Society*, they must be fetch'd higher; as the First thing that we take notice of in the Fellowship of Mankind. *Reason*, and *Speech* are the Bond of it; which, by *Teaching*, *Learning*, *Communicating*, *Disputing*, and *Judging*, accommodate one Man to another, and cement the whole *Body* into a kind of *Natural Community*. Nor is there any thing wherein we are further remov'd from Beasts, than in this Advantage of Society. It is usual for us to speak of *Courage*, and *Boldness*, in *Lions* and *Horses*, but we hear nothing of either *Justice*, *Equity*, or *Goodness* in them: and the business is, that they have neither *Speech*, nor *Reason*. This Society of *one* Man with *another*, and of *All* with *All*: This *Society*, (I say,) *General* and *Particular*, is of a large extent: and herein there must be a Community preserved, of all those things which Nature hath brought forth, for the Common Use of Men; provided always, that such things as are limited by Laws, and Civil Ordinances, may be observed according to the Constitution. As to the rest, they may be reduc'd to the *Greek Proverb*, *Friends have all things in Common*. Now all those things that Men hold in *Community*, are such, as *Ennius* having laid down in One Instance, may be apply'd to Many.

Reason and Speech are the Bond of Humane Society.

To put a Wandring Traveller in's Way,
Is but to light One Candle with Another;
T've ne're the less, for what I Give----

FROM this one Case we may learn, that whatsoever we may part with to another, without any Damage to our selves, it is our Duty to

Benefits in Common.

to Give, or to Lend Freely, tho' to a Stranger. Of this sort, we reckon many things to be in *Common*; as *Water from a River, Fire from Fire, Good Counsel to a Man that is in doubt, or distress.* All these things are profitable to the *Receiver*, without any loss, or burthen to the *Giver*. So that we may both use these things our selves, and yet be still contributing of somewhat to the Common good. But in regard that particular persons have not much to Give, and the Number of those that want, is almost infinite; Common Liberality must have a respect to that End of *Ennius*. We must keep wherewithal to give Light to our selves, that we may have the Means of being bountiful to our own.

Degrees of Communities.

TO descend now from *Humane Society* in the *Latitude*, of which there are many degrees; there is a nearer Bond yet, betwixt people of the same *Province*, the same *Nation*, and the same *Language:* And it is yet stricter, betwixt Men of the same *City:* For among Citizens, there are many things in Common: As Courts of Justice, Temples, Walks, Ways, Lanes, Customs, Judgments, Suffrages; beside frequent Meetings, and Familiarities, Common Bus'ness, Commerce, and Contract. And there is yet a nearer Tye; and That is the Society of Kindred, which is Contracted into a narrow place, apart from the vast Society of Mankind. It is by Nature, Common to all living Creatures, the appetite of producing the Kind: And the First Society is in Wedlock, the next, in Children; it comes then to a Family, and a Community of all things. And this is the Original of a City, and as it were the Seminary of a Commonwealth. The Rela-

Common Privileges.

Marriage, Children, Families.

tion of Brothers comes next; and after That, of Brothers, and Sisters Children; who, when they are too many for One House, are transplanted into Others, as into Colonies. And then follow Matches, and Alliances, with increase of Kindred: and their Off-spring is the Beginning of a Commonwealth. There is no doubt but Relation of Bloud, and the Kindness that arises from it, must necessarily endear Men to one another. For it is a great matter to have the same Pedigree: to exercise the same Religion, and to deposite their Ashes in Common Sepulchres:

Kindred.

Friendship.

But of all Associations, there is none so Firm, none so Noble, as when Virtuous Men are link'd together by a Correspondency of Manners, and a Freedom of Conversation. For such is the Charm of That Honesty which we have often spoken of, that the very Encounter of it moves us, tho' in a Stranger, and makes us Friends to the Possessor of it, where ever we find it. Now th'o all Virtue whatsoever, is of it self, Amiable, and Attractive; insomuch that we cannot but have an Esteem for those that we find possess'd of it; yet *Justice* and *Liberality* gain upon us in a higher degree. But there is nothing more Lovely, or more Engaging, than a *Conformity* and *Agreement* of *Good Manners*. For where there are the same Inclinations, the same Desires, and the same Will, the one cannot chuse but be delighted with the other, as with its proper self: and it effects that which *Pythagoras* requires in Friendship: the making *one*, of *many*. And it is a great Obligation that is created by the reciprocation of Benefits, that pass Forward and Backward, in Exchange: which being mutual, and grateful; must needs, upon the *Enter-*

Similitude of manners.

Exchange of Benefits.

course

course, produce firm and extraordinary Friendship. But when ye shall have lookt over all the Ties in Nature, as far as your Mind, and your Reason can carry you: you will find nothing dearer, no Obligation of greater importance, than that by which we are every one of us Ty'd to the *Commonwealth*. Our *Parents*, *Children*, *Kindred*, *Acquaintance*, are all dear to us; but *our single Country* is more than *all the Rest*: and every honest man is ready to lay down his life for the advantage of that sacred Interest. How execrable then is the barbarous Impiety of those people, that have torn their Country to pieces, by all sorts of Villany: and who not only have been, but are at this instant, conspiring the destruction of it, by a final desolation? But if there should be any dispute or Comparison, where to pay our duty, in the first place, our *Country* and our *Parents* are the *Principals*; to whose Benefits we are the most *Oblig'd*. Our *Children* and our *Families* are next: as depending upon us alone, without any other Retreat: After *These*, our *Friends* and *Relations*: which are commonly of our own Rank, and Condition. Wherefore we owe the necessary helps of Life to these beforementioned: But for Conversation, Table-Society, Counsels, Exhortations, Consolations, and (upon Occasion) Reproofs: These things are found most amongst Friends: and let me tell you over again: *The pleasantest Friendship is That, which is contracted by a Similitude of Manners.*

Our Duty to our Country.

Our Kindred and Friends.

NOW in the Exercise of all these Duties, we should observe what every man has most need of; and what with our help, he may, and what without

out our help, he cannot attain: and in some cases there is a respect to be had to *Times*, and *Occasions*, even before *Relations*: There are some Offices that we should rather pay to *our*, than to *another*: as I would sooner help a *Neighbour* in with his *Harvest*, than either a *Brother*, or *Familiar Acquaintance*: but in a *Suit of Law*, I'll defend my *Kinsman*, or my *Friend*, before my *Neighbour*. Wherefore these Circumstances, and the like, should be duly consider'd in all Offices. By Custom, and Exercise, we shall become good Accountants: For it is by *Adding*, and *Substracting*, that we come to know *what Remains*: and consequently, in all Cases, the Bounds, and Limits of our Duty: But as neither Physicians, nor Commanders, nor Orators, tho' never so well instructed in the Rules of their Profession, shall ever be able, without Use, and Practice, to make themselves Eminently famous; to the same end, are the Precepts of Humane Duties deliver'd us, that we should put them in exercise: but yet the difficulty, and condition of the thing does over and above require it. Now in what manner that Virtue is deriv'd, and whence that Duty arises, which falls under the Consideration of *Sociable Rights*, and *Common Justice*; we have almost said enough already.

Duties vary with Circumstances.

IN the propounding of *Four general Heads*, from whence all Virtues, and Duties flow; That which is done with a Noble, and Exalted Mind; a Mind advanced to the Contempt of Fortune, and Wordly things: that Virtue, I say, ought to be reputed the most Glorious: and therefore that Reproach of *Ennius*'s is always at hand upon Occasion:

Magnanimity.

Young

Young Men, *in* shew, *but* Wenches, *in your* Hearts:

While Clælia *plays the* Brave, *and acts your* Parts.

You're for Exploits that cost no Sweat, nor Blood, &c.

And on the other side, with what Transport and Rapture do we extol the humor of Brave and Generous Actions? From hence comes that Field of the Rhetoricians, upon *Marathon*, *Salamis*, *Platæa*, *Thermopilæ*, *Leuctra*, *Stratoclea*; and from hence it is, that our *Cocles*, the *Decii*, the two *Scipio*'s, *Marcellus*, and a World of others, especially the *Romans* themselves, are grown so famous, for the greatness of their Minds. And their ambition of Military honour, may appear in This, that almost all the Statues they have left us, are dress'd up in Armour.

AND yet that Elevation of Courage which is seen in Hazzards, and Adventures, unless accompanied with Justice, and contending rather for the Publique, than for it self: That Courage (I say) is so far from being a virtue, that it is a Fault, and a brutal Ferity, inconsistent with the Tenderness of humane nature. Wherefore the *Stoiques* have well defin'd it, in calling *Courage*, *a Virtue contending for Equity.* Nor did any man ever gain the Reputation of *True Valour*, by *Treachery*, or *Malice.* Nothing can be *Honest*, but what is Just: and therefore it was notably said of *Plato*. *As that knowledge* (says he) *which is divided from* Justice, *is rather* Craft, *than* Wisdom; *so That* Courage, *which is* Bold, *and* Adventurous, *is rather* Temerity, *and* Fool-hardiness, *than* Valour: *if it be*

Ferosity.

Courage defined.

be carryed on by Paſſion, *or* Intereſt, *rather than for a* Common Good. Wherefore all Men of Valour, and great Undertakings, ſhould be likewiſe Men of Goodneſs, Simplicity, Candor, and Friends of *Truth*: which are all Inſeparable from Juſtice. But the Miſchief is, that this Tumour, and Elation of Mind, breaks out many times into a *Pertinacy*, and an ambitious deſire of *Rule*. For as *Plato* has it, the *Lacedemonians* were Naturally inflam'd with an Ardent deſire of Overcoming. So that whoſoever has the greateſt Soul, is the moſt addicted to aſpiring Thoughts: And to ſet himſelf above all; or in Truth rather to ſtand Alone. It is a very hard matter, for a Man to obſerve the Tenor of *True Equity* (which peculiarly belongs to Juſtice) in the Inordinate Appetite of *Superiority*, and *Dominion*. From whence it comes to paſs, that ſuch men will not be govern'd, either by *Reaſon*, or any *Publique*, and *Lawful Conſtitution*. This humour ſtarts Factions in a Commonwealth, that work by Bribery, and Corruption, to advance their Power, and their Fortunes: whoſe buſineſs it is, rather to make themſelves Greater, by *Violence*, than to keep themſelves in a Station of *Equality* by *Juſtice*. But the harder any thing is, the fairer it is: nor is there any Time, or Seaſon, that can diſpenſe a man from Juſtice. Wherefore Thoſe are Truly *Brave*, and *Magnanimous*, that *keep off* an *Injury*, not Thoſe that *offer* it. He that is truly *Wiſe*, and *Stout*, places That Virtue which is moſt conſonant to Nature, in *Action*, and not in *Glory*: and in *making* himſelf more Conſiderable than other men, rather than *appearing* ſo. No man can be ſaid to be truly *Heroique*, that depends, for his Reputation,

Pertinacy and Ambition.

tion, upon the Opinion of the Multitude. But every man the higher his Stomach is, and the greater his Thirst of Honour, the more easily is he transported to do unjust things. He stands upon a slippery place: For where is the Man, who after all his hazzards, and Travels, does not desire, and expect *Glory*, as a reward of his Adventures?

True Magnanimity.

YOU shall know a man of *Generosity*, and *Courage*, chiefly by these *two Marques*. First, he despises *outward things*, upon an Opinion that a man should not admire, wish for, or desire any thing but what is Becoming and Honest; nor subject himself to any Person, Passion, or Fortune. The *Other* is a disposition of Mind (as is said before) that spurs a man to attempt things *Great* and *Profitable*; but *difficult*, *laborious*, and *dangerous*, as well in the matter of Life it self, as in other Conveniencies that belong to't. All the *Splendor*, and *Reputation* (and let me say, the *Profit* also) of These two Things rests in the *Latter*: but the *Cause*, and the *Motive* is in the *Former*: For There is the Rise, and Spring of great Resolves, that carry men even above the Consideration of any thing that is below. The thing it self is seen in *Two particulars*: *First* in Judging That only to be *Good* which is *Honest*; and, *Secondly*, in a *Freedom* of the Mind from all *Perturbations*. For it must be confest to be the part of a Brave and Generous Mind, to look upon Those, as Little Things, which many Account to be Great, and Glorious; and to Contemn them, upon the Foundation of a firm, and setled Judgment. It is likewise the part of a Constant, and Invincible Mind, so to bear all

sorts

ſorts of Calamity, and Affliction, as neither to depart from the Order of Nature, nor to deſcend below the Dignities of a Wiſe man. How Incongruous is it for a man that ſtands the ſhock of *Danger*, to be broken with *Luſt*? or to endure the Fatigue of *Labour*; and then to be overcome with *Pleaſure*? This muſt therefore be avoided, and ſo muſt the greedy deſire of *Mony*. There

Contempt of Mony.

is not a greater Argument of a Narrow, and Wretched Mind, than to dote upon *Self*: Nothing more humane, and honourable, than to deſpiſe it, if we have it not; and to employ it generouſly, and do good with it, if we have it. And ſo for the Affectation of *Glory*: We muſt

Affectation of Glory.

beware of it (as is ſaid already) for it bars a man of his *Liberty*; which a Brave Man will rather dye, than part with. We ſhould not be ſolicitous neither for *Power*; which in ſome Caſes we ſhould not receive, and in others, we ſhould lay down. We muſt deliver our ſelves from all diſorders of mind; either by *Fear* or *Appetite*, and likewiſe from all *Sowrneſs*, and *Tranſport*, either of *delight*, or of *Wrath*: that we may be Calm, and ſecure: In which State, we ſhall find both Steadineſs, and Credit. There are at this day, and there have been many, that to gain this Repoſe, have wholly withdrawn themſelves from

A Retired Life.

Publique Buſineſs: Among theſe, the nobleſt, and moſt eminent of Philoſophers; and men truly, of great Severity, and Weight; who could neither endure the People, nor Government: and ſo retired into Deſerts, and Retreats, to live privately with Themſelves. And theſe men, in this Receſs, had the ſame Deſign with Princes (whoſe privilege is to live as they liſt) that they might want nothing, but enjoy their

Free-

Freedom, without Controll. Wherefore, since both Those that affect Power, and the other Idle people that I speak of, aim at the same thing; and have This in common betwixt them; the One thinks they may Gain their End, if they had but ample Fortunes: and the Other, Theirs, if they can but be content with their Own, and with a Little: They may be Both, (for ought I know) in some measure, in the Right. But it must yet be allowed, that a Private, and Retir'd Life, is both Easier and Safer: And less Importune, and Troublesome to Others. But the life of Those that apply themselves to Publique business, is more profitable to Mankind: and more conducing to the Acquisition of Honour, and Reputation in the World. Wherefore there is something to be said for those Excellent Wits that dedicate themselves to Letters; without medling in Publique affairs: and also for such Others, as either for want of Health, or perhaps some more powerful Impediment, have quitted their publique Stations, being well satisfi'd, that others should enjoy the Power and the Credit of the Employment. But for those that have none of this Pretence, to talk of despising Government, and Offices, which most people have in great estimation; I do not only, not approve of them, but take them to be much to blame. Not that I disallow of their Judgment, in the little Consideration they seem to have for Glory; but because they are manifestly afraid of the Labours, Troubles, Repulses, and Displeasures that they are to encounter. For there are many that behave themselves *Unequally* in *Contrary Cases*: Severe Contemners of *Pleasure*, but they sink under *Pain*; Regardless of *Fame*, but dejected with

with *Scandal*. Nor are they Steady, even in these very cases: But for those that are by nature, fitted and qualified for civil business; I should advise These people to apply themselves to it without delay: and to take some Commission in the Government. For This is Necessary, both as to Publique Administration; and to shew the Greatness of the Mind. And publique Officers, as much perhaps, as Philosophers themselves, (if not more) should be affected with a general disdain of External things, (as I have often said) and stated in an Immoveable Tranquillity, and security of Mind; which will deliver them from all Anxiety for things to come; and establish them in a life of Constancy, and Honour. Now this Point is by so much easier, for a Philosopher to gain, by how much his Life is less expos'd to the Stroke of Fortune: For there are not many things that he stands in need of: beside, that in case of any disaster, his Fall is not so dangerous. It is but reasonable therefore to conclude, that Men in Great and Publique places, are exposed to greater perturbations of Thought, than those that live in privacy and Repose. So that a greater Stock of courage is there necessary, and a Mind at Liberty from Trouble, and care. But for him that puts himself into *Business*; let him first consider the *Honesty* of the Employment; and then, his Own *Abilities*, to go thorough with it. Wherein let him neither rashly despair, out of heartlessness, and sloth: nor be over-confident neither, in the Opinion of himself. But in all matters of Business, a man should diligently prepare himself before he goes about it.

BUT

BUT since most Men take *Military Charges* to be of a greater Consideration than *Civil*, This Opinion should be a little qualifi'd; For 'tis a very Common thing for men to apply themselves to that course of Life, out of an Itch of *Glory*; and this happens most frequently in Men of *large Souls*, and *Abilities*: Especially where the *Genius* lies that way, and the *Disposition* carries them to the Profession of *Arms*. But if we would deal impartially, there have been Greater and more Glorious things done in the *Senate*, than in the *Field*: for although *Themistocles* be worthy of all honour, and his Name, and Memory more Illustrious than that of *Solon*; *Salamis* being still mentioned as a Memorial of his noble Victory over *Xerxes*, which is still preferr'd before the Counsel of *Solon*, for the Institution of the *Areopagites*. This must not at all give way to That: For the *One* did *once*, deliver, preserve, and help the City; but the *Other* will *ever* do it. This Council preserves the Law of *Athens*, and Constitutions of their Ancestors. *Themistocles* cannot say that ever he help'd *Areopagus*, but the other may truly boast of serving *Themistocles*. For *Solon* was the Founder of That Senate which manag'd the War: And so for *Pausanias*, and *Lysander*. It is true, that their Actions, and Conduct, enlarg'd the Territories of the *Lacedemonians*; and yet the Laws of *Licurgus*, are Incomparably to be preferr'd. Nay, and upon That very Consideration, their Armies were both *Readier* and *Bolder*. It was my Opinion, even when I was a Boy, that *Marcus Scaurus* was not inferiour to *Caius Marius*; and when I came afterwards into Publique Business;

A Comparison of Military Virtues with Civil.

I lookt upon Q. *Catulus* not one jot below *Cneius Pompeius*. For what signifie *Armies, Abroad*, without *Counsel at home?* Neither did *Africanus* (tho' an Excellent *Man*, as well as a great *Captain*) do the Common-wealth a Nobler Service in the Rasing of *Numantia*, than *Pub. Nasica* (a private Man) did at the same time, in cutting off *Tiberius Gracchus*. Now this Instance is not purely *Civil*; but in some respect *Military*, because it was done by a *Violent hand*: But still it was done by a *Civil Council*, and without an *Army*. It was a memorable saying of mine, that is so often cast in my Teeth, by a sort of Malicious, and Envious people.

Let Swordmen *to the* Gown *give place,*
And Crown the Orator *with Bayes.*

To pass over other Instances. Did not the *Sword* give place to the *Gown*, when the Commonwealth was under *My Administration?* Never was there a more malicious Conspiracy; and yet by the Influence of our Diligence, and Counsel, how quickly was it crush'd? Insomuch that the very Arms themselves fell out of the hands of the most Audacious of the Mutineers. When was there ever any Action done in the *Field*, or any Triumph Comparable to it? This Boast, to You, my Son, that are to inherit the honour of my Actions, and to whom I would recommend the Imitation of them; This Boast, to You, (I say) may be allowed me. Nor is it any more than *Cn. Pompey* (a Man laden with Military honours) ascribed to me in a full Audience. *My Third Triumph* (says he)

he) *would have been to little purpose, if* Cicero, *by preserving the* Commonwealth, *had not left me a place wherein to* Triumph. So that *Domestique*, and *Civil Resolution*, is not Inferiour to *Military*. And it requires more Pain, and Study, to be emplo'd upon it. That Virtue without dispute, which we look for from a High, and Illustrious Mind, is acquired by the Force of the Soul, not of the Body. And yet the Body is still to be kept in Exercise; and so affected, as to obey the Dictates of Counsel and Reason, in the dispatch of Business, and in the bearing of Toil. But the *honesty* here in question is wholly plac'd in the Care and Consideration of the Mind: wherein the Men of the *Robe*, in *Civil Administration*, bring no less advantage to the *Publique*, than Those that bear *Arms*: For War is many times, either not begun, or otherwise finish'd, by their Advice: Nay, and some brought on too: as the *Third Punique War* of *M. Cato* was: where his Authority prevail'd, even when he was dead. Wherefore the Faculty of *Determining*, is more desirable than that of *Contending*. Always provided that we steer not our Course rather by an *Aversion* to *War*, than a *Consideration* to *Benefit*. In the Undertaking of a War there should be such a prospect, as if the Only end of it were *Peace*. It is the part of a Valiant and Resolute Man, not to be discomposed in disasters, or to make a bustle, and be put beside himself; but to maintain a presence of Mind, and Judgment, without departing from Reason. As this is the Marque and Effect of a great Courage: so is the other, of an Excellent understanding, to forecast in our Thoughts the Events of things to come: and to weigh before-

hand the Good and the Bad; and what's to be done when it happens, without being put to the fooliſh Exclamation of *who would have Thought it?* Theſe are the Works of an Elevated Soul, that ſupports it ſelf upon Prudence, and Judgment: but he that raſhly thruſts himſelf into Dangers without fear, or wit: and engages an Enemy hand over head: this is only Brutality, and Outrage: But yet when the time comes, and neceſſity requires it, let a man fight with his Sword in his hand, and rather loſe his Life, than his Honour and Freedom.

Clemency to the Conquer'd.

IN the Caſe of *Raſing* or *Demoliſhing* of *Cities* there ſhould be great care taken, that nothing be done either *Headily*, or *Cruelly*. It is the part of a Great man, in Publique Broyles, to puniſh the *Guilty*; but ſtill to ſpare the *Multitude*; and in all conditions, to adhere to that which is Right, and Honeſt.

Spare the multitude.

THERE are ſome that eſteem *Feats of Arms* above *Civil Adminiſtrations*: (as is aforeſaid) and there are Others that think it more eſtimable, to deal in *Dangerous*, and *Crafty*, than in *Quiet*, and *Conſiderate Counſels*. We muſt never in ſuch manner avoid *Dangers*, as to appear *Weak* and *faint-hearted*: And we muſt likewiſe have a care, on the other ſide, not to thruſt our ſelves into *Unneceſſary hazzards*: which is one of the greateſt Follies in the World. Wherefore in difficult caſes, we ſhould do like Phyſicians, that apply *Gentle Remedies* to *Gentle Diſeaſes*: but in caſes of *Extremity*, *a deſperate diſeaſe muſt have deſperate Cure.* None but a Mad man will wiſh for a Storm in fair Weather. But

Courage with Diſcretion.

it

it is yet the part of a Wise man, to weather it the best he can, if he falls into a Tempest. And the honour is so much the more, if the advantage of the success be greater than the Miscarriage.

Danger Publique and private.

ACTIONS are dangerous, partly to the *Undertakers*, and in part to the *Commonwealth*. Some run the hazzard of their Lives: Some of their Good names; and Others of the Love of the people: Now we should more frankly venture our selves, than the Publique: and more chearfully expose our selves for Honour, and Reputation, than for other Commodities. Some there are that make no scruple of hazzarding their Lives, and Fortunes in the defence of their *Country*; and yet are so nice and scrupulous in the matter of *Reputation*: that rather than run any risque of their *Honour*, they will leave their very *Country* in danger. As *Callicratidas* the *Lacedemonian General*, in the *Peloponnesian War*; after many glorious Exploits, ruin'd all at last, by not removing the Navy from the *Arginusæ*, and making his Retreat without giving the *Athenians* Battel, as he was advis'd to do; to which he made This answer, that *if the Lacedemonians lost one Fleet, they might set out another; but that if he quitted his Ground, his Honour was lost for ever.* But the *Lacedemonians* however might have born this Loss, whereas the Other Blow was mortal; when *Cleombrotus*, for fear of an Ill Report, unadvisedly engaged with *Epaminondas*, where the whole power of the *Lacedemonians* was cut off at a Blow. How much better now was the conduct of *Q. Fabius Maximus*, of whom *Ennius*,

A mistake in point of Honour.

Fabius *was* ſlow, *but* ſure, *and his Delay*
Reſtor'd the tottering State. Now 'twas his way
To mind his Bus'neſs, *not what people* ſaid:
He liv'd a Great *man, but he's Greater* dead.

This is an Error, of a Quality to be avoided alſo in civil matters. For there are many that dare not ſpeak their Opinions, tho' for the beſt; for fear of falling under Evil Tongues.

Plato's advice to Magiſtrates.

THERE are two Precepts of *Plato* to be obſerv'd by all Men of Authority in the Government. The One is, in ſome ſort to aſſert and defend the Publique Intereſt, that all their Actions ſhould refer to That, without any regard to their Own advantage. The other is, to attend the ſervice of the whole, in ſuch ſort, that while they are ſerving one part, they do not abandon another. It is in the Adminiſtration of a *Government*, as in the caſe of a *Ward*: The *Commiſſion* has a regard to the benefit of thoſe that are deliver'd up in *Charge*: and not thoſe to whom ſuch a charge, or care is *Committed*. But they that provide for One part of the people, and neglect another, bring into a City the moſt pernicious things in the World; That is to ſay, *Diſcord*, and *Sedition*: and when the are ſplit into parties, ſome ſide with the people others with the Nobility: but none mind th Whole. This wrought great Miſchiefs amon the *Athenians*: and in *our Republique* not onl *Sedition*, but the moſt peſtilent *Civil Wars*. courſe not to be endur'd by a Sober, and valia Patriot; or any man that deſerves a place in th

The danger of Factions.

Go

Government: For such a man will apply himself wholly to the care of the *Publique*, without designing either upon *Wealth*, or *Power* to himself; and in such manner defend the whole, that he also provide for every part of it: Neither will he bring any man into *Envy*, or *Hatred*, by *Calumny*, or *Subordination*; but resolutely adhere to *Justice* and *Honesty*; maintaining his Post, in spite of all Opposition; and rather die than desert the aforesaid Duties.

Of Ambition.

AMBITION or the Thirst of Honour is a wretched thing: Of which *Plato* says very well; they that strive who shall be Uppermost in the *Republique*, do as if *Mariners* should contend which should be at the *Helm*. And he tells us further, that we are to account those for Enemies, that take up *Armes* against the *Commonwealth*; and not such as with *Honesty*, and *Judgment* labour to *defend* it. This was the Controversie betwixt *P. Africanus*, and *Q. Metellus*, without any sort of bitterness.

Against Anger.

GIVE no ear to those that take it to be the part of a Brave, and Resolute man, to be violenty *Angry* with an *Enemy*: For there is nothing more commendable or better becoming a generous person, than *Clemency* and *Good Nature*. Nay towards a *Free People*, where all are liable to the *Law*, we should joyn a *Facility* with That which we call *height of Courage*, lest if we should accustom our selves to Transports upon Unseasonable Addresses, or shameful Importunities, we should fall into a humour of Morose and unprofitable sourness: Provided that with these soft, and gentle ways, we use

severity also, where the Publique requires it; for without That, a City can never be kept in order.

Of Reproof and Correction.

ALL *Reproof*, and *Correction*, let it be without *Contumely*, as being directed only to the profit of the *Commonwealth*; without regard to the gratifying of his *Passion*, or *Interest* that gives either the *Words*, or the *Blows*. And the *punishment* likewise should be proportion'd to the *Fault*: For it is unjust that one man should have *Blows*, and another, not so much as a *Check*, for the same transgression. But above all things, *Correction* is not to be given in *Anger*; For a man in Passion will never observe the due mean betwixt the two Extremes of too *much*, and too *little*: wherein the *Peripatetiques* are much in the Right; if they would not also approve of *Anger* given us by Nature for our Advantage. But I am for the avoiding of it in all Cases; and I could wish that *Magistrates*, like the *Laws Themselves*, would never proceed to *punish*, in *Wrath*, but only in *Equity*.

Moderation in both Fortunes.

LET us also in *Prosperity*, and when we have the World at will, as much as possible, avoid *Pride*; *disgusting* of every thing; and *Arrogance*; for it is the *same Levity* to be Transported either with *Good Fortune*, or with *Bad*: And it is an Excellent Thing to observe an Equal Tenor of Life, and to have still the same humour, and the same countenance; as we find it recorded of *Socrates*, and *C. Lælius*. *Philip* of *Macedon*, was outstript by his Son, in *Glorious Atchievements*, and *Military Executions*, but in *Gentleness*, and *Humanity* of manners, *Alexander*

der came short of him: So that the *One* of them was *always Great*, and the *Other* was *many* Times *Intemperate*, and *Brutal*. 'Tis good Advice, that bids us, the *Higher* we are, to be the more *Humble*. *Panatius* tells us of *Africanus* (his Disciple, and Familiar Friend) how he was wont to say, that as we put out Horses of Service to Riders, for the Training them, and making them fitter for use, when they are grown Fierce, and Unmenageable, by being chaf'd, and heat by the Action of the Battel; so should we commit Men, that are Transported with Prosperity, and over-confident in Themselves, to some Guide that should keep them, as it were in the Ring; or within the bounds of Reason, and good Government, to make them understand the Uncertainty of Humane Affairs, and the changes of Fortune. It is in the height of our Prosperity, that we should chiefly consult our Friends; and allow them more Authority over us than at other times: but we must have a Care of Entertaining Flatteries, and of being impos'd upon by Fair words, wherein we are too easie to be Mistaken. For such is the conceit we commonly have of our selves, that we think no Commendation more than we deserve. From this weakness there arise Innumerable Errors. For when we come once to be blown up with Praises, and high Opinions of our selves, we do but serve to make sport for Others, and labour under grievous Mistakes. And so much for this Point.

THEIR Business that Govern Commonwealths, must of necessity be of the greatest moment, and require the largest Souls; because it has the largest prospect, and concerns most people.

people. This is to be given for granted; and yet it muſt not be deny'd neither, on the Other ſide, that great Generoſity of Mind has been many times ſhew'd in a private Life; either in the ſearch, or attempt of Great Matters; and the people yet keeping themſelves within their own Bounds, or elſe mingling with Philoſophers, and Men in Publique Bus'neſs; contenting themſelves in their Private Condition: Neither ſcraping together Eſtates, by all manner of Ways, nor debarring their Friends from the uſe of what they had; but rather dividing with Them, and with the Republique where there was Occaſion. Now for *This Eſtate*, let it be, Firſt, *well gotten*, and neither by *Shameful*, nor by *Odious ways*: Let a man next do *good* with it to as many as he can; (ſo they be worthy) let him encreaſe it, with *Prudence*, *Diligence*, and *Good Husbandry*: and let him rather indulge *Liberality*, and *Bounty*, than *Luxury*, and *Luſt*. He that obſerves Theſe Rules may live Soberly, Splendidly, and Generouſly; and no leſs Candidly, Faithfully and amicably with all Men.

Greatneſs of mind in a private Life.

WE are now to ſpeak of the remaining part of Duty; wherein *Baſhfulneſs*, and a certain *Gracefulneſs* of Life, *Temperance*, *Modeſty*, the Compoſure of all *Perturbations* of the Mind, and *Moderation*, are to be conſider'd. Here it is that we find that ſame *Decorum*, or as the *Greeks*, πρέπον; which is of ſo Excellent a Nature, that it is Inſeparable from Virtue. For whatſoever is *Decent*, is likewiſe *Honeſt*; and whatſoever is *Honeſt*, is *becoming*. But ſtill there is a difference betwixt this ſame *Honeſty*, and *Decorum*; which may be better underſtood, than

Honeſty *and* Decorum.

than explained: For That which *becomes* us, does only *Then* appear, when *Honesty is gone before.*

NOW this *Decorum* does not only appear in the Virtue now in question, but also in the Three former. For the Right and Prudent use of Reason, and Speech; the doing of every thing Considerately; the finding out of Truth, and the Defending of it, looks well in Any man; as on the Other side to be deceived, to Mistake, to Slip, to be Impos'd upon, is as misbecoming, as if a man were in a fit of Dotage, or out of his Wits. And so whatsoever is *Just*, is also *Graceful*; and whatsoever is *Unjust*, or *Dishonest*, is likewise *misbeseeming*. And the same Rule holds in *Fortitude*: For whatsoever is done *Generously*, and like a Man of *Courage*, cannot but be *Graceful* too, and well-becoming a man; and the *Contrary* as *Reproachful*, and *Misbecoming*. Wherefore the *Decorum* I here speak of, appears likewise in all other Virtues; and does in such manner appertain to them, that it lies open; and there needs no Mystery to the finding of it out. There is in all Virtue, somewhat that is *Graceful*, and only *separable* from Virtue, by *Imagination*: As the Gracefulness, and Beauty of the *Body*, cannot well be separated from *Health*: And so it is with the *Gracefulness* here in *question*. It is a *Decorum* that is in a matter so confused with Virtue, that it is Incorporated with it; but in the Mind and Conception, it may be distinguish'd. And there are of it, *Two Sorts*. The *One* is a certain *General Decorum*, that shines in all Virtues; and there is *Another* that is subject to This, or dependent upon it, which respects

A Decorum in Prudence.

And in all Virtues.

A Decorum General and Special.

ſpects *every Virtue* in *particular*. The *Former* is Commonly defined to be *a Decorum congruous to the Excellency of Man, in that which differences Man, from Other Living Creatures*. But the *Special Decorum*, as dependent upon the General, they define to be *a quality ſo Congruous to Nature, that Moderation and Temperance appear in it, with the very image of a Generous Soul*. This we may judge to be the *Decorum*, which the Poets obſerve; whereof we have ſpoken more in another place. But we are then ſaid to obſerve the *Strict Decorum* of the *Poets*, when every *Word*, and *Action* is fitted to the *Dignity*, and *Condition* of the *Perſon*. As what could be more Improper, and Unſeemly than to bring in Theſe juſt Judges, *Æacus*, and *Minos* with theſe words in their Mouths, *Let them hate, ſo they Fear*: Or, *the Father is the Grave of his own Children*. And yet when *Atreus* ſays it, what Acclamations are there, becauſe the expreſſion Suits with the Perſon! But Nature her ſelf, as to us, has given every man his Part, with great Eccellency, and advantage over other Living Creatures. So that the Poets will ſee to the accommodating of all parts to the variety of Perſons, even the Obſerving of a *Decorum*, toward the worſt of men, as well as the beſt. But ſince Nature has aſſign'd us our parts of Conſtancy, Moderation, Temperance, Modeſty; and the ſame Nature teaches us not to be wholly careleſs, how we demean our ſelves toward one another; it is clear to us, how far that *Decorum* extends, that belongs to every Virtue, and every kind of Honeſty. For as the Beauty of the Body, with an apt diſpoſition of the Parts, proves the Eye; and delights us in the very Correſpondence,

The Decorum of the Poets.

Symmetry

Symmetry and apt disposition of the Parts; so this *Decorum*, that Illustrates Life, gains upon all those we converse with, by the Order, Steadiness, and Moderation of all our Works, and Deeds. Wherefore there should a Certain reverence be used toward all men, both high, and low; for 'tis the humour of an Arrogant and dissolute Man, not to care what the World says of him. But there's a great difference betwixt *Justice*, and *Modesty*, upon all accounts. It belongs to *Justice* not to *wrong* men; and to *Modesty*, not to *offend* them: Wherein the Power, and Virtue of a *Decorum*, does most eminently appear. This is enough said, I suppose, to make it understood, what is intended by that which we call a *Decorum*.

The Decorum of Order, Steadiness and Moderation.

THE Duty that proceeds from it, is chiefly to preserve our selves in a Conformity to Nature; A Guide That will never mislead us; but conduct those that follow her, to all acuteness, and perspicacity of Understanding; to the best means of Uniting men in Society; to That which is strong, and manly. But the mighty power of *Gracefulness* is in That part which we are now upon: For not only the Motions of the Body, according to Nature, are to be allow'd, but the Motions of the mind likewise much more.

A Decorum in a Conformity to Nature.

THE *Force*, and *Nature*, of the *Mind*, is *Two fold*: *One part* is plac't in the *Appetite*; the *Greeks* call it ὄρεξις; that carries a man hither and thither: The *Other*, in *Reason*, that teaches us, and explains to us what to do, and what to *avoid*, by which means, our Appetite shall be kept obedient to our Reason. In all Cases, we

From the Appetite arise Perturbations.

we ſhould have a care of Raſhneſs and *Negligence*; and do nothing but what we can give a fair Account of. This is, in ſome degree, the Image and Deſcription of Duty; But then we muſt ſo order it, that the *Appetite* follow the Dictate of *Reaſon*, ſo as neither *raſhly* to *outrun* it, nor out of *Heavineſs*, and *Sloth* to *deſert* it; but keep it *quiet*, and *calm*, and free from all *Perturbation*. This will make us Eminent for *Conſtancy* and *Moderation*: For *Thoſe Appetites* that wander from the *Rule*; and Skip from one thing to another, either by *Coveting*, or *Avoiding*: *Thoſe Appetites*, I ſay, for want of being govern'd by *Reaſon*, will without all queſtion paſs *Bounds* and *Meaſure*; for they relinquiſh and caſt off their *Allegiance* to *Reaſon*, which they ought to obey by the Law of *Nature*: and their Ill Effects are Imprinted, not only upon our *Minds*, but alſo viſibly upon our *Bodies*: As in the Tranſports of *Wrath*, *Luſt*, *Fear*, *Pleaſure*; What an Alteration is there of *Countenance*, *Voice*, *Motion*, *Geſture*? from whence we may Collect, how neceſſary it is to moderate, and govern our Paſſions; and ſo to keep our ſelves upon a Guard, that we do nothing heedleſly, or as it were by Chance, without Care, or Conſideration. For man was never made for Levity and Pleaſure, but rather for the ſeverity of Grave, and weighty Studies. Not that we are to be debarr'd the Freedom of Froliques, and Divertiſements; provided that we uſe them only as Sleep, and ſuch other ways of Repoſe; after the diſcharge of our Serious and more Important Duties. And our very Liberties in Diſcourſe muſt not be Profuſe neither, nor Immodeſt; but only Candid, and Facetious: For as

Paſſion diſorders both Mind, and Body.

The Bounds of Mirth.

as we do not allow our Children all ſorts of Games; but only ſuch ſports as hold ſome proportion with honeſt Actions; So in *Raillery* it ſelf, there muſt be a mixture of *Candour*, as well as *Underſtanding*.

THERE are two ſorts of *Raillery*, or *Mirth*; the One is *Courſe*, *Petulant*, *Criminal*, and *Foul*; the Other, *Cleanly*, *Gracious*, *Ingenious*, and *Facetious*: In which kind, not only *Plautus*, and the *Greek Comedians*, but the Followers of *Socrates*, have written much; and ſtuffed their Books with a great many of their *ſayings*, and *Conceits*: As *Cato*'s Collection of *Apothegm*'s, &c. Now 'tis an eaſie matter, to diſtinguiſh betwixt a *Courſe*, and a *Cleanly way* of *Jeſting*. The *One*, is *a word for a ſeaſon*, only for *Recreation*, and worthy of a man of Honour. The *Other*, not fit for an *Honeſt man*; eſpecially where *filthy Things* are deliver'd in as *Unclean Words*. *Two Sorts of Raillery, ſcurrilous and facetious.*

NAY in our very *Recreations*, we ſhould keep within Compaſs; and have a Care that we do not laſh out Into Exceſſes, and paſs the Limits of Modeſty, in the Tranſports of our Pleaſures. The Chaſe of Wild Beaſts, and the Military and Manly Exerciſes that are Practis'd in our Field, or *Campus Martis*: Theſe I reckon to be Honourable pleaſures; and we need never want theſe ways of Diverſion. *Honeſt and manly pleaſures.*

BUT whatever we do, it ſhould be always in our Thought, the Excellency of *Humane Nature*, above that of *Brutes*; which are only puſh'd on by *Violent Appetites* to *Senſual pleaſures*: Whereas the Entertainment of a mans Mind, *The Excellency of Man.*

Mind, is *Learning* and *Meditation*; which is never Idle, but ſtill employed either upon Enquiry, or Action; and charmed with a delight that ariſes from what we hear, or ſee. Nay the very man himſelf, that is moſt addicted to his Pleaſures: (if he has but the Soul of a Man in him, and not only the *Name*, without the *Effect* (for ſuch there are) Though he may be overcome by his *Luſts*, he yet ſtands ſo right, as to be *aſham'd of*, to *conceal*, and to *diſguiſe* his *Love* of Thoſe *pleaſures*, even for *Modeſty* ſake; which ſhews that the *Pleaſures* of the *Body*, are not worthy of the *Dignity* of the *Soul*; but rather *Contemptible*, and to be *rejected*. But if any man ſhall be found to have a great Regard for Pleaſures, let him be ſure to uſe them with *Moderation*. In our very *Cloaths*, and *Dyet*, we ſhould ſtill keep an Eye rather to matter of *Health*, and *Strength*, than to the humouring of the *Phanſie*, or *Palate*; and if we ſhall but duly weigh, and examine the Dignity, and Excellency of Nature; we ſhall quickly find how ſhameful a Thing it is to diſſolve in a Luxurious ſoftneſs, and Delicacy: And how becoming, on the other ſide, to live Frugally, Temperately, Gravely, and Soberly.

Brutal Pleaſures.

Man has Two Capacities.

A great Diverſity both in Minds and Bodies.

EVERY man muſt be underſtood to be inveſted with *Two Capacities*; the One *Common* to *Mankind*, as endu'd with *Reaſon*: and in a preference to *Beaſts*, from whence we do not only derive the Knowledge of Decency, and Virtue; but the very means of finding out our ſeveral Duties. The Other is a Propriety that has a reſpect particularly to *Individuals*. There is a great difference in *Bodies*; One man is better for a *Courſe*,

Ano-

Another for a *Scuffle*; and so in *Beauties*; *One Beauty* is *Imperious*, and *Majestical*; *Another*, *Charming*. Now there are at least as great *diversities*, and *Varieties* in our *Minds*. L. *Crassus*, and *L. Philippus*, were both of them of a *Nature*, Wonderfully Gentle, and Gracious; and Both these qualities were yet more Eminent; and more Labour'd too, in *C. Cæsar*, the Son of *Lucius*. There was a strange Austerity of Humour, in *M. Scaurus*, and *M. Drusius*; and in the same Time, and as yet in their Youth too. *C. Lælius* was *Gay*, and *Pleasant*; his Friend *Scipio* more *Ambitious*, and *Reserved*. It is reported, that *Socrates*, among the *Greeks*, was a Gentle and a pleasant Companion; a Wit that lay much upon *Innocent Raillery*, and had an Excellent faculty of speaking his Mind, under an agreeable Disguise. *Pythagoras*, on the other side, and *Pericles*, advanc'd themselves, without any Gayety of Humour at all. Among the *Carthaginians*, *Hannibal*, and among *our Own Commanders*, *Q. Maximus* have the Name of men extremely *Close*, and *Secret*, *Silent*, *Dissembling*; notably good at *Stratagems*, or setting Spies upon an Enemy, and disappointing their Counsels. Those that the *Greeks* have the greatest esteem of, are *Themistocles* the *Athenian*, and *Jason* the *Pheræan*. But above all, they magnifie that profound, and politique Fetch of *Solon*: who, for the advantage of the Commonwealth, and for his Own security, counterfeited himself *Mad*. There are others now, so far from This Artifice, that they are *Simple* and *Open*: to the degree of not enduring any thing but what's done above board; They will not suffer any thing that looks like Treachery. These men are

Several Humours.

the Servants of *Truth*, and the Enemies of *Fraud*. There are others again, that will bear any thing, and crouch to any man, for their own Ends; as *Sylla*, and *M. Craſſus*: The *Lacedemonian Lyſander* is ſaid to have been a great Maſter of his Art in This kind; and yet *Callicratides*, that ſucceeded him in his Command of the Navy, is reported to have been quite of another humour. And we find diverſity as well in the *Stile*, and *Faſhion* of *Speaking*, as in the *difference* of *Manners*. As you ſhall ſee men of great Authority and Parts, that yet wont themſelves to the Phraſe and Language of the Common people: As the *Two Catulus's*, Father and Son, and the like *Q. Mutius Mancinus*, which I my ſelf am Witneſs of. Nay I have heard old men ſay, that *P. Scipio* of *Naſica*, had that way with him, but his Father the clean contrary, and no Grace of Speech in the World. I ſpeak of him that reveng'd the Commonwealth, upon the *Seditious* attempts of *Tiberius Gracchus*. And no more had *Xenocrates*, the ſevereſt of Philoſophers; and yet Famous and Eminent for that very Sourneſs. There are a world of *Other diſſimilitudes*, both of *Nature*, and *Manners*, which are not yet to be deſpiſed. So that every man ſhould do well to ſtick to that Inclination that nature has given him in particular; provided that it be not Vitious: and by ſo doing, he ſhall eaſily more diſcover and attain the *Decorum* which we look for in this place.

Nature is the beſt Miſtreſs.

BUT yet we are ſo to behave our ſelves that without oppoſing *Common Nature*, we follow the *Dictates*, *every man* of his *Own Genius*; and tho' other things may perhaps be weightier

and better, we are yet to take our Measures according to the bent of our Own Particular. For 'tis in vain to struggle with Nature; or to pursue any thing which we cannot attain. From hence it is, that we must gather the Knowledge of what becomes us. For nothing can be *Graceful*, that lays a *Force* upon *Nature*. In short, there is nothing more *becoming*, in humane life, than an *Equability*, and *Congruity* of our *Actions*: which, if ever we depart from, and pass to the *Affectation* of *another mans Nature*, we lose *our Own*. For as we are to use our Own Native Language, without forcing foreign Words into it (as some people do) and make themselves only ridiculous for their pains) so should we in our LIVES, and *Actions*, make our selves all of a piece.

The same thing Good in one, and Ill in another.

NAY, so sensible is This difference of Natures, that one man shall be *honour'd* for *destroying of himself*, and another *condemned* for it, all in the same Case: as it was with *Marcus Cato* that *kill'd himself*, and the rest that *rendred themselves* up to *Cæsar* in *Africa*. This might perhaps have turn'd to their reproach, if they had laid violent hands upon themselves: For an action so heroical would have born no proportion with the softness and facility of their Ways and Manners, but rather have introduc'd an *Incongruity* betwixt their *Lives*, and *Deaths*. But for *Cato*, that was a man naturally *Grave*, and *Severe*, (even to a Miracle) and hardn'd to it by a long habit of Constancy: a man unalterably *Firm* to his *purpose*, and *resolution*: it made for the *dignity* of his *Humour*, and *Character*, rather to support *death* it self, than the *frown* and

Dominion of a *Tyrant*. How many miseries did *Ulysses* suffer, in it tedious Ramble of his, enslaving himself to Women, (if a body may give *Circes* and *Calypso* that name) and a Complaisance upon all Occasions to all sorts of people? Nay at his own house, how patiently did he put up the Contempts, and Flouts of the meanest of his Servants there? Whereas *Ajax*, according to the report we have of him, would have born a thousand deaths, rather than those Contumelies. This Contemplation should make every man look into himself, to see what he has of his *Own*, and to make his best of *That*, without disguising himself, to act the part of *Another*. *That which every man has Peculiar to himself, is the thing which best becomes him.* Wherefore every man should take a true estimate of what he is, and impartially examine his Abilities, and Defects; What he can do, and what he cannot. That we may be, at least, as wise in our *Lives* as *Comedians* are upon the *Stage*: who make *choice*, not so much of the *Best Parts*, or *Plays* as of the *fittest* for their *disposition*. He that has the strongest Voice, chuses the Tragedy of *Epigonus*, or *Medea*: The best Actor prefers *Melippe*, or *Clytemnestra*. *Rutilius* (whom I remember) always acted *Antiope*: and sometimes *Æsopus* play'd *Ajax*. Shall a *Stage-player* now take more care of himself in a *Comedy*, than a *Wise Man* in his *Life*? Let every man see in the *first* place, *which way* his Talent Lies, and in the *next*, let him endeavour to *improve* it. But if we should be forc'd at any time by necessity, to play a Part that we were never made for: let it be our Care, Study, and Thought, so to behave our selves, that at least

Let every man Act his own Part.

we may not *lose* our Credit, where we cannot *get* any. So that the best of this Case will be to avoid *Shame*, without pretending to get a *Reputation*, by the forcing of our *Nature*.

NOW to those *two parts* already spoken of, that is to say, of *Common Nature*, and *particular Inclination*, there is a *Third*, that is cast upon us either by Time, or Chance, and yet a *Fourth*, which we accommodate according to our own Judgment. For Kingdoms, Empires, Dignities Honours, Riches, with their Contraries, are all of them in the hand of Fortune, and governed by the Revolution of Times. Now it is wholly at our own Choyce, what part we will Sustein. Wherefore One man takes to *Philosophy*, another to the *Civil Law*, a Third to *Rhetorique*, and a Fourth affects an Excellency rather in *One Virtue* than in *Another*. But for those whose Ancestors were any of them very Famous; They commonly study to get Reputation by treading in Their Steps: as *Q. Mucius* follow'd his Father *Publius* in the *Civil Law*: And *Scipio Africanus* emulated his Father in Feats of *Arms*. Some again are not content with the honour they derive from their *Predecessors*, unless they add somewhat to it of their Own. As *Africanus* did yet Augment and Illustrate the Honour of his *Military Knowledge* by his *Particular Eloquence*. And so did *Timotheus*, the Son of *Conon*, who being a *Captain* not inferior to his *Father*, made himself yet greater by the Addition of *Letters* and *Understanding*. But it happens sometimes that the Son declines the Imitation of the Father, and betakes himself rather to some Course, or design of his own; which is a thing often found

Let every man chuse his own Study.

in men of large minds, that are deſcended from obſcure Parents. All theſe Circumſtances muſt be taken into Conſideration, in the queſtion of *This Decorum*.

Some Courſe of Life muſt be pitched upon.

THE Firſt point in Deliberation is This, what it is that we deſign either to *Be*, or to *do*; and what Courſe of Life to take to. In this Deliberation, there is great hazard, and difficulty. For it is in our Youth, that we are to reſolve, and pitch upon the Condition we propound; at which time, we are leaſt able to judge of it. So that we are commonly engag'd in ſome certain purpoſe of Life, before we are able to diſtinguiſh betwixt a Better and a Worſe. For although (according to the Report of *Prodicus*, out of *Xenophon*) ſo ſoon as ever *Hercules* came out of his *Minority* (the time for every man to chuſe what courſe of Life he will Steer) he retir'd into a *Solitude*, and upon the Sight of *Two ways*, the *One* of *Virtue*, and the *Other* of *Pleaſure*, he ſat a long time conſidering with himſelf which of the Two ways he ſhould take: Yet this might do well enough for *Hercules*, that was the Son of *Jupiter*, but not for us, I fear, that commonly follow thoſe men ſtill that we like beſt; and take up an affection for their ways and Studies. And yet for thoſe that are trained up under the Inſtitution of their Parents; they do commonly and inſenſibly contract an Affection for the Methods and Cuſtoms of their Education. Others are carried away by the Stream of Popular practice; eſteeming That ſtill to be the Beſt; that pleaſes the *moſt*. And yet ſome there are, that lead the Courſe of Life they ought to do; induced thereunto, either by Providence

a certain Felicity, or Goodneſs of Nature; a Virtuous Inclination, or ſome particular advantage of their Inſtitution: But it is a very rare thing to find a Concurrence of Eminent Wit, and Learning; or to find Either of them, with ſo much Time for deliberation, as is needful for the Election of a profitable Courſe of Life. In this deliberation, a regard muſt be had to That which is moſt proper, and Natural to every particular: For (as is already ſaid) ſince in whatever we do, we muſt enquire into every mans particular *Genius*, before we can ſay what becomes him; ſo we muſt be more Careful yet, in the Eſtabliſhment of our one Lives, to ſee that we maintain an Equality in the main; and that we never differ from our ſelves, or falter in our Duty.

Nature and Fortune to be conſulted what courſe of Life to fix upon.

BUT ſince *Nature* has the *greateſt* power in *This Caſe*; and *Fortune*, the *next*; we muſt conſult them *Both*; what Courſe of Life to fix upon; But *Nature*, in the *firſt place*: For ſhe is much firmer, and more conſtant; and it is not for *Fortune*, that is *Frail* and *Mortal*, to contend with *Immortal Nature*: Whoſoever therefore ſhall Conform in the Ordering of his Life, to the Inclinations of an uncorrupted Nature, muſt keep conſtantly to that Tenour, which is the *Decorum* of Life; unleſs he find himſelf miſtaken in his Choice. And in that Caſe (for it is a Caſe to be put) there muſt be a Change admitted of Purpoſes and Manners. And that change will be more eaſily and commodiouſly wrought, under the favour of Times and Occaſions: But where the Seaſon is not favourable, it muſt be Introduc'd by Little and Little; as Wiſe men

ſay of Inconvenient, and Ill Grounded Friendſhips; 'tis better to unſtich than to tear them all to pieces on a ſudden. But when we have once alter'd our Courſe, we muſt be infinitely Careful to make it appear, that we have done it upon good and weighty Reaſons. Now whereas I have, (in what is aforeſaid) propounded the Imitation of our Predeceſſors; let me not be thought to adviſe an Imitation of them in their Vices: beſide that there are many things wherein Nature is not to be Imitated. As the Son of *Africanus the Elder.* (he that adopted the Son of *Paulus Æmilius.*) It was not poſſible for him, by reaſon of the Crazineſs of his body to be ſo like his Father, as the Other was like His.

Let every man do all the Good he can.

Wherefore if a man be not in Condition to plead at the Bar; to *Harangue* the People in *Publique Aſſemblies*, or to *lead Armies*; there are ſome Duties yet in his Power, which he is obliged to perform: as the *Offices* of *Juſtice*, *Faith*, *Liberality*, *Modeſty*, *Temperance*, which Benefits will fairly ſupply the want of the Other. The beſt of *Patrimonies* is the *Reputation* of *Great*, and *Virtuous Actions*, and *Anceſtors*; and the Son that does not uphold the Renown of his Father, is a Shame, and a Scandal to it.

NOW in regard that there are *ſeveral Duties* properly belonging to *ſeveral Ages*; and many things that becoming a *Young* man, would be ridiculous in an *Old*; we ſhall ſay ſomething alſo under That diſtinction.

The Duty of a Young man.

IT is the duty of a *Young man* to Reverence his *Elders*, and to make his Choice of the Beſt and moſt approved among them, for his Direc-

ctors

tors and Governors: For the Ignorance, and Folly of Youth should be ordered, and instructed, by the *prudence* and *experience* of the *Aged*, But above all things, he should be restrained from *Loose* and *Wanton pleasures*: and trained up rather in *Laborious exercises*: and in the *Fatigues*, and *Toyles*, both of *Body*, and *Mind*. For it makes men *Vigorous*, and *Industrious*, as well in *War*, as in *Peace*: and even in the Intervals of Liberty, and Refreshment, young Men should have a Care of *Intemperance*: and not to pass the Bounds of *Modesty*; which will be the more Easily attained, if they be often in the Eyes of their *Seniors* and *Tutors*.

Youth should be Temperate and industrious.

WHEN we come to be in *Years*, the labours of the body must be abated, and we should encrease those of the Mind: but striving still, by all means to be serviceable to our Friends, and to our Juniors, by our Advice, and Wisdom: but principally to the Commonwealth. But above all things, have a Care of a Drowsie, a Languishing, and a Lasie Old Age; and so likewise of a Luxurious: which, as it is reproachful and dishonourable, in this Case it is most of all. But if the Intemperance of *Lust* be added to it, the Mischief is Double. *First*, the *Infamy* which it reflects upon *Age it self*: and *Then*, the *Ill Example*, in Authorizing young men to be more Shameless and wicked.

The Business of Age is Wisdom.

Beware of Sloth and Luxury.

IT would not be impertinent, here to speak something of the Duties of *Magistrates*, *Private Citizens* and *Strangers*. The *Magistrates* part, is to consider himself as the *Representative* of the *City*: and to uphold the *Honour*, and *Dignity* of

The Duty of a Magistrate.

of it: to obſerve the *Laws*, and *Cuſtoms*, to do *Juſtice*; and to remember, that all theſe things are committed to his *Charge*. It is the part of a *Private man*, to live with his *fellow Citizens*, under *one Common Bond* of *Legal Duty*; neither falling ſo Low, as to make himſelf deſpicable, nor too much exalting himſelf: And never to entertain any Thought, but to the Glory, and Peace of the Commonwealth. This is the man that we eſteem, and pronounce to be a worthy Citizen. As to the Duty of a *Stranger*: let him mind his own buſineſs, and not intermeddle with Other peoples, but keep himſelf within his Compaſs. By theſe means it will be underſtood, when it ſhall come to be diligently examin'd, what is moſt becoming us, under the ſeveral Circumſtances of *Perſons*, *Times*, and *Ages*: But there is nothing ſo Graceful, as to behave our ſelves equally, and ſteadily, in all our Actions, and Counſels.

A private man.

And a Stranger.

The Decorum of the Body.

BUT this Gracefulneſs ſhews it ſelf in all our Words, and Deeds, nay in the very Motions, and Poſtures, of the body: and conſiſts principally in Beauty, Order, and a kind of Air, or Agreement ſuitable to every thing we do. 'Tis a hard matter to expreſs This, but it ſhall ſuffice, that it may be eaſily underſtood. In the Obſervance of Theſe three Points, we render our ſelves Acceptable in our Converſation with all People. And ſo much for This too.

The Seeds of Modeſty are in Nature.

NATURE has undoubtedly taken great Care in the forming of Mans Body, expoſing only Thoſe parts to ſight, that are Beautiful, Comely and Agreeable to the Eye: and keeping Thoſe parts

parts conceal'd, and Cover'd, which would give Offence if they were laid open to View: and ſerve us only for Unclean, and Common Neceſſities. There is no queſtion, but the Modeſty of the Mind conforms it ſelf, in this particular, to the exquiſite fabrique of the Body: For whatſoever Nature has conceal'd, all men in their right Wits, do naturally keep out of ſight, and as private as poſſible, in compliance with their very Neceſſities. Now for Thoſe parts of the body which are of moſt neceſſary uſe to man: we neither call the part, nor the uſe of it, by the proper name: and that which may be honeſtly done, (if ſecretly) we cannot ſo much as honeſtly name. Inſomuch, that thoſe things cannot be done openly without Impudence: nor ſo much as mention'd, without Obſcenity. Wherefore there's no hearkning to the *Cyniques*, or to the *Old Stoiques*, (which are almoſt *Cyniques*) that blame and laugh at us, for reckoning thoſe things to be *foul*, in *Words:* which are *not ſo*, in *Truth.* And yet Thoſe things which we *all agree* to be *foul*, we can yet call by *Their own names.* As *Theft*, *Conſenage*, *Adultery*, are all *diſhoneſt* in the *Deed:* and yet we uſe the *Words* without *Scruple.* To beget Children is an honeſt Action: but it wears a Courſe name. And we find a great deal more to this purpoſe, againſt Modeſty, in their Diſputations. But we are to follow Nature, and to fly whatſoever may offend either the Eye, or the Ear of a Modeſt man. Nay, in our very Poſtures, and Geſtures: as Walking, Standing, Sitting, Lying: in the very Countenance, the Eye, the Motion of the hands, there muſt a regard be had ſtill to that which is Becoming. In all This, there are *Two things* we ſhould

The Obſcene humour of the Cyniques.

A Decency in Geſtures and Poſtures.

beware

beware of. The *One*, not to do any thing that is *Looſe*, *Nice*, and *Effeminate*: The *Other*, to *avoid* things that look *Harſh*, *Rough*, and *Uncivil*. For why ſhould That which *becomes* an *Orator*, or a *Comedian*, *misbeſeem us*? The Diſcipline of the *Theatre* has a long time had ſuch a regard to *Modeſty*; that no man enters upon the Stage, without *Drawers*, leſt ſome part of the body ſhould come to be diſcover'd by Chance that ought to be Conceal'd. The *Roman Cuſtoms* will not allow Sons, when they are Men grown, ſo much as to Bath, with their Fathers: Or Sons in Law, with their Wives Parent. In theſe points of Virtuous Modeſty, Nature is both our Miſtreſs and our Guide.

The Modeſty of the Romans.

Of Dignity and Graceſulneſs.

OF *Beauty*, or *Agreeableneſs*, there are *Two Kinds*: the *One* is matter of *Graceſulneſs*; the *Other*, of *Dignity*: and we may call them *Male*, and *Female*: It is not for a man to be Trickt out with *Fooleries*: or to have any thing that is *Phantaſtical*, or *Effeminate*: no, not ſo much as in his very *Motion*, or *Geſture*. How are we diſguſted many times, at the Conceited actions of *Stage-Players*? and the more Odious, and affected Motions of Wraſtlers? And yet we Commend that which is Natural, and Simple, both in the One, and in the Other. The dignity of the Countenance is Maintain'd by a good Colour; and that Colour by the Exerciſe of the Body; and to all This we ſhould keep our ſelves *Neat* and *Cleanly*: not to the degre of *Niceneſs*, and *Affectation*, but only ſo, as not to incur the cenſure of *Rudeneſs*, *Sluttery*, and *Neglect*. And the ſame Rule we ſhould obſerve in our *Garments*: In which particular, as well as in other

Affectation is Odious.

other things, a *mediocrity* does best. In our *walking* we must neither march so *Slow*, as if we were officiating at a solemnity: nor yet make such *post-hast*, as to run our selves out of breath, and put the Mouth, or the Countenance into disorder: which is a sign of a Light, and unsteady humour. But we must take more pains, yet, to keep the *Mind* in a temper of Conformity to *Nature*: which we may easily compass, if we can but preserve our selves from Falling into *Transports*, and *Perturbations*, and diligently attend to a Conservation of the *Decorum* here prescribed. The *Motions of the Mind* are *Two-fold*. *Some* are of *Thought*, and others of *Appetite*. Those of *Thought* are chiefly employed in the finding out of The *Truth*. Those of *Appetite* push a man forward to the *doing* of something. We must be carefull therefore, *First*, to apply our *Thoughts* to That which is most *worthy* of them: and, *Secondly*, to keep the *Appetite* in subjection to *Reason*.

A Mean does best.

The Motions of the Mind are Thought and Appetite.

AS to the matter of *Speech*, the Power of it is *Great*; and it is also *Two fold*. The *One* is a Speech of *Contention*; the *Other*, of *Common discourse*. The *Former* is for the *Barre*, for *Publique Assemblies*, and for the *Senate*; the *Other*, is for *Ordinary Conversation*, *Casual disputes*, *private meetings* of Company or Friends at the *Table*. The Masters of *Rhetorique* have given Precepts for the *Former*, but we have none for the *Latter*; altho' perhaps, that might be done too. But there's no body that addicts himself That way. For if men would but apply themselves to the Study of it, they would never want Masters to Teach it. And yet we are all of us Mad

Of Rhetorique, and Ordinary Discourse.

Mad upon *Rhetorique*, altho', for what concerns *words*, and *Periods*, the same Rules would serve Both. It is by the help of the *Voice*, that we *discourse*; and the *Two great advantages* of it, are to be *Clear*, and *Sweet*; We must stand indebted to *Nature* for them *Both*. And yet *Exercise*, and *Practice*, will help us in the *One*: and the *Imitation* of *Smooth* and *gentle Speakers*, may be of use to us in the *Other*. What was it but This, that gave the *Catuli* so fair a Reputation, both for Judgment and Language? They were *Learned men*, 'tis true, and so were *Others*; but These yet were lookt upon as the great Masters of the *Latin Tongue*: They had a wonderful Sweetness of Voice, and their Pronunciation neither too loud, and open, nor yet muffled betwixt the Teeth. So that it was both Audible, and Agreeable; and without any Affectation: The Tone, without any Force, and neither too faint, nor too shrill. *L. Crassus*, 'tis true, was a word-flowing Speaker, and no less Ingenious: but for well-speaking, the *Catuli* were no less esteem'd. Now for sharpness, and pleasure of Wit, *Cæsar*, the Brother of the *Elder Catulus*, went beyond them all. Insomuch that in his ordinary Discourses, he surpass'd the best Pleaders of his Time. All these things, severally, must be diligently heeded, to make us understand what it is that may best become us in every thing.

The Voice should be Clear and Sweet.

Instances of Excellent Speakers.

Of Familiar Discourse.

IN *Familiar Speech*, the Followers of *Socrates* are most worthy of Imitation. It should be *Gentle*, without being too *pressing*, or *tedious*: and I would have it *pleasant*, and *entertaining*, in all Cases. Nor would I have any man take possession of a Common Right, in such sort as

to

to Talk all himself, to the Exclusion of Others: but in Discourse, as in Other things, every man to take his Turn. The First thing to be heeded, is the subject Matter of the Discourse. If serious, it must be seriously handled: if Matter of Mirth, a Freedom of Raillery, and Lightness, does well enough with it. But above all things, we must be Careful in the government of our Speech, not to discover any Vice, or Defect in our Manners; wherein a man is most liable to betray himself, when he talks spitefully of the Absent; and either in Jest, or in earnest, maliciously exposes them to Contumely, and Reproach. The Ordinary matter of *Familiar discourse*, is either about *Domestique Affairs*, the *Republique*, or matter of *Studies* and *Learning*. If at any time we Pass These Bounds, we must as soon as may be take up again. But be it as it will, it must be thought upon, how far our Discourse may be Grateful to the Company: For we are not Equally pleased with the same things, at all times. And then, as we begin a discourse upon Reason, we must not continue it beyond Measure. But as it is laid down upon very good Grounds, and as a general Rule, that we should keep our selves Clear from Perturbations, or violent Motions of the Mind, that rebel against Reason, so should we in our Speech keep a guard upon our selves against Those Intemperate Motions; and that we do not lay open our Distempers of Anger, Appetite, Laziness, Heartlessness, or the like. We should be very Careful also in our Conversation, to possess the Company with an Opinion of the Reverence, and Good will that we have for them. There are many Occasions wherein we cannot avoid Chiding:

Cautious.

The Subject of it.

Seasonable and not Tedious.

Not Passionate.

Respectful.

Let reproof be without Anger.

Chiding: and we may be allow'd ſometime, a more than ordinary Contention of Voice; and a ſharper ſeverity of Words: but yet This is not to be done neither, as if we were Angry; but we are to proceed to this kind of Reproo, as we do to *Laming*, and *Scarifying*, *rarely*, and *unwillingly*; nor ever at all, but upon *Neceſſity*, and for want of ſome other way of Remedy, but not in Anger ſtill upon any Terms: For it never does any thing either well or wiſely: And yet it may do well enough to uſe a Temperate, and a mild way of Rebuke; but ſtill accompany'd with Gravity, that the reprehenſion may be apply'd without Reproach: It muſt be alſo ſignifi'd that the Only thing intended by the Reproof, was the Amendment of him that ſuffers it. Nay, it will become us in our differences, even with our greateſt Enemies; in deſpite of all Indignities yet, to preſerve a Gravity; to keep our ſelves free from Paſſion; for whatſoever we do in diſtemper, can neither be well done in it ſelf, nor approved by thoſe that are Witneſſes to the doing it. It is a lewd thing likewiſe for a man to talk much of himſelf: eſpecially with *Thraſo*, to brag of things that are falſe, and to make Sport for the Company.

Oſtentation is Odious.

Of Building and Palaces.

BEING now to go through all the Points of *Decency* and *Duty* (as That is my deſign) I ſhall ſay ſomething what kind of Houſe I ſhould think fit for a Perſon of Honour, or a Prince, ſo as to have it accommodate for uſe; for That's the Intent of Building it: and there muſt yet be had a regard to the State and Dignity of the Perſon that Inhabits it. I have been told of *Cn. Octavius* (the *firſt Conſul* of *That Family*) that he was highly

highly reverenc'd for a Magnificent Pile that he built upon the *Palatine-Hill*; and that the Reputation he got by so many peoples coming to see it, open'd his way (being but a new man) to the *Consulship*. *Scaurus* afterward caused That to be demolish'd for the Enlargment of his Own. The former brought the Consulship first into his Family: and the latter, (tho' the Son of an Eminent, and Famous person, and the House enlarged) brought into it, not only a Repulse, but Misery and Shame. It does well to have the Dignity of the Master yet further adorned by the House, but not that Dignity to be fetch'd altogether from it. The House should be grac'd by the Master, and not the Master by the House; and it is in a House, as it is in other Cases: a man must have a respect, not only to himself, but also to others. In the House of a Person of Eminent Condition, where many Guests, are to be received, and men of all sorts to be admitted, there must great care be taken that it be large enough: but a large House, without People, disparages the Master of it; and especially if it has been more frequented under a Former Possessor: for 'tis an Odious Thing to have Passengers reflect upon it, and say (as in these Times there's too much Occasion) *Here's the* Old House, *but where's the* Old Master? I would have him that sets upon Building, take special Care not to lash out into Magnificence, and Expence, as a thing of Ill Consequence, even in the Example; for there are too many Imitators in This Kind, of the doings of Princes. How many have we that Emulate the Splendor of *Lucullus*'s *Villa's* (his Country-houses:) but where is the man that Emulates his Virtue? There must

Fit the House to the Master.

Keep the Expence within Compass.

be a *Mean* obſerv'd in Theſe things, and that Moderation muſt be transferr'd in all Caſes, to the Uſe, Ornament, and Convenience of Life. But enough of This.

Three Rules for all Undertakings.

IN all Undertakings there are three things to be obſerv'd. *Firſt*, That we govern our Appetites be *Reaſon*, which is a ſure way to keep us to our Duties. *Secondly*, That we take a right Eſtimate of our Enterprizes, and allow Time and Pains, neither more nor leſs than the matter requires. *Thirdly*, That we keep a Meaſure even in thoſe things that are matter of Dignity and Reputation. We cannot do better, than to obſerve the *Decorum* already ſpoken of, without moving one ſtep beyond it. But the Firſt point is the moſt Excellent of the Three.

The Decorum *of Place and Time.*

WE come now to the *Order of Things*, and the *Opportunity of Seaſons*. Under this Science is comprehended that which the *Greeks* call Εὐσχημοσύνη, by which we underſtand the *Harmony of Order*, and not *That Modeſty* that regards *Temperament* and *Meaſure*. Now to take it as *Modeſty*, the *Stoical Definition* of it is This, *It is the Art of diſpoſing all our Words, and Actions, in their Proper Place*. So that the *Ordering* of things, and the *placing* of them, are much one and the ſame: for they define *Order* to be only the *laying together of things in their due, and fitting places*. But they tell us, that the *Place* of *Action* reſpects the *Opportunity* of *Time*: Now That ſeaſonable *Time* of *Action*, the *Greeks* call Εὐκαιρία, the *Latins*, *Occaſio*. So that *This Modeſty*, taken in the ſenſe aforeſaid, is *the Knowledge of the Opportunities of Times fit for Action*. Which

Order defin'd.

a definition that may as well agree with the *Prudence* which we have treated of in the beginning. But in this place we are discoursing of *Moderation*, *Temperance*, and Virtues of that quality. Wherefore having lodg'd these matters which particularly belong to *Prudence*, in their Right places; we come now to those Virtues that refer to *Modesty*, and the Gaining of a Good opinion, and Esteem in the World: of which we have spoken largely.

Indecencies in respect of Time and Place.

IT should be in the *Order of Life*, as in That of an *Artificial*, and *well govern'd Discourse*. All the *Parts* of it should be *Equal*, and *Correspondent* one to another. Many things do well enough over a Glass of Wine, that would be most ridiculous and shameful, upon a Debate. There should be no fooling in serious matters. It was well said of *Pericles*, at a Council of War, to his *Colleague Sophocles*, that was joyned with him in the Command of the Army. As they were upon a Consultation, there happened to pass by, a very fine Youth, *What a delicate Child is there?* says *Sophocles*, in the middle of the Debate.) *Brother* (says *Pericles*) *a* Generals *Eyes, should be as Temperate as his Fingers.* But if the same thing had been spoken at a publique Spectacle, nothing could have been said against it; so powerful is the Consideration of *Time* and *Place*. If a man were upon a *Journey*, and going to Plead a *Cause*, no body would blame him for thinking of his Bus'ness, and conning of his Lesson, by the way; but That pensive, musing humour, at a Jolly Entertainment, would be looked upon, to be either want of Wit, or Breeding, in the not distinguishing of Times. Now for things

which are very groſs, as for a man to fall a Sing ing in a Court of Juſtice: or to do any thi that is notoriouſly prepoſterous, or improper These are abſurdities ſo well underſtood by a people, that there needs no Precept, or Ca tion, in the Caſe. But there are certain Nicetie of Converſation, which are indeed ſo minute that *ſome* make *ſlights* of them; and *others* do no ſo much as *perceive* them. And yet theſe are th Points that require our moſt diligent conſider tion. For as it is in Muſical Inſtruments, I them be never ſo little out of Tune, a skilful E preſently takes Cheque at it: and that's the Ca in the leaſt diſconſonancy of Life. Only the O fence is ſo much the Greater here, by how muc the *Agreement* of our *Actions*, and *Manners* of greater *value*, and *effect*, than a *Conſent* Sounds. Wherefore, as there is no Jarre, Diſcord in Muſique, ſo ſmall, as to ſcape t animadverſion of a Critical Ear; no leſs quic and accurate ought we to be in Cenſuring, a Detecting the Venial Errors of Life: Being l to the knowledge of the greateſt matters, ev by the ſmalleſt. From the Motion of the E from a Smooth or a Contracted Brow; fro Sadneſs, Mirth, Laughter, Speech, Silence; n from the very Tone of Soft, or Loud ſpeakin and a thouſand ſuch Common Circumſtances, w gather the underſtanding of Humane Duties and of what Naturally becomes us, and what t Contrary.

The Nicetie ſ of Converſation.

By Obſerving others we may Reform our ſelves.

NOW toward the Erecting of a true Judg ment upon things in This Kind, it were not amiſ for us to begin our Obſervations *abroad*: An then to Avoid, or Correct That in our *ſelve* which

which we find misbecoming in *Others*. For so it is, (I cannot tell how it comes about) that we are much better at spying out our *Neighbours Faults*, than our *Own*: and therefore it is a good and a Profitable Method, the teaching of Children to do better, by shewing them in imitation how ill it becomes them to do amiss. In Cases doubtful, and hard to be resolv'd upon, it will behove us to consult men of Learning, and Experience, for Direction. Now it is very Natural for men to follow the Byas of their proper Inclinations. So that we are not only to attend to what any body *says*; but likewise to what he *Thinks*; and even to the very Motive that leads him to That Thought. For as it is with Painters, Statuaries; nay, and with Right Poets too; They love to have their Works expos'd, and, as the World finds fault, to mend them. They take advice upon what's amiss, both with Themselves and their Friends, and are induc'd to the doing, or not doing; to the Changing, or Correcting of many things by the Opinion of Others. But for what concerns Customs, and Civil Institutions, there can be no place there for the prescribing, where the matter it self is a Precept. Neither let a man so much deceive himself, as to imagine that the Example of *Socrates*, for the purpose, or *Aristippus*, in the saying, or doing of any ill thing against Rules of Government, must presently authorize him to the same Licence: For This Liberty, in those Great and Divine men, we are to look upon as a priviledge purchas'd by their Virtues. Now for the *Cyniques* (those Enemies of *Shame*, and consequently of *Honesty*, and *Virtue*) there's no enduring of them. To Magistrates, and Persons in Authority, we are

Great Virtues are a Privilege to some Mistakes.

to pay all Honour, and Reverence, and so likewise to all those worthy Patriots that have spent their Lives in Great, and Honest Actions; and in the service of their Country. We owe a respect also to Grey hairs, and even to Those that are but design'd to any Administration in the Government. We must distinguish betwixt a Citizen and a Stranger, and even in a Stranger, betwixt a Private Person, and a Publique. But to sum up all in a word, it is our Duty to Cherish, Maintain, and Preserve Unity, Peace, and Good Agreement, in Humane Society.

A General Duty.

WE come now to the matter of *Trade*, and *Profit*, which we find to be divided into *Liberal* (or in Vulgar *English*, *Creditable*) and *Sordid*. There are some *Painful Employments*, that carry along with them a *General Odium*; as that of a *Tax-gatherer*, or an *Usurer*. These, in the first place, I do not like; and I do also look upon all *Mercenary Dealings*, where we pay for the *Work*, and not for the *Art*, to be *Meane*, and *Ignoble*. The very price of the *Commodity* is a kind of *Covenanting* for *Slavery*. It is also a *Course of Business*, That of a *Retayler*, that only buys in a Lump, to sell again in Parcels; For they get their very Bread commonly by Lying; which is a most Unmanly submission. And so for all *Mechaniques*, they are men of Low, and Vulgar business, and we are not to expect any thing that is Clear, and Generous, from the Shop. I am likewise with *Terence*, no friend to those Trades that Minister to Luxury; as *Fishermen*, *Butchers*, *Cooks*, *Pudding-makers*, *Fishmongers*; nor to the *Voluptuous Arts*, as *Perfumers*, *Dancing-masters*, and the whole Mystery of *Gaming*. But for

Of Trade. Which is either sordid.

And Voluptuary.

for those Professions that require a greater measure of *Prudence*, and Minister *Advantage* in proportion; as *Physique*, *Architecture*, the furnishing of *Good Instructions*; These are commendable Employments, where they suit with the Condition of him that uses them. And then for *Merchandizing*, the driving of a *petty Trade*, That way, is little better than *Pedling*. But when it comes to be *Large*, and *General*, and to be menag'd back and forward, with *Candor*, and *Credit*: it is no contemptible Application. Nay, on the Contrary, This way of Commerce is highly to be esteem'd; when he that has made his Fortune by it, sits down (not satiated, but) contented; and retires as well from his *Port*, to the *Country*, as he has done many a time from the *Sea* to the *Port*, and there quietly enjoys himself, and his Possessions. Of all *Beneficial Industry*, Certainly there is not any thing more Agreeable, or more Worthy of a Man of *Honour*, and *Reason*, than the *Culture* and *Improvement* of the *Earth*; which being a Subject handled at large in our *Cato Major*, we shall refer you thither for your satisfaction.

Or of Candour and Credit.

HERE is enough said already upon the *several parts* of *Virtue*, and our Duties arising from thence. It remains now to consider in a Case of *two Duties* before us, *which to chuse*: (a thing that often happens) and of *Two Honest Propositions*, which is the *Honester*, is the Question: (a Point omitted by *Panatius*.) For since there is *no Virtue*, but what issues from One of these *four Fountains*, and has a respect either *to Knowledge*, *Society*, *Courage*, or *Moderation*; it must necessarily be, that upon a *Complication* of these

Of Two Duties, which to Chuse.

Virtues, there must likewise ensue a *Competition* of *Duties*. Now it is my *Opinion*, that Mankind is Naturally more concerned in Offices that relate to the *Community*, than in matters that only affect the *Understanding*; which may be thus made out. Take a wise man, that has the World at Will, both for Fortune, and Leisure; let him consider with himself, and contemplate all things whatsoever, that are worth the Knowing. He would be yet sick of his Life, for all this, if he were to spend his time wholly in solitude, and without a Companion.

Wisdom is the principal Virtue.

THE Principal Virtue is (as I have said) That, which the *Greeks* call σοφία, and *We*, *Wisdom*. But their φρόνησις (or *Prudence*) is quite Another thing; being *the skill of Judging what we are to do, and what not*: Or of distinguishing betwixt Good and Evil. Whereas *Wisdom* (which we call the Principal) *is the Knowledge of things Divine and Humane*: wherein is comprehended a certain Correspondence betwixt the Gods, and Men, and a Society among Themselves. Now *This* be the most Eminent *Virtue*, as Certainly it is. So must that likewise be the most Eminent *Duty*, which refers to *Community*. For the *Speculation* and *Perception* of things, is but *lame* and *imperfect*, if it be not follow'd with *Action*; which *Action* is best seen, in providing for the *Common Benefits* of *Mankind*: And must therefore be reduced to the Subject of Humane Society; in preference to the naked Understanding of things. And this does every Good man find to be True, upon his Own Practice, and Observation. For where's the man, that is so transported with a Thirst of Knowledge; or a desire

of piercing into the Nature of things, that if he ſhould be call'd upon the ſuddain, to the Relief of his Country, his Father, or his Friend, that were in danger: Where is the Man (I ſay) that in the heat and rapture of his moſt Divine Contemplations, would not quit All, to attend this Duty, even ſuppoſing him to be in his Thoughts already numbring the Stars, and taking meaſure of the Univerſe? This gives us to underſtand, that the Offices of *Juſtice*, conducing to the Common Utility of Mankind (than which nothing ought to be dearer to us) are of ſo much greater importance, than theſe of *Study*, and *Science*; and never was any man ſo taken up in his Life, and Application, with the ſearch of Knowledge, as not yet to have an Eye to his Duty to the Publique; and to Conſult the well-being of Sociable Nature: As we ſee in the Inſtance of *Lycias* the *Pythagorean*, to the *Theban Epaminondas*; and in That of *Plato*, to *Dion* of *Syracuſe*; and divers others that train'd up their Diſciples to the Love, Knowledge, and Exerciſe of Civil Duties. And for the ſervice, (if any at all) which I my ſelf have render'd to the *Republique*, I muſt aſcribe it to my Maſters, and to my Books, that inſtructed, and fitted Me for my Function. For great men do not only teach the Lovers of Learning during their *Lives*; but in their very *Graves* too: Tranſmitting their Precepts down to after times, for the Uſe of Poſterity. Now to ſhew how much Their Leiſures contributed to our Buſineſs; Theſe Eminent men have not ſlipt ſo much as any one point appertaining to the Laws, Manners, and Diſcipline of the Commonwealth; but have ſtill, with all their Faculties, applyed the Fruits of their Labours and Studies, to

Juſtice more valuable than Science.

Our Country in the firſt place.

to the well being of the Publique. So that a Copious Eloquence, joyned with Prudence, is much more profitable, than the most refin'd subtilty of *Thought*, without *Speaking*. For *Meditation* does only *Circulate* within it self; Whereas *Eloquence* works upon *Others*, and Insinuates it self into the Affections of all that hear it. We must not imagine that *Bees* gather into Swarms, upon a design to make their *Cells*, but it is in their Nature to *Congregate*, and then they work their *Combs*. And so it is with *Men*, who are much more Sociable by Nature; when they are gotten together, they Consult their Common business. Now for That Virtue (of *Justice*) which provides for the Defence, and Conversation of Men in Society; if it be not accompanied with the *Understanding* of Things, it is but *solitary*, and *Fruitless*. And what is *Courage*, without the softness of Humane *Courtesie*, and *Candour*, but a *Savage*, and *Outragious Brutality*? From hence we may infer the Excellency of a *Practical Justice*, in the Ordering of *Mankind*; above the force, and effect of a *Speculative Notion*. There are some people that Phansie all Leagues and Associations amongst men, to arise from the need that one man has for another, toward the supplying of our Natural, and Common Necessities: because (say They) if Providence had deliver'd us from This Care of Looking after Food, and Cloathing, by appointing some Extraordinary way for the furnishing of it; no man, of either Brains, or Virtue, would ever trouble his head about Business; but wholly deliver himself up to the attaining of Wisdom. But This is a mistake: For even in That Condition, a man would fly Solitude, and wish for a Companion in his very Studies;

Leagues are more for Society than Defence.

Studies: he would be willing to Teach, and to Learn; to Hear, and to Speak. So that beyond question, the Duties that defend, and support men in Society, are more to be esteem'd than those, that barely relate to Learning, and Knowledge.

Justice and Temperance compar'd.

IT may be another Question whether *This Community* which is so Consonant to Nature, be in all Cases to be preferr'd to *Modesty*, and *Moderation*. Now I think Not. For there are some things, partly so foul, and in part so flagitious, that a wise man (even if it were to save his Country) would not be guilty of them. *Posidonius* has made a large Collection of such Cases: But so filthy, so obscene, that a man cannot honestly repeat them. Now why should any man do that for the saving of his Country, which his Country it self would rather perish, than any member it self would do? But however, this is the best on't; that it can never be for the Interest of the *publique*, to have a wise man do any such thing. Let it be therefore concluded, that of all Duties we are to prefer those that tend toward the Maintaining of Society. For a *Considerate Action presumes an Antecedent Cognition, and Wisdom.* So that it is more to *Do Considerately*, than to *Think Wisely*. But let This suffice; for the matter is made so plain, that there will be no difficulty to resolve upon *Two Duties* in *question*, which to *Chuse*. But then in the Community it self, there are several Degrees of Duties, in subordination one to another. The *First* is what we owe to the Immortal *Gods*; the *Second*, to our *Country*; the *Third*, to our *Parents*, and so in Order, successively,

Degrees of Duties.

ceſſively, to Others. Upon a Brief Diſquiſition of This Matter, it will appear that the point in debate, is not only which is *honeſt*, and which the *Contrary*: but of *Two honeſt propoſitions*; which is the *Honeſter*; and then, which is the *Honeſteſt of All*. This (as I have ſaid) was ſlipt by *Panætius*; but let us now proceed.

The End of the Firſt Book.

TULLY's

TULLY's OFFICES.

The Second BOOK.

IN What manner Duties ariſe from Virtue, and from every diſtinct Branch of it, is ſufficiently explained, (as I conceive) in the Former Book. It remains now (my Son *Marcus*) that we proceed upon ſome certain ſorts of Duty, that have a regard to the ſplendor and Ornament of Life: As to Riches, Power; and a Competent proviſion of things Commodious for the Uſe of Man. The matter in queſtion was, (as I told you) *Firſt* what is *Profitable*, and what *not*. *Secondly*, What is *more Profitable*, *Comparatively* with that which is *Leſs*: And *Laſtly*, What's *moſt Profitable* of All things, *without Compariſon*. You have here the Subject of This Treatiſe: But before I enter upon this Diſcourſe it ſelf, I muſt give you a word or two of my Purpoſe, and Intention. *The Subject of This Book.*

THERE are a great many I know that have been excited, by my Books, to the Love of Letters: And to the love, not only of Reading, but of Writing alſo: And yet Philoſophy has gotten *The Introduction.*

ſo

ſo Ill a Name in the World, (verily with ſome good men too) that I am afraid ſometimes, of hazzarding my Credit with them; for beſtowing ſo much Time, and Labour upon This Study. But truly, for my Own part, ſo long as the Management of Publique Affairs paſt through thoſe hands, to which the Commonwealth had deliver'd up it ſelf: All my Thoughts, and Cares were directed That way: But when One man came to Graſp all, and that there was no longer Any place for Authority, or Counſel, (thoſe Publique-ſpirited men being gone too, that had been my Partners in the Charge of the Government) It was not for me, either on the One hand, to abandon my ſelf to an Anxious, and irkſome Melancholy; or, on the other, to plunge my ſelf into Pleaſures, below the Dignity of my Profeſſion. Oh! that the Republique might have continu'd ſtill in the Former ſtate, without falling into thoſe hands; that ſought not ſo much the Change of Affairs, as the Total Ruine of them. For if the Commonwealth were Now ſtanding, I ſhould be doing at this inſtant juſt as I did before. Firſt, my Buſ'neſs would lie more at the Bar, than in my Study; and Secondly, I ſhould now be ſetting down my Pleadings, as formerly, inſtead of theſe Morals: But ſince the Diſſolution of the Government, that took up all my Cares, my Thoughts, my Studies; There's no more Law, or Senate-Imployment. Matters being brought to This Paſs, (and 'tis not for any man that has a Soul, to ſit ſtill, and do nothing) What could I better do, than to betake my ſelf to my Philoſophy; My Firſt Study, and the moſt Innocent, the Honeſteſt Diverſion of my Troubles? It was the Inſtitu-

tion

tion of my Youth; and I ſpent a great deal of Time upon't: Till I came afterward to puſh my Fortune in the World, for Offices, and Preferments; and then I dedicated my ſelf wholly to the Government: But ſtill reſerving Thoſe hours for Philoſophy, which I had to ſpare from the Publique, and my Friends; and Thoſe very hours were ſpent in Reading too; for I had no Leiſure to Write. The Calamity of thoſe Times was Extreme: and yet we have drawn This Benefit from it, that we are now at Liberty to commit thoſe things to Letters, which our Countrymen were very little acquainted with, tho' in themſelves infinitely worth the Knowing. For (*in the name of all the Gods!*) *What is more deſirable than* Wiſdom? *more Excellent; more uſeful to a man? or what more worthy of him?* We call the Lovers of it, *Philoſophers*, from the very *Etymon* of the word: For *Philoſophy*, by Interpretation, is only *the Love of Wiſdom.* The Antients defin'd it to be *the Science of things Divine and Humane; and of their Cauſes.* What will any man ſpeak well of, I wonder, that reproaches this Study? if he ſeeks either the Delight of his Mind, or the allaying of his cares, this is the Study that does it Incomparably above all others: For it furniſhes him, every day, with ſomething or other, toward Attaining, and Enjoying a Virtuous, and a Happy Life. If Virtue, or an Unſhaken conſtancy, be his Buſ'neſs, it is either to be compaſſed This way, or not at all. There is not any thing ſo ſmall, but there goes Art, and Application toward the acquiring of it: And ſhall any man be ſo mad then, as to think that there needs none toward the moſt Important Acquiſition of our Lives? But if there

The Praiſe of Philoſophy.

be

be any Diſcipline of Virtue, where ſhall we look for it; if we depart from This way of finding it out? This Queſtion, as it falls properly under another *Topique*, So we have handled it in another place; and more accurately too; That is to ſay, in our Exhortations to Philoſophy. My preſent purpoſe is only to ſet forth, that having nothing any longer to do, in the Government, I made choice of This Subject for my private Entertainment. But I muſt expect to be here encounter'd, and that by ſome of the Learned too, with a charge of contradicting my ſelf. For how does it conſiſt, ſay they, the entring upon *Diſputes*, and delivering *Precepts* of *Duty*, as things *Certain*; and yet at the ſame time, to maintain that we have *no certain Knowledge of any thing*? I ſhould be glad to be a little better underſtood; For I am none of thoſe Roving, Wandring heads, that Live, and Live on; without propoſing to themſelves any Scope, or Deſign. How Miſerable were That mans mind, or rather his Life, that ſhould be debarr'd the Uſe of his Reaſon, not only in the matter of Argument, but in the main End of his Being? Now for thoſe Points which Others Divide, into *Certain*, and *Uncertain*; it pleaſes me better, that they ſhould be *diſtinguiſhed* by calling them *Probable*, or *Improbable*. And what ſhould hinder me now from Embracing the One, and diſallowing the Other? provided that I keep my ſelf from being either Arrogantly poſitive; or Raſh and Inconſiderate; Two qualities that hold no fellowſhip with Wiſdom. But our people, on the Other ſide, will diſpute every thing: For (ſay they) without comparing *Both parts*, how ſhall any man know which is the *Right*? But This

An Objection Anſwered.

matter

matter (I suppose) is sufficiently clear'd, in our *Academical Questions*. Now for You, (my Son) tho' you have been train'd up in the most Ancient, and Noble sort of Philosophy, and under the Institution *Cratippus*; (an Author not inferiour to the most Venerable Founders of it) I would not have you a Stranger yet to your Fathers Writtings, which you will not find much differing from your Own. But now to the Point.

The Distribution of the Whole Work.

WE have, for methods sake, made a Distribution of *Humane Duties* into *Five Parts*; *Two*, upon the Points of *Decency*, and *Virtue*; *Two more*, with a respect to the *Commodiousness* of *Life*; as *Power*, *Wealth*, &c. And a *Fifth*, with a regard to our *Election*, rather of *One*, than *another*, when *several things*, either *Good*, or *Profitable*, meet in *Competition*. We have already gone through the First Branch of this Division, which I must recommend to your particular Attention, and Study. The Point now in hand is That which we call *Profitable*: A word, which by the Corruption of *Time*, and *Custom*, is perverted insensibly to the signification of somewhat that may be separated from *Honesty*: as if any thing could be *Profitable*, that were not *Honest*, or any thing *Honest*, without being *Profitable*; an Error of the most pernicious consequence imaginable to the Life of man. These Three Points, how confused soever they may appear to be, are yet by Philosophers of great Authority, very judiciously, and ingenuously distinguished in the Imagination: concluding in This, that *whatsoever is* Profitable, *is* Honest, *and whatsoever is* Honest, *is* Profitable: And

The Word Profitable *is Corrupted.*

Profitable and Honest are Convertible Terms.

consequently that whatsoever is *Either* of them is the *Other*. From the not understanding this matter aright, it comes o ten to pass, that we have a Cunning, Artificial sort of People, in great Admiration: mistaking *Craft*, for *Wisdom*. This Opinion is by all means to be rooted out from among men; and this following perswasion erected in the stead of that, there is no compassing the end we aim at, by Fraudulent and Indirect Courses, but only by just Dealings and honest Counsels.

Craft mistaken for Wisdom.

Things Inanimate.

Animate.

Unreasonable.

Reasonable.

NOW the things appertaining to Conveniencies for the Life of man, are either *Inanimate*, as *Gold*, *Silver*, *Minerals*, and the production of the *Earth*; or *Animated*, and indu'd with *Impulse*, and *Appetite*; And those again are divided, into *Unreasonable*, and *Reasonable*. Of the former kind, we may reckon *Horses*, *Oxen*, and other sorts of *Cattle*; *Bees*, &c. whose labour Contributes in some measure, to the Use and Necessities of Life: and then for *Reasonable*, we may account the *Gods*, and *Men*. By Piety and Holiness, we make our selves acceptable to the Gods; but in the next place to the Gods themselves, it is in the Power of Men to render themselves most Beneficial to one another. And those things which may be hurtful, or Injurious to us, do fall likewise under the same Division. But in This Case the Gods are excepted; as presuming that they will do us no harm. So that the greatest mischief that we are liable to, is from one another. For the very *Inanimate* things we spake of, are most of them, the Effects of Humane Industry and Labour. There goes a great deal of Work, and Art, to the very *prepara-*

One man is the greatest Benefit or Mischief to another.

The Necessity of Mutual Help and Society.

of them; and then there must be Humane Application to the *Using* of them: For neither Physique, Navigation, Tillage, the Reaping and Gathering of our Corn, and Fruits, or the Conservation of them, could be effected without the labour of *Man*. There would be no Exporting what we have to spare, or Importing what we want, without the mutual Help one of another. How should we fetch up Stones out of the Quarries for our necessary use: or Iron, Brass, Gold, Silver, out of the Bowels of the Earth, without Labour, and the Hands of men? whence came our Houses, at First, to defend us from the Injuries of Heat and Cold? or How should we afterward have Repaired, or Rebuilt them, when they come to be laid in Ruines, either by Tempest, Earthquakes, or even by Age it self: If the Obligations and Necessities of Humane Societies, had not mov'd us to call for Help, one of another? Our *Aquaducts*, Our *Canals* for the turning of Rivers, and flowing of our Grounds, our Sea Banks, our forced Ports, and Harbours, are they not all of them the Effect of Manual Operation and Industry? From these Instances, and a thousand more, it appears undeniably that the very advantages which we receive even from Inanimate things would be totally lost to us; but for That Labour and Endeavor that gives us Profit of them: and to which we are likewise indebted for the Benefits that we receive even from Beasts themselves. It was undoubtedly the Invention of man too: the Application of them to the Use of Mankind; nor can we at this day either Feed, Reclaim, or Preserve what we have occasion for, or make our Best of their Service, without the Assistance of one another.

other. It is not by the help of Men, that w
deſtroy thoſe Creatures that are hurtful to u
and take others, that we may be the better fo
What ſhould I ſpeak of thoſe Innumerable Ar
without which we are little better than *Dea*
Living? What *Cure* for the *Sick*? What d
light for the *Sound*? What *Food*, or *Clothin*
without the help of *Arts*, and *Trades*, to ſu
ply us? This is it that furniſhes, and Sweete
Humane Life; and in our manner of Feedin
and Covering, raiſes us above the Condition
Beaſts. How ſhould *Cities* have been eith
built, or *peopled* without *Correſpondence*, a
Commerce? And hence come *Laws*, and *Cuſtom*
the *Equal* and *Univerſal Bounds* of *Comm*
Right, for the *Comfort*, and *Regulation* of
Lives. And this Communication produces *Gen*
neſs of Manners, and *Modeſty*, and This is
that ſupports us in a State of Security, and fu
niſhes us in all our Wants, by the Intercou
of Giving, and Receiving, and by the Exchan
of Good Offices, and Conveniences. A gre
deal of this might have been ſpar'd; For it
clear to every man, That which *Panætius* has
much enlarg'd upon; Which is, that never
Prince or General, either in War, or in Peace
atchiev'd any Great, and Profitable Explo
without the Concurrence of Humane Aid.
makes his Inſtances in *Themiſtocles*, *Pericles*, C
rus, *Ageſilaus*, *Alexander*; who could ne
have done thoſe mighty things (he ſays) witho
the help of Others. But there was no neceſſ
of Witneſſes in ſo evident a matter. Now
the Advantages are very Great, which we
ceive by Communication, and Agreement;
there is no Miſchief ſo deteſtable, which one m
do

The great Miſchiefs are from one man to another.

does not bring upon another. *Dicearchus*, a famous, and an Eloquent *Peripatetique*, has written an expreſs Tract *of the Deſtruction of Men.* He ſumms up all the *Fatalities* of *Mankind*; as *Inundations*, *Plagues*, *Deſolations*; the hidden *Incurſions* of *Wild Beaſts*, and *Serpents*, which, according to his Relation, have ſometimes devour'd whole Nations: and all This, (he ſays) is as nothing, to the Calamities, that by *War*, and *Seditions*, we have brought *one upon another.* Now ſince it is without diſpute, that we are the Authors both of great Good, and of great Evil, among our ſelves, it muſt be the Buſ'neſs, as it is the Property of Virtue, ſo to mould and faſhion mens minds, as to Create in them, Inclinations of Contributing toward the Common good of Mankind. Now for thoſe Benefits, that we receive from things without Life, or in what kind ſoever, in the uſe and ordering of Beaſts; they are properly *Mechanical*: and the Works of the *Body*, rather than of the *Mind.* But thoſe Studies, that fit, and diſpoſe us for the Emprovement of our Fortunes, are excited by the Prudence and Virtue of excellent Men: For almoſt all Virtue moves upon *Theſe three Points.* Firſt, the *Accurate Perception* of every thing in its Naked *Truth* and *Simplicity*; in the Correſpondence of Circumſtances, and the Conſequences of things, with the Riſe and Cauſes of them. *Secondly*, the Moderating of our *Paſſions*, and *Appetites*, (which the *Greeks* call πάθη, and ὁρμὰς) and ſubjecting them to the Government of Reaſon. The *Third*, is, the Skill of managing our *Converſation* with ſo much *Courteſie*, and *Diſcretion*, as to gain the kindneſs and aſſiſtance of our Acquaintance, toward the

Of Prudence and Virtue.

furnishing of us with all things that our Nature requires, in competency and plenty; Defending and Protecting us from Violence, revenging ourselves upon those that affront us, by inflicting such punishments only as may stand with Humanity, and Justice. As to the Means, and Faculty both of Making Friends, and Keeping them, (which we shall speak of in due Time, and Place) only a word, in passage.

The Power of Fortune.

WE are all of us sensible of the Power of *Fortune*, in the matter of *Prosperity*, and *Adversity*. When she gives us a Fair Gale, our Course is smooth, and gentle; till we arrive at our desired Port. But when the Wind blows strong against us, we are fain to beat it out, under a thousand hazards. Now there are some Casualties, less frequent than Others: which are commonly ranged under the Dominion of *Fortune*. First from things *Inanimate*, as *Storms*, *Tempests*, *Shipwracks*, *Ruines*, *Conflagrations*; from *Beasts* as *Strooks*, *Bitings*, *Trampling under foot*, &c. These are *Accidents*, as I said, that fall not often. But the Routing of *Armies*; (as of no less then Three lately:) the Loss of *Brave Commanders*, (one Incomparable Person but the other day) the *Envy* of the *Multitude*, and World of Gallant, and Deserving Men, by *Proscriptions*, *Imprisonments*, and *forced Escapes* sacrific'd to *Popular Malice*: And on the *Other Side*, *Honours*, *Empire*, *Victory*; tho' these things are All look'd upon as *Fortuitous*; yet neither the *One*, nor the *Other* come to pass without the Interposition of Labour and Industry. Now since thus it is; let us consider

Unhappy Casualties.

what fair Means we may make such Interest

nd Friendſhips in the World, as may turn to our Advantage. If you ſhall think the Diſcourſe over-long; compare it with the Dignity of the Subject, and perhaps you'll come to wiſh there had been more on't.

The Grounds of Honor and Eſteem in the World.

WHAT good Office ſoever one Man does for Another, whether in the matter of Fortune, of Credit, he does it either upon the Account of *Good Will*, and *Perſonal Affection*; or of *Reſpect*, as wiſhing well to the Advancement of his Fortune, out of a Veneration for his *Virtue*: Or *elſe*, upon the ſcore of *Truſt*, and *Confidence* in him: as one that is able to give us good *Advice*: Or *otherwiſe*, out of *fear*, perchance, of his *Power*. Or in hope of a *Reward*: (as it is common for Princes, and Popular Pretenders, to ſcatter their *Donatives*.) Or *Laſtly*; Many Men are mov'd by the bare Obligations of *Money*, and *Reward*. The *fouleſt*, and the *baſeſt* of all *Conſiderations*, both to Him that *entertains* the Addreſs, and to the Other, that *makes* it. For Matters are at an Ill paſs, when that which ſhould be obtain'd by *Virtue*, is attempted by *Money*. But ſince there is, many times, a *Neceſſity* of *That Proviſion*, we will give ſome Directions for the *Uſing* of it. Only ſomething muſt be ſaid in the Firſt place, of Thoſe Things that have a nearer Affinity with Virtue. There are ſeveral Reaſons for which One Man puts himſelf under the *Power*, and *Government* of *Another*; Either *Affection*, *Obligations*, *Excellency of Endowments*, *Hope of Profit*; *Fear* of being *forc'd* to't: Or Men are Inveigled by Liberal *Promiſes*; or in fine, by *Corruption*, and *Reward*; which we find to be a common caſe in *our Republique*.

Mercenary Natures.

Love is the beſt Security of Power.

Hatred is the certain effect of Fear.

THERE is nothing that *ſecures Power*, and *Greatneſs*, like *Love*: Nothing that *endangers* it, like *Fear*. Wherefore *Ennius* ſays very well, *He that is Fear'd, is Hated; and they that hate a Man, wiſh him Dead.* But when it comes once to a *General Hatred*, there is no force that is able to encounter it: As we have found by late, and dear Experience, even if the thing had been unknown to us before. And it is not only in the Violent Death of that *Tyrant*, *Ceſar*, (whom this Oppreſſed City was forc'd to bear, for want of Power to make Reſiſtance) but we may read it alſo in the common fate of our Oppreſſours; ſcarce any of them coming to a Natural End. *Fear* is a *Falſe*, and *ſhort-liv'd Security*; but *Love* on the contrary, and *Benevolence*, are Firm, even to the *Death*. In the Caſe of a *Conquer'd People*, I muſt confeſs, if nothing elſe will keep them in Order; I ſhould adviſe the ſame Rigour, and Authority to be exercis'd over them, that a *Maſter* uſes over his *Servants*. But for any Man to purſue the ſame courſe in a *Free City*, of making himſelf *Fear'd*, were a direct Madneſs. For let the Laws be never ſo much Oppreſt, by Might, and Faction, and the very Foundations of the Common Liberty ſhaken, there will be ſecret contrivances yet, private Conſultations, and Inrolling of Parties; that will ſome time or other put Life again into the Government. For Men are more ſenſible of the Want of Liberty, than of the Enjoyment of it. Let us therefore imbrace that which moſt conduces, not only to our *Security*, but alſo to *Wealth*, and *Power*. The Ready way to the attaining of our Deſires, either in Publique Affairs, or in Private, is, to

caſt

cast out Fear, and to preserve and maintain Charity. For whosoever would be Fear'd, must necessarily be afraid himself of all that are afraid of him. What shall we think of the condition of the *First Dionysius*, under the horrour and the torture of his Terrours? that singed his very Beard, because he would not venture his Throat under the hand of a Barber? Or of *Alexander* the *Pherean*; that durst not trust himself with his beloved *Thebe*, without a *Barbarian*, a branded Slave, with his drawn Sword, for his Conductor; and his Guards sent before him to search all the Womens Boxes, even to their very Clothes and Linnen, for conceal'd Ponyards, or other dangerous Weapons; before he durst venture himself only from his Table, into his Bedchamber? O miserable wretch, that could put more confidence in a *Stigmatiz'd Barbarian*, than in his own *Wife*! But his Fears fell upon him, for she kill'd him with her own Hand, upon the jealousie of a private *Amour*. Nor is there any Power under Heaven that can long maintain it self against a pressing and an Universal Fear. And this we may see in the Example of *Phalaris*; a Tyrant celebrated for his Cruelty: who was cut off, not like the *Pherean Alexander*, by secret *Treachery*; nor yet like *Our Cesar*, by a particular band of *Conspirators*: But he was put to Death, by the Unanimous Outrage of the Citizens of *Agrigentum*; in the very *Market-place*. Did not the *Macedonians* abandon *Demetrius*, and go over as one Man, to *Pyrrhus*? Were not the *Lacedæmonians*, for their Iniquity, and Mis-government, almost totally deserted by their *Allies*, at that fatal Battle of *Leuctra*? where they stood looking on, as Idle Specta-

The Condition and Fate of Tyrants.

The End of Phalaris.

Spectators, till the *Lacedæmonians* were wholly routed, and cut to pieces. I had rather make use of Foreign Instances, than Domestique upon This Subject: But This however let me say, so long as the Government of *Rome* was influenc'd by Principles of *Gentleness*, more than of *Violence*: so long as they fought only for their *Friends*, or for *Empire*; the Issue of the War was either a Generous Mercy, or at worst, no manner of Unnecessary Rigour. The Senate of *Rome* was in those days the Haven, the Sanctuary of Oppressed Kings, People, and Nations; And the Magristrates and Captains of Those Times, had no Other Ambition, no Other Pique of Glory in prospect, than to defend their Provinces, and to support their Associates with Truth and Equity: so that *Rome* did rather affect the *Patronage* of the whole World, than the *Empire* of it. This custom, and Discipline began sometimes since by little and little to decline; but after the Victory of *Sylla*, it was totally extinct: And in Truth, it would not have lookt well after such Barbarities exercis'd upon the *Citizens Themselves*, to have kept Touch in any point of Faith and Justice, with their *Allies*. Here was a Glorious Cause attended with a most Impious, and Shameful *Victory*. The Goods of so many Honest, Worthy, and Eminent Citizens expos'd to Sale in the Market-place: And to heighten the Affront; under the very Title of *Sylla*'s *Booty*. There was another that came after him; whose Cause it self was bad, and yet made fouler by the Victory. For not only the Goods of particular Citizens, but whole Nations and Countries, by One common Act of Calamity, were here upon *Auction*; and after infinite Vexations, and

Rome was formerly the Sanctuary of the Oppressed.

The Miseries that befel Rome *for Cruelty and Injustice.*

and Ruines wrought abroad, we liv'd to see the Image of *Marseilles* born in Triumph: *Marseilles*, I say without which, we our selves could never have carry'd a Triumph beyond the *Alps*; and This was the condition too of the lost Empire. I might reckon up Histories without end, of our perfidious dealings with our *Allies*: but This One shall suffice; being the basest perhaps that ever the Sun look'd upon. Now this Judgment upon us is Just: For the Sufferance of *many Criminals* made way to the boundless Licence of *This One*; who has left a great many Heirs of his *Ambition*, tho' but few of his *Fortune*. And there shall never want either Disposition, or Matter, for a Civil War, so long as *Sylla*'s Successes shall stand upon Record, for an Encouragement to desperate Wretches to inrich themselves by his Example. Those bloudy, and prosperous Usurpations of *Sylla*; which, as they were formerly Acted in the *Dictatourship* of his near Kinsman, so they were now renew'd six and thirty years after, with more Outrage, and horrour. He that had been but a *Clerk* under the former *Dictatourship*, was now preferr'd, in the *Latter*, to be *City-Treasurer*. Why should we expect now, ever to be quiet, when Sedition meets with such Rewards? 'Tis true, the Walls of the City are yet standing, and in Being, tho' in continual dread of the utmost of Extremities: But the Government it self is absolutely sunk already. And to return to my Subject, all these Calamities are fallen upon us, for making it our bus'ness rather to be Fear'd, than Belov'd. Now if the Power of *Rome* could not support it self under *Tyranny*, and *Oppression*; how should any particular person expect to escape? It is sufficient-

Prosperous Cruelties are dangerous Presidents.

ſufficiently made already appear, that the Bonds of *Love* are much ſtronger than thoſe of *Fear*. We ſhall now debate upon the Faireſt means of obtaining that Affection, which we ſo earneſtly deſire, with Honour and Juſtice. But we do not all of us ſtand in need of it alike: ſo that we muſt accommodate the Matter to every Mans condition, and courſe of Life; to ſee whether it be neceſſary to procure a General Eſteem, or that the kindneſs of ſome few may do the bus'neſs. We may however conclude upon This, as the Firſt, and principal point: That we contract Faithful Friendſhips; and make acquaintances with thoſe that Truly Love, and value us. And this is a *Common Medium*, almoſt indifferently, betwixt Great, and Small. And a Rule that holds with Both alike; not as if all men ſtood equally in need of Glory, and Reputation, but they are good Helps yet (whoever has them) toward the Gaining of Other advantages, and the making of Friendſhips: which in my *Lælius* I have expreſly handled. And I have written two Books alſo upon the Subject of *Glory*; which yet I muſt touch over again, as a thing of great moment in the Conduct even of our moſt Important affairs.

How to gain a fair Reputation in the World.

What is perfect Glory.

WE are then arrived at the higheſt pitch of Glory, when we have gained Theſe Three Points: The *Love*, the *Truſt*, and the *Reverence* of the *People*: When we can hear them ſay; *That Man is worthy of Honour*. Now to ſpeak Short, and plain; The Method is well nigh the ſame, of Ingratiating our ſelves with a *Single Perſon*, or with the *Multitude*. But yet there is another manner of addreſs alſo, toward

toward the Influencing of the Minds, and good Will of the People, in our Favour.

Bounty and Gentleneſs, work much upon the People.

TO ſpeak in Order now, to the three Points before mentioned; Nothing works ſo much upon the Affections of the People, as *Liberality* or *Bounty*. And next to That, is a *Benevolent*, and *Generous Inclination*: even without the Means of expreſſing it in *Effects*. For the very *Fame* and *Opinion* of a Mans Frankneſs, Bounty, Juſtice, Faith: and briefly of all thoſe Virtues that Contribute to the Sweetning, and Smoothing of our Manners, has a wonderful power over the hearts of the people. There is ſuch a Charm in That *Gracefulneſs* and *Decorum*, which we have already Treated of, that the very Nature, and bare Appearance of it does move us ſtrangely. Beſide that as it receives its Luſtre from the aforeſaid Virtues; whereever we find thoſe Virtues, we cannot but naturally have a good Inclination for the perſon that poſſeſſes them. Theſe are the moſt powerful attractives of Love. Not but that there may be other motives alſo, tho' of leſs moment.

The Power of Juſtice and Prudence.

AS to the Matter of *Truſt* and *Credit*; if we can but get the Reputation of being *Prudent* and *Juſt*, our Bus'neſs is done: For we have naturally a confidence in thoſe that we think Wiſer than our ſelves; In men of *Providence*, and *Foreſight*, upon whom we may depend for our ſeaſonable direction, and advice; as thoſe that in Caſe of any difficulty, are able to help us out. This is the True, and Profitable *Wiſdom*: As to the *Truſt* now which we repoſe in *Juſt*, *Good*, and *Faithful* Men; we muſt

must not entertain so much as the least suspicion in it, of Fraud, or Injury: These being the men into whose hands we do reasonably commit our Lives, our Children, and our Fortunes. But it is *Justice* yet, that creates the greater Confidence of the Two: For *Justice* may beget *Confidence*, without *Wisdom*; but *Wisdom* can do nothing without *Justice*. For take away the Opinion of a mans *Integrity*, and the more *Crafty*, and *Subtle* he is, by so much is he the more *Hateful*, and *Suspected*. *Justice*, and *Prudence* in *Conjunction*, will give a man what *Credit* he pleases; but taking them *Apart*, *Justice*, even without *Wisdom*, may do very much; but *Wisdom*, without *Justice*, is nothing Worth.

Wisdom without Justice, is Craft.

Let not any man wonder now at my dividing One Virtue from Another, as if it were possible for a man to be *Just*, and yet not *Prudent*; when the Philosophers are all agreed upon't (and my self too for one) that he that has one Virtue, has All. For it is One thing, the Nicety of hitting a Truth in a Philosophical Decision; and another thing to make a Discourse in Words accommodated to Vulgar acceptation: And that's my Intent in this place, when I say that one is *Valiant*, another *Good*, a third *Wise*: For these are popular Opinions, and must be clothed in Common and popular Terms, which was also *Panætius*'s way of expressing himself. But to resume my purpose.

THE Third point recommended toward the acquiring of Glory, is This: So to behave our selves that people may hold us in Admiration, and account us Worthy of all honour. The Common people are Generally admirers of all things that

Admiration produces Esteem.

that are Great, and beyond their Understanding: And so they are in particular Cases too: Where they find more Good in a man than they expected. But where they phansie any Virtues peculiar, and Extraordinary, they extol men to the Skies, and behold them with a kind of Veneration, despising, and vilifying such, on the other side, as they find wanting either in Virtue, Strength, or Courage. But they cannot yet be said to *Despise* all that they have an *Ill Opinion* of. For there is a Lewd, Backbiting, Couzening, Quarrelsom Generation of men, which tho' they do exceedingly *Dislike*, they do not yet *Contemn*: For those Only are properly to be taken for *Contemptible*, that lead a *Lazy*, *Droning*, *Heedless Life*; without any Benefit, either to Themselves, or Others. The Admirable Spirits are such as have the Repute of a Preeminence in Virtue; and keep themselves not only from doing Mean and Dishonourable things, but clear even of those Vices, which others cannot easily resist. For by the Charms of pleasures, our Minds are Dissolv'd, and withdrawn from Virtue; and we are as much discomposed and shaken, on the other hand, with the Burnings, and Tortures of Pain. It is a prodigious power that the Consideration of Life and Death, Riches and Poverty, has over the Weakness of Flesh and Bloud. But how Glorious then, and how Admirable must That Virtue be, that takes so absolute a profession of the Soul of man, in the Contemplation of Great and Honorable things? As in that elevated state of mind, to make him look down upon all the Circumstances of Fortune, with *Indifference*, and *Scorn*. This Bravery of mind never fails of moving great Admiration:

Great Virtue produces great Admiration.

As Magnanimity.

Especially

Justice. Especially accompany'd with *Justice*; which single Virtue constitutes the very Character of a *Good man*; and makes him wonderful in the Eyes of the people; and not without reason neither. For no man can be *Just*, that either Fears *Death*, *Pain*, *Banishment*, or *Poverty*; Or that Values before *Equity*, the Comforts that stand opposed to these Calamities. But the highest Veneration of all is paid to him that holds out against *Money*: And wheresoever they find such a man, they think they can never do enough for him. So that by *Justice* we gain all those points that lead to *Reputation*; As *Benevolence* by Obliging as many as we can; *Repute* and *Admiration*, by the *Contempt* and *Neglect* of those things which the greater part of the World pursues with *Greediness* and *Passion*.

Contempt of money.

NOW in my Opinion, there is not any Design or Condition of Life wherein one man does not stand in need of Another; and especially, as to the matter of *Familiar Discourse*, and *Conversation*: which a body shall hardly find to his satisfaction, but under the appearance of an *honest man*. Nay, the very *Opinion* of *Justice* will stand a man in great stead, even in the strictest solitude, and retirement imaginable; and more perhaps in that State, than in any other, as living, in some sort, out of Protection; and more exposed to affronts; which, under the Notion of an Impious person, people will be forward enough to put upon him: And then for men of *Business* and *Commerce*, as Buying, Selling, Hiring, Letting, there can be no dealing without *Justice*. Nay so great is the force of it, that common Highway-men, and those that support themselves only

The very Opinion of Justice gives a man Reputation.

Justice is sacred, even among Thieves & Pirates.

only upon Rapine, and Violence, cannot yet subsist without it. Insomuch that if one Thief does but Steal from another of the same Troop, he's expell'd the Society, as a man of no Faith. And if the Captain of the Band shews but any partiality in the Distribution of the Booty, he is at least deserted by his Party, if it does not also cost him his Life; For there is a Discipline even among Pirates themselves: And their Laws are duly executed, and obey'd. *Theopompus* writes of an *Illyrian Robber*, (one *Bargulus*) that was celebrated for his Justice to his Partners, and made himself a great Fortune by't; but not so great a one yet as *Viriatus* the *Portugueſe*; of whose Power, and Courage some of our *Armies*, and Generals felt the sad Effects; till the *Prætor Lælius* (surnamed the *Wise*) defeated and scattered his Forces; and finally put such a *Cheque* to his Undertakings, that he left but little work for Those to do that came after him. How great now must the force of *Justice* be in a *Regular*, and *well order'd Government*, which of it self alone is able to Advance, and Establish even a *Piratic Power*, without any other support?

Kings chosen for their Virtues.

HERODOTUS tells us that the *Medians* chose their Kings Originally, for the Probity of their *Manners*, and in hope of enjoying the Benefits of *Common Justice*: Which I am perswaded was the End, and Practice likewise of our Predecessors. For when in old time, the Weaker were Oppressed by the Stronger, the people presently betook themselves to one more Excellent than the rest, for their Protector: And it was his part to relieve the distressed, and to make such Provisions, that common right might

be done Indifferently betwixt all Parties. And in the making of their *Laws*, they had the ſame Proſpect, as in the choice of their *Kings*. The thing propounded, was an *Equal*, and a *Common Right*; and in Truth, it could be no Right, whithout being ſo qualifi'd. If under the Adminiſtration of ſome *One man* that was *Juſt*, and *Good*, they attained that End, they were well contented There to reſt: But in Caſe of failing, there were Laws Invented, which to all, under them, and at all times, ſhould ſtill pronounce one and the ſame ſentence. This now is clear, that in all Elections, the people have ſtill had a Care to pitch upon him for their *Governour*, that was moſt reverenc'd for his *Juſtice*: Always provided, that he were a Man of *Prudence* too. And what is it that a Nation would not believe it ſelf able to compaſs, under ſo Auſpicious a Conduct? We are therefore obliged to cheriſh, and to preſerve *Juſtice*, by all manner of Means. *Firſt*, for its own ſake, (for otherwiſe it were not *Juſtice*;) And *Secondly*, for the Augmentation of our *Honour*, and *Glory*. But it is in *Glory*, as it is in *Money*; there muſt care be taken, both in the *Getting* of it, and in the *Laying of it out*; for we ſhall have perpetual Occaſions for it; and we muſt provide for Uſes of *Dignity*, as well as thoſe of *Neceſſity*. It was a great thing ſaid, That of *Socrates*; *The neareſt way to Honour* (ſays he) *is for a Man ſo to live, that he may be found to be That in* Truth, *which he would be* Thought *to be*. 'Tis a groſs miſtake, for any Man to think of getting a laſting Reputation in the World, by falſe Appearances of Things. Vain Oſtentation, or ſtudy'd Forms of Looks, and Words. *True Glory* is rooted in the very *Soul*, and brings forth fruit in

A Notable Saying of Socrates.

in our *Actions*. All Disguises pass away, and shed like Flowers; and nothing can be durable, that is Counterfeit. This might be confirm'd by Instances in abundance; but for Brevity sake, I shall content my self with an Observation only upon One Family. The Name of *Tiberius Gracchus* the Son of *Publius*, shall be famous to Posterity, so long as there shall be any Memorial left of *Rome* it self: But for his *Sons*, they were neither beloved, *Living*, nor Lamented, *Dead*; All good Men agreeing in a Detestation of their Lives; and approving the Justice of their Executions: He that would make himself truly Eminent for the Love of *Justice*, must discharge the *Duties* of it; of which Duties, we have treated in the former Book. But how easily soever we may make our selves known to Others for what we are, (tho' in truth the main point rests in being such Men, as we would be thought to be) it will not be amiss yet to lay down some certain Precepts concerning this Matter. He that comes into the World under any Remarkable Circumstance to make him taken notice of, either in respect of Fortune, or Family; as the Son for the purpose of such or such a Father, (which I take (my *Cicero*) to be your Own Case:) All Mens Eyes are presently upon him, and every body enquiring into his Life, and Manners: He lives, as it were, in Open View, and all his Words and Doings are made Publique. Now for Those, who by reason of their Obscure Extraction, are in their tender age not so much known in the World, I would have them prompted Early toward great Undertakings; and bend their Endeavours directly That way; which they will do the more Vigorously, in regard that Young Men

Some are Born remarkable.

Others make themselves so.

are so far from being *Envy'd*, that they are rather cherished, and Encourag'd in Virtuous, and Generous Inclinations.

Let a young Man Study the Use of his Arms.

THE First Lesson that I would give to a *Young man* for the advance of his Credit with the people; should be to addict himself to the Study, and Practice of *Arms*; at least where there were any *Glory* to be gotten by *Military Virtues*. Our Predecessors, that were almost Continually in War, made themselves Famous by This Profession: But it has been Your Lot (my Son) to come into the World amid the Broils of a Divided State, where the One side was Extremely Wicked, and the Other as Unfortunate. And yet in the Command you had under *Pompey*; even in This very War, you acquitted your self as *a Man at Arms* to all purposes; an Excellent Horseman; a person of Indefatigable Industry: and all This to the Common Satisfaction both of the Glorious General, and the Whole Army. But the Commonwealth it self sunk here, and so did your Glory. It is not upon your particular, but a general account, that I have taken up this Discourse: Wherefore I shall now proceed to that which remains.

The Virtues of the Mind are more Noble than those of the Body.

AS the Operations of the *Mind*, are in all Cases much more Noble than those of the *Body*; so are the things that we compass by the Faculties of our *Reason*, and *Understanding*, of much greater value than those things that we bring to pass by *Corporal Force*. The *First* point that recommends us to a good Esteem in the World, is *Modesty*; after that, comes *Piety*, and *Reverence* to our *Parents*; and then follows a Tender-

Of Modesty and Piety.

ness

derneſs of *Affection* to our *Relations*, and *Friends*. It is a promiſing Sign, when a Young Man applies himſelf to perſons of Eminence for Wiſdom, Authority, and Good affection to their Country: For it Creates an *Opinion*, and *Expectation* of *Great Matters* from him that propoſes to himſelf the Imitation of *Great Examples*. It was every Bodies Judgment, upon *Publius Rutilius*, that if he liv'd, he would make a *Famous Civilian*, and an *Honeſt Man*. And what was This grounded upon, but the frequent Converſation that he had in his Youth with *Publius Mucius?* But *Lucius Craſſus*, I muſt confeſs, without the help of any borrow'd Reputation, advanced his own Fame, and digniſi'd himſelf in that Generous and Memorable accuſation of his. He was at That time, of an age to be rather held by Flatteries and fair Words to his very Exerciſes, than left to himſelf. And yet at That age, with *Demoſthenes*, the things which he had ſo happily conceiv'd at Home, he did with no leſs Honour Execute in Publique.

It is a good Sign when a man loves good Company.

WE may divide *Speech* into *Familiar Diſcourſe*, and matter of *Argument*, or *Pleading*. The *Latter* undoubtedly is of the greater Efficacy toward the purchaſing of *Glory*: And this is it which we call *Eloquence*. And yet there is a certain *Affability*, and *Gentleneſs* of Faſhion too, that does wonderfully work upon the Affections of all People. There are yet extant ſome Epiſtles of *Philip* to *Alexander*; of *Antipater* to *Caſſander*; and of *Antigonus* to *Philip*; (Three perſons highly eſteemed for their Wiſdom:) And they do all of them preſcribe

Of Speech.

Affability.

the Uſe of *Courteſie*, and *Fair Language* to him that would Ingratiate himſelf with the *Multitude*; and only the Careſs of ſome Frank and Familiar *Name*, or *Compellation*; (as *Fellow-Souldier*, or *Camarade*) to the *Commander* that would endear himſelf to the *Souldiery*. But then it has another kind of force, the Faculty of *Haranguing* the *Multitude*; when with *One Speech* ſometimes a Man gets an *Eternal Fame*. It is wonderful, the Tranſports that are wrought by the Power of *Eloquence*, and *Wiſdom*: And the Veneration that is paid by the Auditory to a perſon whom they take to be ſo much Wiſer, and Intelligent, than other Mortals. And yet there is a *Mixt way of ſpeaking*, that does wonders too; Eſpecially with a Concurrence in it of both *Weight* and *Modeſty*; which, in a Young Man, makes it ſtill the more admirable. There are many Occaſions that require *Eloquence*; and many of our Countrey-men, (and Young Men too) that are highly eſteemed for it, both at the *Bar*, and in the *Senate*. But that which I look upon to be the moſt *Effectual*, and *praiſe worthy*, is the *Eloquence* of the *Bar*; and the Subject of it, is either *Accuſation*, or *Defenſe*: the *Latter* is the more *Laudable* of the Two, and yet in many Caſes, the *Other* is likewiſe to be *Approved*. As in what I ſaid juſt now of *Craſſus*; and *Anthony* alſo, when he was a Young man, did the ſame thing. *Publius Sulpitius* raiſed the Glory of his Eloquence by his Charge againſt *C. Norbanus*, a Seditious and an Unprofitable Citizen. But this is not a thing to be done often; nor, in Truth, is it to be done at all, unleſs on the behalf of the *Government*, as the *Two Luculluſes*: or in favour of the *Oppreſſed*, as I my ſelf did for the *Sicilians*:

Eloquence the Power of it.

The Subject of it.

Julius

Julius Cæsar did as much for the *Sardinians*; and *Fusius* shew'd his Skill too against *Marcus Aquilius*: so that it may be once done, but no more; unless a Man be call'd to it by his Duty to the Commonwealth. And in the very Case of *Publique Enemies*, there may be an excuse for *Frequent Accusations*: But even There too, we must keep within the Bounds of Moderation: For it is the part of an Ill-natur'd Man, (or I might rather say, scarce of a Man) to make a Trade of hunting People to death. And beside the danger that it brings upon the Persecutor, it is an Infamous, and a Rascally *Character*, that of an *Informer*. It was the *Nick-name* that was given to *Marcus Brutus*, (the Son I mean of the Eminent Civilian) and it cast a blemish upon the very Lustre of his Family. And moreover, he sure to observe this Duty, as Inviolable, and Sacred; *Never to have any thing to do in the Exposing of Innocent Bloud.* For it is a Crime, that no Colour in the World can justifie; for what can be so Inhumane, as to turn the Faculties of Reason, and Eloquence, that were given us for the Benefit, and Conservation of Mankind, to the Ruine, and Destruction of Honest Men? But it does not follow yet, because we must not upon any terms persecute the Innocent, that therefore we may not in some Case defend the Wicked, and the Guilty: For it is a thing many times agreeable to the Will of the People; to Custom, and to Humanity, so to do. It is the part of the *Judge*, constantly to follow the *Truth*; but the *Advocate* is not so strictly ty'd up to the *Precise Truth*, as not to make his best sometimes of that which carries some near *Resemblance* of it. I should not take This Freedom upon This

It is a busie Office that of an Informer.

Have a Care of Innocent Bloud.

Subject, if I had not the Authority of *Panætius*, (one of the ſoundeſt of the *Stoiques*) to ſupport me in it. The greateſt Favour and Renown is gotten by a *Defenſive Eloquence*; and it is ſo much the Greater, as the Power, and Oppoſition of the Adverſary is the Stronger; and according to the Straits, and Exigencies of the Party reliev'd. We have brought off many, and particularly, in our younger days, we defended *Sextus Roſcius Amerinus* againſt the Force and Authority of *L. Sylla* himſelf: The Oration you know is ſtill Extant.

Liberality is Twofold Labour and Money.

HAVING already ſet forth the Methods by which a Young man may advance his *Reputation* in the World; we ſhall now diſcourſe that matter of *Liberality*, and *Bounty*, which is *Twofold*; For we oblige thoſe that ſtand in need of our Help, either by our *Labour*, or by our *Mony*. The *Latter* is the *Eaſier* way; eſpecially where the *Benefactor* is Maſter of an *Eſtate*; but the *Other* is the more *Honorable* and *Splendid*, and better becoming a Clear and Generous Mind. For tho' the Will may be Frank enough in Both, yet the one Obligation is rather a Debt to his *Fortune*, but the other to his *Virtue*. And then by Theſe Pecuniary Bounties, the very Fountain is drawn dry, and one Bounty is deſtroy'd by another; and in the very act, we loſe the Means of Obliging. But he that is Liberal of his *Pains*, that is to ſay, of his *Induſtry*, and *Virtue*, the more Good he has done already, the more Friends will he find to aſſiſt him toward the doing of more: and then by the Cuſtom and Practice of doing good Offices a man does not only learn the *Way* of *Obliging*, but gets the very

very *Habit* of it. It is a Notable Reprehenſion, that of *Philip*, in a Letter to his Son *Alexander*, for endeavouring to ingratiate himſelf with the *Macedonians* by the Force of *Mony*. *What is it, (with a miſchief)* ſays he, *that ſhould make you expect Faith from thoſe People whom you your ſelf have Corrupted? Is it that inſtead of their Prince, you would be look't upon only as their Servant or Purſe-bearer?* An Office ſo much below the Dignity of a Monarch! Such a Bounty could not have been better expreſt, than by calling it a Corruption: For the very Receiver is the worſe for't, and the more he gets, the more he looks for. This Epiſtle was written only to his Son; but it may ſerve as a Precept to Mankind.

A generous Reproof.

NOW as there is no queſtion, but that the Bounty which conſiſts in *Labour*, and *Induſtry* is the *Fairer* of the two, and the more *Extenſive*, becauſe more men are the better for't; we meet with ſeveral Occaſions yet, and many proper Objects for the Exerciſe alſo of the *Other ſort* of *Bounty*, which in ſome Caſes muſt be put in Practice, but with Choice, and within Compaſs: For there are many people that ſquander away their whole Eſtates upon Inconſiderate Gratuities. Nor can any thing be more ſenſeleſs, than for a man to take pains to put himſelf out of condition to do the thing that he loves to do. And theſe unadviſed Liberalities are commonly follow'd with Extortion too; for when men are brought to Want, by Over-giving, they fall to the repairing of their *Profuſions* upon *Some*, by *Violence* upon *Others*: and the Friends they get by *Giving*, on the *One* ſide, will not ballance the Enemies they raiſe, by *taking away* on the *Other*.

The Bounty of Labour is the faireſt of the Two.

Give within compaſs.

Where-

Wherefore, as I would not lay my Fortune in Common, ſo neither would I refuſe a part of it to my Friend, but ſtill in proportion to the whole. We have a common ſaying which is grown by uſe into a Proverb, *Bounty has no Bottom*, and it is worth remembring. For what Mean can be There expected, where by the Cuſtom of *Giving*, and of *Receiving*, both the *Giver* and the *Receiver* come to deſire the *ſame thing?*

Prodigality. *True Liberality.*

OF *large Givers* there are *Two ſorts*; the *Liberal*, and the *Prodigal*: The *Prodigal*, they laſh out upon Treats, Popular Doales, Prizes, Publique Sports, and Spectacles, and other Entertainments, which are no ſooner paſt, than forgotten. The *Liberal*, they employ their Expences upon Redeeming of Slaves, ſetting a Friend out of Debt, or helping him out in the beſtowing of a Daughter, in the Getting of a Fortune, or in the Encreaſing of it. I cannot but wonder what put it into *Theophraſtus*'s head, in his Book of *Riches*, that among ſo many Excellent things, he ſhould be guilty of one ſo very groſs an abſurdity. His Diſcourſe runs much upon the Honour, and Magnificence of Popular Shews, and Preſents; and he makes this to be the great advantage of an Ample Fortune, that it Furniſhes a man with means to be at That Expence. Now in my Opinion, the Fruit of Liberality is much more certain, and Conſiderable, in the few Inſtances I have before mentioned. It is a Grave, and a Pertinent Reproof, that of *Ariſtotle*'s, upon This Subject: *We make nothing* (ſays he) *of our Profuſions upon the Humouring of the Common People, but to hear of* Ten Crowns *given in a Siege for a* Bottle of water, *what a wonderment is made of it,*

it, as a thing Incredible: till upon ſecond Thoughts, we find the price excus'd by the Neceſſity? But in the Other Extravagant Spoil, and Exceſſive Prodigality, where there is neither Honour, nor Neceſſity conſulted in it, and the very pleaſure paſſes with the Spectacle; we can find nothing there to wonder at. And who are they but the weakeſt of the people that ſtand affected with this Vanity? and no ſooner are they ſatiated, than the Delight it ſelf is forgotten. And who are they that are ſo much taken with theſe Fooleries, but Women, Children, and Slaves, that is to ſay, people either of ſervile Condition, or of ſervile Minds, ſcarce any man of Senſe, Judgment, or Conſideration, approving of them? I know very well that it is an Antient Cuſtom in This City, for the *Ædile* to exhibit Shews to the People, upon entring his Office; and that very good men expect it from him. *P. Craſſus* the *Rich* (as well in his *Fortune*, as in his *Name*) made a very *Magnificent Entry*; and ſo did *L. Craſſus*, after him; tho' joyned with *Q. Marius* too, a man of ſingular Moderation. And then *C. Claudius*, the Son of *Appius*, with a great many more; as *Lucullus*, *Hortenſius*, *Silanus*; which were all out done by *P. Lentulus*, in my Conſulſhip, and *Scaurus* Emulated him. But the moſt Pompous, and Expenſive Solemnity of all, was that of our Friend *Pompey*, in his *Second Conſulſhip*; This is enough to ſhew you my opinion in all theſe Caſes. But yet however, we muſt have a Care on the other hand, not to incur a ſuſpicion of *Avarice*. *Mamercus*, (a very Rich man) was repulſed when he ſtood for *Conſul*, becauſe he had refuſed the Charge of *Ædile*. Wherefore, if the people call

Fine ſhews are only for Women and Children.

In what Caſe Profuſion may be allowed.

call for it, on the One ſide, and wiſe men be not againſt it, (tho' they do not deſire it) on the Other; the thing ought to be done: But according to our Abilities, as it has been my own Caſe: or otherwiſe, where we may reap ſome advantage by it, that will more than Countervail the Charge. As it turn'd much to the reputation of *Oreſtes*, not long ſince, the publique Dinners that he expos'd in the Streets, to the Multitude, under Colour of Dedicating his Tenths to *Hercules*. Neither did any man blame *M. Seius*, for ſupplying the people in a great Scarcity with Corn, at about a Groat a Buſhel: when by ſo doing, he delivered himſelf from the great and inveterate hatred of the Multitude; and (being *Ædile* too) by a Liberality, that was neither Diſhonourable nor Burthenſome. But it was a moſt Glorious, and Memorable action my Friend *Milo*'s engaging of the *Sword-players* for the *Publique ſafety*, which in my own particular I was not a little concern'd in: and by means whereof, all the attempts and outrages of *Clodius* were Cruſht and diſappointed. So that Bounties ſhould be grounded either upon Neceſſity or Profit; and even in Theſe Caſes too the beſt Rule is Mediocrity. *L. Philip* the Son of *Quintus*, (a perſon of great Worth, and Underſtanding) was wont to make it his Vaunt, that it never coſt him one peny of Money to the people, the obtaining of all the Favours that were ever conferr'd upon him. *Cotta* ſaid the ſame thing, and without Vanity, ſo might we our ſelves too, in ſome degree; for the expence of my *Ædileſhip* was ſo ſmall, that it could not ſignifie any thing toward the gaining of thoſe Offices which were afterward conferr'd upon

But ſtill within Bounds.

upon me as by a Common Consent; and That in my own year too: which is more than any of those beforenamed, can boast of. I take that mony to be best laid out which is employed upon Common Walls, and Ramparts, Docks, Havens, Aquaducts, and other works, for the good of the Publique. Those Bounties give more of present satisfaction, I must confess, that are laid down upon the Nail, as I may say; but the Other will find better acceptation with Posterity: As for Theatres, Walks, Galleries, Temples, I shall speak the more Favourably of them, for *Pompey*'s sake: But Learned men, I perceive, do not approve of them; and *Panætius*, for one, whom in this Discourse I have rather Followed, that Interpreted: and then there is *Phalereus Demetrius*, who was very sharp upon the famous *Pericles*, for his Extravagant Profusion upon the Porch of the Temple of *Pallas*. But I have handled this Subject at large in my Discourse of a *Common-wealth*. Now for a Conclusion; This kind of *Liberality*, upon the whole matter, is stark naught; and yet by the Circumstances of Times, and the like, it may be render'd Necessary; But in all Cases there must be observ'd a *Mediocrity*, and a *Proportion*.

Of Privater Liberality.

AS to the Other sort of a *Bounty* that arises from *Liberality*, we must accommodate our selves to the Occasion, and in Differing Cases use Differing Methods. One man lies under the pinch of a pressing Calamity: another man's Condition is not much amiss perhaps already, but yet he would be glad to make it better. My Charity binds me in the First place, to assist the Miserable person; at least if he did not make himself

How to bestow them.

himself so by his own fault. And yet I would not be so hard neither as not to help him also, that is Well already, in order to his Further advantage: but this is a point that requires singular Care and Judgment in the Choice. It was well said of *Ennius*, *A Benefit misplaced turns to a Crime*. But in that which is bestow'd upon a good and a Grateful man, there's, First, the Conscientious Comfort of the Virtue it self; and then the Satisfaction that it brings us in other respects: For the most acceptable thing in the World is a discreet Liberality, and the Reputation of it must needs be great, when the Goodness of every man in Power is the Common Sanctuary of Mankind.

A Regard to the Benefit as well as to the Person.

WE must have a regard also to the Benefit, as well as to the person; and that it may be of such a Quality as to Descend in the memory of it to the Children and Posterity of the person Obliged, that there may be no place left for Ingratitude. For all Mortals have a Detestation for it, and every man looks upon himself as Injur'd in the discouragement of Bounty: And the Guilty in this Case, are reputed the Common Enemies of the Needy. Beside the Benefit that this piety of Disposition brings to the Publique, in the Enriching of the poor, and the Redeeming of Captives, which, as *Crassus* delivers at large in One of his Orations, was many times the Work of the Senate it self. And is not this now a Nobler way of Obliging than the Casting of our mony away upon *Pageantries*, and *Popular Spectacles*? This is an Expence for a man of Sense, & Honour; whereas the other is only a Fawning application by Chargeable Fopperies to tickle the phansies of the Common people.

AS

AS we are to Oblige with Frankneſs; ſo we are not to Exact any thing again with Rigour, but in all our Dealings, as buying, ſelling, letting, hiring, *&c.* to behave our ſelves toward our Neighbor and acquaintance, with Candor, and Reſpect: tho' to the prejudice ſometime of our Own Right: avoiding Law-ſuits as much as may be, and a little more perphaps than needs; for it is not only Generous, but profitable too, for a man in ſome Caſes to remit ſomewhat of the ſtraitneſs of his juſt due: but in ſo doing he muſt have an Eye yet to his Family, or Eſtate, which it were Impious not to defend: but in ſuch a manner too, that there appear nothing of Harſhneſs, or Greedineſs in the Diſpute. For a man cannot employ his Mony better, than to do others good with it, with a regard ſtill to the maintaining of his Own.

Our Obligations ſhould be Frank.

IT is with great Reaſon that *Theophraſtus* recommends *Hoſpitality*: for in my Opinion it is a very Honourable faſhion for the Houſes of Noblemen to be ever Open to Illuſtrious Gueſts: and it gives no ſmall Reputation to our Commonwealth, that Strangers can never want That ſort of Beneficence in This City. But then for thoſe that would make an Honeſt Intereſt abroad in the World, it is a very great advantage, the Favour, and Recommendation which they get among Foreign Nations through the friendſhip of thoſe they meet with upon This Occaſion. *Theophraſtus* writing of the Hoſpitality of *Timon* of *Athens*, tells us that he gave ſtrict Order to his Servants in the Country that his Houſe ſhould be ſtill Open, to whatever *Lacian* (or *Townſman* of his) paſt that way.

Of Hoſpitality.

NOW

Obligations of Care and industry.

NOW for Those Obligations that are only the Effect of *Care*, and *Industry*, without *money*, they are both *Publique*, and *Private*: Extending from the *Commonwealth* it self, to every *Particular Member of it:* For what readier way can there be in This World to Eminent *Wealth*, and *Preferment*, than the Skill of Directing, and Advising in Difficulties of *Law*: together with the Power of Obliging so many upon That Score?

The Reputation of the Civil Law.

Wherefore, among the Excellent Qualities of our Fore fathers, the Knowledge, and Interpretation, as well as the Constitution of the *Civil Law*, was ever had in great Esteem: and reserved (until this Confusion of Affairs) as a Matter Sacred, in the Possession of Men of Highest Authority and Wisdom. But the Glory of This Science, as Well as That of our Ancient Nobility and Virtue, is now quite Extinct: and to aggravate the Indignity, this fell out in the time of a person not inferiour in *Honour* to all that went before him, but in *Letters* much their Superiour. So that This is a Study generally acceptable, beside that it puts us in the way of doing a thousand Good Turns.

Some Affinity betwixt a Civilian *and an* Orator.

AND there is some Affinity or Resemblance too betwixt the Art of a *Civilian*, and that of an *Orator*: Only the *Latter* has more in it of *Vigour*, *Agreeableness*, and *Elevation of Spirit*. There is not any thing that moves the Soul, like *Eloquence*. It fills the Hearers with *Admiration*: it gives *Hope* to the *Miserable*: it creates as many *Friendships* as there are Persons that it Defends, and our Predecessors accounted of it as the most Honourable of all Professions. It is a General, and Publique Blessing, when men of Eloquence,

The Force of Eloquence.

and

and Industry, (after the Example of our Forefathers) undertake the Patronage of so many as stand in need of it, without either *Grudging*, or *Reward*. I should take Occasion here, over and over to Lament the Discontinuance, if not the utter Loss and Destruction of this Divine Faculty, if it were not for appearing over much concerned in my own Interest and Case. And yet we cannot but take notice how many brave Orators we have lost; how few we have any hope of, among those that are growing up; and the smaller number yet, of those that are left; tho' 'tis true that we have men of Boldness without Knowledge in Abundance. Now since we cannot be all of us either *Orators*, or *Lawyers*, (having indeed but few great men in either Faculty) we may do a world of good services yet, by Recommending, or Solliciting on the Behalf of Petitioners, or Clients; and by Employing our Interests either with the Bench, or with the Counsel, for their Behoof. Whosoever takes This Course, shall be sure to Oblige a great many men, and consequently by a great many to be well spoken of. But then we must have a Care (which every man will look to in his Own Discretion) that while we would Oblige one man, we do not Offend another. For it happens many times that either through Heedlessness, we disoblige some body that does not deserve it, or out of Rashness provoke some Other body that may make us rue it. In which Case, we ought to excuse our selves, as well as we can, for the least offence given to any man, even where we never intended it; by shewing him the Inevitable Necessity that forc'd us upon it, and the desire we have, upon any

The Decay of Orators.

Disoblige no man.

favourable Occaſion, to make him ſome favourable amends.

In Benefits conſider the Man, *not the* Fortune.

IN the Conferring of *Good Offices* we have uſually a regard either to peoples *Manners*, or to their *Fortunes*; and therefore we have the Common ſaying ready at our Tongues end, that *'tis the* Man *only that we conſider, and not the* Eſtate. This is a handſom flouriſh, but where is the Man yet that does not more willingly beſtow his Time and his Pains, upon the ſervice of a powerful, and a Wealthy perſon, than in the ſupport and protection of the beſt Poor man that ever was born? For we are naturally inclined to lay out our ſervices where we may reaſonably hope for the ſpeedieſt, and the moſt Certain Return. And This proceeds from a Miſtaken Eſtimate of the Nature of Things. For what if *That Honeſt Poor man* cannot requite us in *Kind*, He may do it yet in *Thankfulneſs of Heart*, and in *Juſt Acknowledgments*? It was well enough ſaid, (whoever ſaid it) *He that* Has *my Mony, has not* Reſtor'd *it*; *and he that has* Reſtor'd *it*, Has *it no longer*. *But in the Caſe of* Good Will, *he that has* Paid *it* Has *it ſtill*; *And he that* Has *it ſtill, has* Paid *it*.

The Pride and Vanity of Great Men.

Now for thoſe men that value themſelves upon their Titles, or Poſſeſſions, and have the World at Will; they are ſo far from accounting themſelves under any Obligation for a Benefit Received, that they look upon the very acceptance of it, (let it be never ſo great) as an Obligation laid upon the other ſide. Nay they will not ſtick to be Suſpicious, and Jealous of it as a Prologue to ſome Petition, or further Deſign. But to tell them, *that ever they ſtood*

need of, or were Beholden to any man, is to ſtrike them to the very Heart. Whereas the *Poor man*, that takes all Friendly Offices to himſelf, without any reſpect to his Condition; *This Poor man* (I ſay) makes it his Bus'neſs, not only to expreſs his Gratitude to thoſe that have already obliged him, but to ingratiate himſelf likewiſe to thoſe which he hopes hereafter may be kind to him; as having Occaſion for many Friends. And if it be his Good Hap to render his Patron a profitable ſervice, his Humility makes the Value of it to be Leſs than it is, rather than Greater. And it is further to be Obſerved, than upon the Defence of a Great man, the Acknowledgment terminates either in Himſelf alone, or, at the Utmoſt, in the Effect it may have upon his Children, and Family. But in the protection of a poor Creature, that is yet Virtuous, and Modeſt, a man makes to himſelf an intereſt in all the poor honeſt men in Nature; which is no Inconſiderable party out of the Body of the Common people. So that it turns to a better account to oblige the *Good*, than the *Fortunate*. We ſhould do our beſt however to leave no ſort of men unſatisfied; and if This point ſhould come in queſtion, let *Themiſtocles* decide the Controverſie. It was put to him *Whether a man ſhould rather beſtow his Daughter upon a* Poor man *that were* Honeſt, *or upon a man that had* More Wealth *but* Leſs Integrity. And his Anſwer was This; *I had rather beſtow her upon a* Man *that wants* Mony *than upon* Mony *that wants a* Man. But our Minds and Manners are now-adays corrupted and depraved with the Love of *Mony*: and yet, as to the matter of *Superfluity*, what is any man

The Poor mans Gratitude.

A Wiſe ſaying of Themiſtocles.

the *Better* for't? it may be of some use perhaps to him that has it; but that is only at *Some Times*, and in *Some Cases* too. Or taking the advantage of it for Granted, it serves only to make a man the more powerful, but not one jot the more Honest. Not that I would serve a good man ever the less, for being *Rich* over and above. But I would still serve him for his *Virtue*, and not because of his *Wealth*: and govern my self by the Judgment I make upon the Qualities of his *Mind*, without Calculating upon his *Fortune*. Now with one Precept more I shall Conclude: We must never Employ our Faculties and Endeavours, either to *uphold Iniquity*, or to *overthrow Justice*. For *Justice is the Foundation of an Everlasting Fame, and there can be nothing Commendable without it.*

Justice is the Foundation of a Lasting Fame.

Of Publick Bounties.

HAVING already treated of Benefits with a regard to *Particular Persons*; we shall now Discourse of That sort of Bounty, which respects the *Universality* of the *Commonwealth*. Of This Bounty there are Two Kinds. The *One* concerns the whole *Body* of a City, or the *Community*; the *Other*, the *Particular Members of it*: And the Latter is the more acceptable of the Two. It is our Duty, as much as in us lies, to consult the Common Satisfaction of Both; or however, to take Care of particulars: but in such manner that the whole may be the Better for it; Or at least not the Worse. *Caius Gracchus*'s *Excessive Largesse* of *Corn* to the people was *Mischievous*; for it exhausted the *Treasury*; but the *Moderate Donative* of *M. Octavius* was both *Tolerable* to the *Government*, and *Necessary* to the *People*; and consequently both the

Republique

Republique it ſelf, and the Citizens were the Better for't.

I T ſhould be the Principal Care of him that has the Adminiſtration of Publique Affairs, to ſee that every Individual be protected in his Propriety; and that private men may not be diſpoſſeſs'd of their Rights and Eſtates, under the pretext of a Publick Good. It was a peſtilent propoſition, That of *Philip*'s, in his *Tribuneſhip*, about *an Equal Partition of Lands*; But then it was a great Inſtance of his Modeſty, the letting of it fall ſo eaſily again. He did many Ill things, to curry favour with the people; and he dropt one lewd ſpeech too, *that there were not Two thouſand men of Eſtates in the whole City.* What a deſperate Hint was That toward the bringing of all things to a Level, and all Conditions of men to a Parity: One of the greateſt Plagues that can befal a State? For it was the main End of the Founding and Eſtabliſhing of Cities and publick bodies, that particulars might be ſecur'd in their Poſſeſſions, and every man ſafe in the Enjoyment of his Own. For though men Aſſociate by an Impulſe of Nature, it was Deſire and Hope yet of keeping what they had gotten, that made them Build Cities, for their Protection. It has been a Great Inconvenience that our Fore-fathers have been often put upon, the charging of the people with Extraordinary Taxes: which happened either through the Lowneſs of the Treaſury, or the Expence and Burthen of a Continual War. This is a Courſe by all means poſſible to be avoided, by laying in of Proviſions beforehand; but if ever any Commonwealth ſhould fall under This Neceſſity (for I had rather

The Propriety of Particulars muſt be protected.

The danger of Levelling Principles.

No Extraordinary Taxes.

foretel it of any Other, than Ours; as I ſpeak This only by way of General Diſcourſe) it will be highly neceſſary that the people be punctually enformed of the Exigent; and that there is no way for them to ſubſiſt, but by complying with ſuch a Neceſſity. It behoves all Governors to furniſh the Publique Stores with Neceſſaries, before the Danger preſſes them; in what Proportion and of what Kind, is a matter ſo well known, that it is ſufficient the bare mention of the thing thus by the By.

Corrupt Magiſtrates are the Bane of any Government.

BUT above all things, let all men in Publique Adminiſtration keep themſelves clear from the leaſt ſuſpition of *Avarice*. *I would to the Heavens* (ſays *C. Pontius* the *Samnite*) *that Fortune had reſerved me for another Age, and kept me from coming into the World, till the* Romans *had begun to take Bribes. If this had been, I ſhould quickly have put an end to their Empire.* Truly he muſt have ſtaid a good while then; for 'tis but of late that *Rome* has been tainted with This Evil. Now if *Pontius* was a man of ſuch a Reſolution as he appears to have been, it is well for us that he came into the World when he did. The firſt Law that ever we had againſt the *Corruption of Magiſtrates*, is not as yet of *a hundred and ten years ſtanding*? and That was *Piſo*'s. But we have had a great many Others ſince That time; and every One ſtill more ſevere than the Other. How many Criminals have we had? How many Condemn'd? What a Confuſion upon the *Social War* in *Italy*? And That War excited too merely by the *Guilty*, to ſave themſelves from *Puniſhment*? There was no longer any Court of Law, or Juſtice; but our Friends and Allies la

lay expoſed to Seiſure and Pillage, without Relief: And if we are not totally ruin'd, it proceeds more from the Weakneſs of Others, than from our own Virtue.

PANÆTIUS extols *Africanus* for his *Abſtinence* in the matter of *Mony*: And why not? But ſtill he might have found greater Virtues in him than That: For That Abſtinence of his was not the Virtue of the *Man* only, but of the *Times*. *Paulus Æmilius*, upon his Victory over *Perſeus*, made himſelf Maſter of all the *Macedonian Wealth*, to an Infinite value; and brought ſo much Money into the Publique Treaſury, that One Captains Booty deliver'd the People from any further need of Taxes. And This he did without any other Advantage to his Family, than the Honourable, and Immortal Memory of his Name and Action. *Africanus* the Younger (in imitation of his Father) got as little by the Deſtruction of *Carthage*; and his *Fellow-Cenſor*, *L. Mummius*, as little as either of them, by the Ruines of the Magnificent City of *Corinth*. But his Bus'neſs was rather the Ornament, and Luſtre of his *Country*, than That of his *Houſe*. Although in giving Reputation to the One, he could not fail of doing the like to the Other. But to go on where I left. *The Abſtinence of Africanus.*

THERE is not certainly a more Deteſtable Vice (eſpecially in Princes, and Publique Magiſtrates) than Covetouſneſs: And it is not only a Mean thing, but an Impious, to make a Prey of the Commonwealth. That which the *Pythian Oracle* deliver'd in the Caſe of *Sparta*, looks *Avarice a Deteſtable Vice.*

like a Prediction, not only Applicable to the *Lacedæmonians*, but to all Opulent Nations alſo whatſoever: To wit, that it was not in the Power of any thing in the World, but *Avarice*, to Deſtroy That Commonwealth. There is no ſurer way in Nature for men in Power to gain upon the affections of the multitude, than by *Frugality* and *Moderation*. But yet when out of an affectation of Popularity they come to propound ſuch a *Levelling Diviſion of Lands* as is above mentioned; and either to Force the Right Owners out of their poſſeſſions, or to the remitting of Juſt Debts, theſe people ſhake the very Foundations of Government; In the firſt place Diſſolving the Bonds of Concord and Agreement, which can never conſiſt with This way of taking Moneys from ſome, and Diſcharging others. And what's become of common Equity then, when no Man is left the Maſter of his own? For it is a Priviledge Eſſential to a Community, that it be Free, and every Man ſecur'd in the Enjoyment of what belongs to him. Neither does This way of Confounding all things create that Intereſt and Reputation among the People, which the Projectors may Imagine: for it makes the Loſer ſtill your Enemy; and the very Receiver will hardly thank you for't neither: Or at beſt, ſo coldly, as if it were a thing he had no great mind to: Eſpecially diſſembling the Inward ſatisfaction of being forgiven a Debt; for fear of being thought unable to pay it. Whereas the Injur'd party will never forget it, but carry the purpoſe of a Revenge in his Heart. Or what if there ſhould be more to whom we Unjuſtly Give, than there are from whom we do as Unjuſtly take away? This does not mend the matter

The Power of Frugality in Publique Adminiſtrations.

matter one jot: for we are not to judge in This caſe by Number, but Weight. What colour of Equity is there for a Man that never had an Eſtate, to diſpoſſeſs another of an Eſtate that has been many Years (nay Ages perhaps) in the Poſſeſſion of it, himſelf and Family; and that he that hath an Eſtate, ſhould have it taken from him? It was for this way of proceeding that the *Lacedæmonians* Baniſh'd *Lyſander*, and put their King *Agis* to Death, beyond all Preſident of former times. And there follow'd ſuch Broils upon it, that their beſt men were Baniſh'd, a *Tyranny* introduced in the place of an *Ariſtocracy*, even to the utter diſſolution of one of the beſt Conſtituted Republiques upon the Face of the Earth. And *Sparta* did not fall alone neither; but the Contagion of Thoſe Tumults ſpread it ſelf ſo far, that the reſt of *Greece* was wholly Ruin'd by That Example. What ſhall we ſay of our *Gracchi*? (the Sons of the famous *Tiberius Gracchus*, and Grandchildren of the *Elder Africanus*) It was this very point of Controverſie about *Lands*, that deſtroy'd them too. But on the contrary, how much Honour has *Aratus* worthily acquired to himſelf, by his Exploit upon *Sicyon*? It had been Fifty Years under the Dominion, and in the Poſſeſſion of *Uſurpers*, when he recover'd it by a ſurprize from *Argos*, ſuppreſs'd *Nicocles* the Tyrant, Reſtor'd ſix hundred of the Wealthieſt Citizens that had been Baniſh'd, and ſet the City it ſelf at Liberty. But finding great difficulty at laſt how to accommodate the bus'neſs of Lands and poſſeſſions; and conſidering that it would be hard on the One ſide for thoſe that he reſtor'd to their Town to live ſtill in want, while Others enjoy'd Their Eſtates; and little Better, on the Other

The danger of Invading Proprieties.

A Generous account of Aratus.

Other ſide, to break in upon, and take away Poſſeſſions of Fifty Years ſtanding; wherein ſo many ſeveral Intereſts were concern'd, by Purchaſes, Portions, Settlements, and the like, and without any Injury by Them done to the Right Owners: He concluded it Unreaſonable either to take from the One what they were poſſeſs'd of, or not to ſatisfie the Other, in ſome degree, for their Juſt Pretenſions. Wherefore he bethought himſelf, end reſolv'd upon a Journey to *Alexandria*; giving Orders that all things ſhould continue in the ſame ſtate he left them, until his Return: So that he preſently poſted away to his Old Friend, and Acquaintance, *Ptolomy* the *Second King* of *Alexandria*; He had no ſooner informed that Generous Prince of his Bus'neſs, with the Deſign he had, and in what Manner, to Deliver his Country; but without any difficulty, this Illuſtrious perſon prevail'd upon him for a large Sum of money. This Treaſure he carry'd with him back to *Sicyon*, and then pick'd out Fifteen of the Principal perſons of that place, to adviſe with upon This Affair, and to take a ſtrict account, as well of thoſe that were poſſeſs'd of Other Mens Eſtates, as of thoſe that had Loſt their Own. The matter was ſo handled, that, upon a reaſonable Eſtimate of the Lands, ſome were perſwaded to content themſelves with the value in Money, and to yield the Land; and Others choſe rather to take Money for their Land, than to conteſt for the Recovery of it. So that in the Concluſion, the Controverſie was Compounded, and Both parts abundantly ſatisfi'd with the Accord. What Pity was it that this Great Man was not born a Citizen of *Rome!* This is the right way of proceeding in

ſuch

ſuch Caſes; without expoſing the perſons and goods of Citizens (as it has been Twice in our days) to *Proſcriptions*, and *Outcries*. This *Grecian*, like a Brave, and a Wiſe man, conſulted the Common welfare: And it is the higheſt point of a Good, and a prudent Magiſtrate, to Maintain the Properties of the people, and not to Invade them; but keeping all within the Bounds of common equity. Why ſhould any Man dwell *Gratis* in my houſe? as if I were to purchaſe, Build, Repair, and Defend it, for Another (in deſpite of my heart) to reap the Fruits of my Labour, and Expence? For This is the Caſe in taking away from me That which is my Own, and giving to another That which does not Belong to him. And what's the End of theſe *Letters of Protection*, (if I may ſo call them) but that you ſhall buy Land with my Money; you keep the Land, and I loſe my Money?

No Debts to be permitted, that may endanger the Publique.

IT is a matter therefore of great Moment, that no Debts be permitted, which may endanger the publique. And This may be ſeveral ways prevented, if ſuch a Courſe be taken, that Prodigals and Debtors may not raiſe their Fortunes upon Defrauding their Creditors; the One loſing their Own, and the other getting what belongs to another Man. There is nothing that upholds a Commonwealth like Faith, and Credit: which can never be expected where people do not lie under a Neceſſity of paying their due Debts; a thing which was never ſo violently preſt, as when I was Conſul: All Sorts and Degrees of Men were even in Arms about it: And yet I reſiſted all Motions tending That, way to the very Rooting of This Evil out of the Com-

mon-

monwealth. There was never more money ſtirring, nor ever was there ſurer, or better Payment: For where the Hope of Deceiving is cut off, Men muſt neceſſarily keep Touch. It is true, that *Cæſar*, (who was in Thoſe days ſubdu'd, though now a Conqueror) that *Cæſar*, I ſay, did put his former purpoſes in Execution, even when he had no need ſo to do: His very Appetite being ſo Vicious, that he took pleaſure in the Evil it ſelf, without any other Inducement. It is the Duty then of all good Patriots to keep themſelves clear of this ſame perverſe ſort of Liberality, that takes from one, and gives to another: and in the firſt place, to provide that all men may be equally ſupported in the Enjoyment of their own, by Law, and Common Juſtice. And that the poor, and ſimple may not be Circumvented, or Oppreſs'd by Power, nor the Wealthy obſtructed in the holding or receiving of their Dues, by the Envy and Malignity of the people. And moreover, they ſhould by all means endeavour both in War, and Peace, to advance the Republique, in Empire, Poſſeſſions, and Revenue: Theſe are the proper Offices and Atchievements of Great men, and this was the Study, and the Exerciſe of our Forefathers. Thoſe that addict themſelves to theſe Duties, gain great Glory and Good will to their Own particulars, beſide the profit that they bring to the Publique. *Antipater* the *Tyrian* (and a *Stoique*) that lately deceaſed at *Athens*, charges *Panætius* with leaving out Two Branches touching Health, and Money in theſe Precepts concerning Benefits. But I ſuppoſe that they were rather paſs'd over by That famous Philoſopher, as things well enough underſtood, and needleſs

leſs to be further inculcated, how advantageous ſoever.

IT is a good means of preſerving *Health*, for every man to underſtand his own Conſtitution; and to obſerve what agrees with him, and what not. To live Temperately in all reſpects, as well in our Diet, and the care of our Bodies, as in our pleaſures: Uſing the common helps of Phyſique alſo, in caſe of need. In the gathering of an Eſtate, we muſt do nothing but what is warrantable, and honeſt: And when it is fairly gotten, it may be preſerv'd, and improv'd by Parſimony, and caution. This Point is excellently well handled by *Xenophon* (the *Socratiſt*) in his *OEconomiques*; which I my ſelf, at about your Age turned out of *Greek* into *Latin*. *A Caution in matter of Health and Eſtate.*

THE Concurrence of Two Profitable Things in compariſon, (which was the Fourth Conſideration, omitted by *Panætius*) is a caſe which very often happens: For ſometimes *Bodily Goods* fall into Competition with the Goods of *Fortune*: Sometime *Outward Goods* with Thoſe of the *Body*: And ſometime again, One of either of them is compar'd with Another of the ſame Kind. As in the *Firſt* inſtance, I had rather have *Health*, than *Money*: In the *Second*, I had rather have a *Great Eſtate*, than a *Robuſt ſtrength* of *Body*. And ſo forward: I had rather enjoy *Health*, than *Pleaſure*; I had rather be *Strong*, than *Nimble*. And then in the Collation of *External things*, I had rather have *Honour*, than *Wealth*: and a Fortune in the *City*, rather than in the *Country*. The Compariſon that *Two Profitable things meetings in compariſon.*

that we find in the *Elder Cato*, was of This Quality. The Queſtion was put to him, What he look't upon as the greateſt convenience in a *Country Life*? His anſwer was, in the *Firſt place*, *Good Paſturage*. What *next* then? *Paſturage* that was *Indifferently Good*. And what *then*? *Paſturage* ſtill, tho' a Degree *worſe* than the Other. And what again? *Tillage*. What do you think of *Uſury*? (ſays the *Enquirer*.) And what do you think of *Murther*? (ſays *Cato*.) By This and abundantly more, we cannot but underſtand that Things Profitable came often in Competition: And that This Fourth enquiry was not at all Impertinent. But as to the matter of Getting, Diſpoſing, or Uſing of moneys, it is a Subject fitter for a Scrivener than a Philoſopher; and better underſtood by the Good Men upon the *Bourſe*, than by the Learned Men in the *Schools*. It is a thing needful however to be known, as appertaining to the Bus'neſs of *Profit*: of which having diſcourſed ſufficiently in This Book, we ſhall now proceed to what remains.

The End of the Second Book.

TULLY's

TULLY's OFFICES.

The Third BOOK.

IT was the saying (my Son *Marcus*) of *Scipio Africanus* the *Elder*, (as we have it from *Cato*, his Cotemporary) that *he was never Less* Idle, *or* Alone, *than when he most* appeared *so to be.* It was a Noble thing said, and worthy of a Great, and of a Wise man; to shew that in all his Leisures, his Thoughts were still taken up with Business; his Solitudes, in Discourses to himself, without any Loss of Time: and without need some whiles of any other Company. Insomuch, that the Two things which commonly make Other people Listless, and Heavy, did even set an Edge upon him: That is to say, *Solitude*, and *Leisure.* Now tho' I cannot come up to the Imitation of that Illustrious person, I am not much behind him yet in my *Good Will* (I would I could say as much of my self, as he does in *Effect.*) For since I have been driven by the Force of Impious Arms from my Station in the Government, and the Bus'ness of the Bar; I have apply'd my self to a Life of Leisure too: upon That very Consideration, quitting

A famous saying of Scipio Africanus.

Cicero's *Retreat.*

quitting the Town, and betaking my ſelf to the Privacy and Solitude of a Country Life. Not that I compare either This Leiſure, or Solitude with that of *Africanus*. For his way only a Voluntary Retirement from the Importunities of Company, when he had a mind to give himſelf ſome Reſpite from the Honourable Charges he ſuſtained in the Commonwealth, by withdrawing into a Receſs, as a man ſometimes puts into a Port: But my Leiſures proceeded not from a deſire of Reſpite, but from want of Employment. For ſince the Diſſolution of the Senate, what is there to be done, either in the Palace, or in the Hall, that is worthy of us? The world ſwarms every where with Criminals; and after a life ſpent in ſo Eminent a Poſt, and in the Open View of the people, I am e'en forc'd to hide my head, and live (in a manner) quite alone to avoid the very ſight of them. I have heard Wiſe men ſay that we are not only to chuſe the leaſt of neceſſary *Evils*, but out of all Evils themſelves to extract ſomewhat of *Good*. I ſhall therefore make the beſt of my Repoſe, tho' not ſuch perhaps as he has deſerv'd from his Country, who hath formerly contributed ſo much to Their Quiet. And though this be a Solitude wholly of Neceſſity, not Choice; I would not yet have it abſolutely Fruitleſs. *Africanus* (I muſt confeſs) gained to himſelf a Fairer Reputation, but we have no Monuments of his Thoughts, committed to Writing: No Remains of his Leiſures, and Solitude that we find extant. But we may conclude however, that he was neither Idle nor Alone, from his Glorious Actions, which were only the Product of Deliberation and Thought. But Alas! I have not that ſtrength of Mind to

Cicero *compares himſelf with* Africanus.

Think

Think away my Solitudes, and ſupply the want of Company with bear Meditation. So that My whole Diverſion is to paſs away my Time, and my Cares upon Writing: and I have done more that way now, in a little while, ſince the overturning of the Government, than I did in many years before, while it was in a flouriſhing Eſtate.

NOW (my Son) tho' Philoſophy be Profitable and Fruitful from one end of it to the other, without any Waſte, or Deſert; there is not any place yet in the whole Extent of it that yields grater advantage, and benefit, than that part of it which treats of *Civil Duties*, and the Rules of a Steady, and a Virtuous Life. Wherefore, tho' I doubt not either, of the Great and Excellent *Cratippus*'s care in the inculcating of this Leſſon daily to you; or of your own Diligence, and Attention in the receiving of it; it is not amiſs yet to be often minded of ſo neceſſary a point; and (which way ſoever you turn your ſelf) to have this voice ſtill ſounding in your Ear, even, if it were poſſible, without hearing any thing elſe. This is a thing for every man to do, that propounds to himſelf an Honeſt Courſe of Life; and it is your Intereſt perhaps as much as any bodies; becauſe the world expects it from you, that you ſhould ſucceed to the Induſtry, the Honours, and (if I may ſo ſay) in ſome Meaſure to the Reputation of your Father. And you have a great deal to anſwer for upon the ſcore of *Athens*, and *Cratippus*. For what could be more Diſhonourable than after ſo ample a Commiſſion granted you to the famous *Staple* of the whole World, for *good Manners* and *Letters*, to come back empty; to the Diſpa-

Of Civil Duties and a Virtuous Life.

ragement both of the Maſter, and the City? Wherefore you muſt labour with all the Faculties of your Soul, and Body, to make good This expectation: (if I may call that a Labour, which is ſo great Pleaſure) and let it never be ſaid that after all other ſupplies from your Father, you were only wanting to your ſelf: But let this ſuffice: having written ſo much, and ſo often to you already, upon This Subject. We ſhall now return to the remaining part of the Diviſion propounded.

Panætius *of Civil Duties.*

PANÆTIUS is the man, without Diſpute, that has the moſt accurately handled This queſtion: and Him have I chiefly follow'd, with ſome amendment and additions of my Own. He lays down *Three Propoſitions* that men are wont to deliberate and adviſe upon, in the Caſe of *Duty*. *Firſt*, whether the matter in queſtion be *Honeſt*, or *Diſhoneſt*. *Secondly*, whether it be *Profitable*, or *Unprofitable*. *Thirdly*, where *Two things* meet in *Competition*, the *One* of them appearing *Honeſt*, and the *Other profitable*; how to diſtinguiſh. He has written Three Books upon the Two former Heads; and promiſed a Diſcourſe upon the Third; but he has not been ſo good as his word: which I do the more wonder at, becauſe I find in his Scholar *Poſidonius* that he liv'd Thirty years after the Publiſhing of theſe Books. And I am in ſome Admiration too, that *Poſidonius*, in his Commentaries, ſhould paſs the matter over ſo ſlightly; eſpecially making This Remark upon it, that of the whole Body of Philoſophy, This is the moſt neceſſary part. There are ſome that will not have This to be an *Overſight* in *Panætius*; but a point left

out upon Consideration; as a thing wholly Impertinent. But I am of another Opinion. The Reason they give, is This. *Honest*, and *Profitable* (they say) are *Convertible Terms*; and not to be so much as Imagined in Opposition. From hence there may arise another Question, whether the Third Branch of *Panætius*'s Division should not have been absolutely rejected, without any mention of it at all. But it is Certain however, that he did at first undertake it, and then let it fall. He that makes a Tripartite Division, and goes through with Two parts of it, is undoubtedly answerable for the Third: And he passes his word over and above toward the latter end of his Third Book, that he will go on with it. And we have the Authority of *Posidonius* himself to Witness as much; writing in a certain Epistle what *Publius Rutilius Rufus* (an Auditor of *Panætius*) was wont to say. That there was never any Painter (says he) that durst venture upon Finishing the Picture of *Venus*, which *Apelles* had begun (such was the Decacy of the Face, that there were no hope of matching it with a suitable Body) so in the Case of *Panætius*, the Excellency of those things which he did perfect, was so Transcendent, that no man after him durst ever attempt the supplying of what he either Omitted, or left Imperfect. So that of *Panætius*'s Intention there can be no longer any doubt. But yet whether he did Well or Ill in adding the Third member of his Division, may perhaps bear a dispute: For making it either according to the *Stoiques*, that nothing can be *Good* but that which is *Honest*; or with the *Peripatetiques*, that *Honesty* is the *Soveraign Good*, to such a degree, that all other

Cicero excuses an Omission of Panætius.

Goods are as nothing in the Ballance againſt it; they do both of them however agree in This, that *Profit* can never be admitted into a Competition with *Honeſty*. How does *Socrates* Curſe the Firſt dividers of *Honeſt*, and *Profitable*, in *Imagination*, which are ſo *Inſeparable* by *Nature*? And the *Stoiques* go ſo far along with him too, as to hold that nothing can be the One, without being alſo the Other. But if *Panætius* were one of thoſe that will have *Virtue* to be *Therefore* Eſteem'd for the *Profit* that ſhe brings us; meaſuring things *Deſirable*, either by *Pleaſure* or *Freedom* from *Pain*; he might then be allow'd to erect the Notion of a *Poſſible Repugnancy* of *Profit*, to *Honeſty*. But being of Another Opinion, and that the *Only Good* is That which is *Honeſt*: and that whatſoever ſtands in Oppoſition to it, under the ſhew of *Utility*, Mans life is neither the *Better* nor the *Worſe* for it, either With it, or Without it: He ſhould not ſo much as have put the Caſe, methinks, when *Profit* and *Virtue* ſhould appear in the *Compariſon*. For to Live according to *Nature*, which the *Stoiques* account for the *Soveraign Good* is nothing elſe (as I underſtand it) than to lead a life Congruous to *Virtue*: And in all Caſes whatſoever, to follow the direction of *Nature* in a Conformity thereunto. The matter ſtanding Thus; ſome men are of opinion that This Compariſon was not properly introduced; and that there was not any need of preſcribing in This Kind, at all.

Nothing can be Profitable, but what is Honeſt.

True Honeſty and True wiſdom are Inſeparable.

NO man can be *Truly Honeſt*, but He that is *Truly Wiſe*; and there is no ſeparating the One from the Other. There may be an *Imperfect*

perfect Honesty, 'tis True, with an *Imperfect Wisdom*; which is rather the *Resemblance* of *Honesty*, than *the Thing it self*. And therefore all those Duties that we treat of in this Discourse, the *Stoiques* call *Middle Duties*: which are Common indifferently to Mankind; and of a large extent: and some people attain the knowledge of them by a Felicity of Nature; others, by a Progression, and advance upon Study. But those which They call *Right Duties*, are Complete and Consummate in all the parts (or numbers as they express it) and This perfection is only to be found in a Wise man. But he yet that acquits himself in the Discharge of these *Middle Offices*, goes for Currant with the *Multitude* for a *good* and *Wise man* in the *Abstract*: They not being able to distinguish betwixt what is *Perfect*, and *Defective*. Wherefore so far as They understand the Business, there is nothing wanting. We see many times in Poems, Pictures, and a World of other Instances, how strangely the unskilful are delighted with them, and yet for the most part commending the least masterly stroke in the piece: which arises from This Ground, (I suppose) they find something in the whole that pleases them; but they are not able to judge of the Imperfections of the several parts; But when they come to be better instructed, they are easily brought to change their First Opinion. *Middle Duties.*

THE Duties here Treated of, are with the *Stoiques* a kind of *Second-rate Honesty*; and not *peculiar to wise men*, but *Common* to *Human Nature*: And therefore they affect all people that have in them the least spark of Good Nature,

No man Good or Wise in the Abstract.

or Virtue. Now when we speak of the *Magnanimity* of the *two Decii*, or the *Scipio*'s, or of the *Justice* of *Fabricius*, or *Aristides*; we do not propose their Example as the Standard of that *Courage*, and *Equity* that is required in a *Wise man*. For I do not look upon either of them to have been *Wise* to the Degree of *Wisdom here intended*; no, nor those very Persons upon whom the World has bestowed both the *Reputation*, and the *Name* of *Wise men*. I speak of *Cato*, *Caius Lælius*, or the *Seven Sages* themselves. But by the Frequent exercise of *Middle Offices* they had somewhat of the *appearance*, and *Resemblance* of *Wise men*. So that we must neither Compare *Profit* in Opposition to that which is *truly Honest*; nor oppose any matter of *Gain* to that which we commonly call *Virtue*, whereupon these people value themselves, that would be accounted *Good men*. And we must as well uphold and preserve That Practical Honesty that falls under our Capacities; as that which in Strictness and Truth, is only the Honesty of Wise men: For otherwise, how shall we know what progress we make toward Virtue? And so much for those that by doing *Good Offices* get themselves the Reputation of being *Good men*.

The Epicureans *measure* Honesty *by* Profit.

BUT for those that Measure all things by the Common Interest of *Gain* and *Benefit*, and will not allow *Honesty* to take place; it is ordinary for them to put *Mony* in the Scale against *Virtue*; which no good man will ever do. I suppose therefore, that *Panetius*, when he says that men are wont to make some doubts upon the comparison, means only (as he says) that they are *Wont* to do so; and not that they *do well*

ſo doing. For not only the Preference of profit to Honeſty, but the very comparing of them, and the making a doubt in the Caſe, is a ſhameful Bus'nes. But what is it that we doubt upon? Or what's the Ground of our Conſideration? It is (I preſume) upon the Quality of the Point in Queſtion: For that which is Diſhonourable at one time, may be Warrantable at another. As for Example, upon a ſuppoſition more at large; what fouler Villany can be imagined than the Killing not only of a Man, but a familiar friend? and yet the people of *Rome* do not only Abſolve any man that deſtroys a *Tyrant*, tho his Familiar friend; but they reckon upon it as the moſt Glorious action of an Honourable Life. Is it in This Caſe that *Profit* prevails over *Honeſty*; or rather that the *Honeſty* follow'd the *Profit*? *Circumſtances alter the Caſe.*

THE Certain way to keep us Right in our Judgments upon the Concurrence of *Profitable*, and *Honeſt*, will be the Eſtabliſhment of ſuch a Rule as upon the Comparing of things will direct us in our Duty: which Rule I would have to be ſquar'd to the Reaſon and Diſcipline of the *Stoiques*: And This is the Rule which I ſhall obſerve in this Treatiſe; Becauſe tho' the Ancient *Academiques*, and the *Peripatetiques* alſo, (which were formerly all one) give a Preference to that which is *Honeſt*, before that which ſeems to be *Profitable*; the matter is yet more Generouſly handled by the *Stoiques*, that make *Profit* and *Honeſt Reciprocal*, than by thoſe that imagine a thing may be either *Honeſt*, and not *Profitable*, or *Profitable*, and not *Honeſt*. Now our *Academy* allows great Liberty, and gives us a *A Rule keeps us Right.*

Right to defend That which appears moſt *Probable*. But to Return to my Rule, to take away any thing wrongfully from any man, or to make my Own Fortune by the empoveriſhing of another, is more Contrary to *Nature*, than Death, Beggery, Pain: or whatever elſe can befal a mans Body, or Eſtate. For at Firſt Daſh it deſtroys all Neighbourhood and Society: For if we come once to entertain an Opinion that One man for his own advantage may Aſſault, or make a Prey of another; there follows neceſſarily an Abſolute diſſolution of Human Society, and a Violation of the moſt Certain and powerful Dictate of Nature. Put the Caſe that one Member ſhould draw to it ſelf the Health, and Good Blood of the Member next unto it; the whole Body muſt, of neceſſity, Conſume and Periſh: In like manner if every man ſhould take from another what he can get, and apply his Neighbours Goods to his Own Uſe, this would undoubtedly put an end to all Friendlineſs, and Fellowſhip among men. It is natural enough for a man to provide Neceſſaries for himſelf, in the Firſt place; But it is yet againſt Nature for him to furniſh himſelf with Mony or Proviſions, by Spoil and Rapine: And it is not only by the dictate of Nature, or the Rights of Nations, but by the particular Laws and Conſtitutions of all States, that it is declared Unlawful for One man to do any Miſchief to Another for his proper Benefit. It is the expreſs Care, Will, and Intent of all Laws to maintain the Duties of Society, Safe, and Inviolate: and they puniſh the Tranſgreſſors of theſe Rules with Death, Baniſhments, Priſons, and Fines: And much more does Nature her ſelf exact this from us:

In our Judgments of Profitable *and* Honeſt.

Fraud and Rapine are againſt the Laws of Nature & Nations.

Natur

Nature (I ſay) which is the *Law Divine* and *Humane, Both in one.* Whoever obeys Her Dictate (as all men will, that propoſe to live in a Conformity to the Principles of a Reaſonable Being) will never agree to the Coveting of what is Another mans, or to the taking away from his Neighbor, and Giving to himſelf. For Greatneſs of Mind, Gentleneſs, Juſtice, and Liberality are much more Conſonant to Nature than Pleaſure, Life, or Riches: which, in compariſon with the Common good, are by all men of Brave and exalted Minds, neglected and deſpiſed. Whereas on the Other ſide, to Spoyl my Neighbour for my One Advantage is more contrary to Nature, than Death, Torments, and the like. And it is more according to Nature for a man to undergo all ſorts of Labours and Troubles for the Service and Conſervation, (if it were poſſible) even of the whole World: After the Example of *Hercules*, whom the Gratitude of *Men* has placed for his Virtues among the *Gods*: All this (I ſay) is more Agreeable to Nature, than to live in Solitude; and not only free from Cares, but even wallowing in Pleaſures, and Plenty; with all the Advantages of Strength and Beauty, over and above. This is it that makes all Great and Glorious Spirits, ſo much to prefer difficulty and action, before a Life of Idleneſs and Sloth. From hence it comes to paſs, that according to Nature, One man can never hurt another. And beſides, he that wrongs another for his Own Advantage, he does either imagine that this is not againſt Nature; or elſe he ſuppoſes that Death, Poverty, Pain, Loſs of Children, Kindred and Friends, are more to be avoided, than the doing of Injuries.

ries. But if he conceives that one man may do an Injury to another without an offence to Nature, there's no diſpute with One that has loſt his Reaſon; and in effect, Ejected all that is Man even out of himſelf. But what if he thinks the *One* to be *Bad*, and yet the *Other*, *Worſe*? He is in a Grievous Miſtake, to phanſie any Calamity of Body or Fortune comparable to the diſorders of his Mind.

The Intereſt of the Whole, *is the intereſt of every* Part.

WE ſhould all of us therefore agree upon this common propoſition, That the Intereſt of the *Whole*, is the intereſt of *Every part*; and that whoever draws more to himſelf than belongs to him, is an Enemy to the Publique. Now if it be the very preſcript of Nature, that for Humanity ſake, one Man ſhall take Care of another; it does neceſſarily follow, that the Welfare of the Publique, is the Intereſt of every particular, according to the ſame Principle. Let but This be admitted, and we are all of us equally under the Government of the ſame Law: And then taking That for granted; to do an Injury to any Man is againſt the Law of Nature. The Former is certainly True; and ſo is the Other, by Conſequence. It is a Ridiculous Shift, to ſay, that I would not take away any thing from my Father, or from my Brother, to put in my Own Pocket; but to take from other People, is quite another caſe: as if every Individual were not concerned in the Protection of the whole: An Opinion utterly Inconſiſtent with the Rules of Government.

THERE are ſome again will have the *Citizens* provided for, but not *Strangers*: And Theſe

These Men tear up the very Foundations of Human Society. For take away That once, and there will be no longer any Good Nature, Liberality, Honesty, or Justice, to be found upon the Face of the Earth. And whosoever brings Matters to That pass, is to be accounted an Enemy to the *Gods Themselves*, for breaking that Union among men, which was no other than a Constitution of *Divine Appointment*. It is the strongest Band of Society, a General Agreement in This Position, that it is a greater Offence to Nature for me to take any thing from another, for my own Advantage, than to suffer all the Miseries that can possibly be al any Man in his Body or Estate: Nay, that can befal the very Mind it self; saving the single point of Justice, which one Virtue is the Mistress, and the Princess of all the rest. But what? (will some say) Shall a Wise Man rather Perish for want of Bread, than take a Loaf from another Man that's good for nothing, to keep himself from Starving? This must not be done yet; no not upon any Terms: Life is not so dear to me as my Duty; and my Resolution not to wrong any Man for my own Benefit. Suppose an Honest Man almost frozen to death might save his Life by taking away the Cloak of *Phalaris*; (a Barbarous and a Bloudy Tyrant) should he not do it? This is a Case easily determin'd: For the taking of any thing away from another, for a Man's Own sake, is Inhuman, and against the Law of Nature, let the Man be never so worthless. But in the Case of a Person whose Life may be of Eminent Use and Service to the Commonwealth, to take any thing from such a Worthless person to preserve so necessary an Instrument to the Publique; and

Better suffer any Calamity than do an Injury.

to

to take it purely upon That Conſideration, it is not blame-worthy: But otherwiſe, I muſt rather bear my Own Misfortunes, than Relieve my ſelf by what I force from another Man: ſo that it is not more againſt Nature to be Sick, or Neceſſitous, than to Seize upon, or Covet the Goods of another: But the abandoning of the Common Good is an Offence to Nature; for it is Unjuſt; and therefore the Law of Nature, that Regulates and Provides for the Common Welfare of Mankind, does in a manner direct the Tranſlation of Neceſſaries from a ſlothful and unprofitable wretch, to the behoof of a Wiſe, a Good, and a Valiant Man, and whoſe Loſs might be of great damage to the Government: Provided that it be done meerly out of ſuch a reſpect, without any Vanity, or Self-love, or making uſe of a Publique Pretext for a Colour to a particular Injuſtice. In ſo doing, I keep my ſelf ſtill upon my Duty, conſulting the Benefit of Mankind, and (that which I often Inculcate) of Human Society.

AS to the Caſe of *Phalaris*, the deciſion is Obvious: For a Tyrant is rather an Enemy, than a Member of Human Society; and there can be no Crime in the deſpoiling of an Uſurper, whom it is Lawful to Kill; and it were well if the whole Race of this impious and peſtilent ſort of men were exterminated from having to do with Mankind. For as we cut off Mortifi'd Limbs, when the Blood and Spirits have in a manner forſaken them, and that they grow dangerous to the Reſt: ſo ſhould that fierce and outragious Brutality be ſeparated, if I may ſo ſay, from the Common Humanity of the Publique

lique Body. Of this Quality are all thoſe Queſtions of Duty, whereof the Reſolution depends upon the Circumſtances of Times: which I preſume, *Panætius* would have perſu'd, if ſomewhat of accident or bus'neſs had not taken him off from his purpoſe. We have ſaid enough in our former Books upon This Matter; to ſhew what we are always to ſhun, as evil and ſhameful in it ſelf, and what we are not obliged always to avoid, becauſe it is not *always*, either *Miſbecoming*, or *Diſhoneſt*.

Certain Principles to be given for granted.

BUT being now about to Crown the Work we have begun, I muſt deal with You, (my *Cicero*) as the Mathematicians do with their Diſciples. They lay down certain *Poſtulata*, to be taken before-hand for granted, without the Trouble of diſcourſing the Points; to the end that they may make themſelves more eaſily underſtood. So muſt I require of You (my *Cicero*) to yield me this point, (if you can afford it) that *Nothing is deſirable for it ſelf, but what is Honeſt*. Now if *Cratippus* will not allow of the Propoſition whole as it lies; This yet, I preſume, will not be deny'd, That *Virtue* is *Chiefly*, if not *Only* to be *deſired*, and *for its own ſake*. It is all one to me, which of the Two you take, for they are Both of them more probable than any thing elſe: And Firſt, let me vindicate *Panætius*, in This, that he never ſuppoſed a *Competition* of *Utility*, and *Virtue*; (nor could he have juſtifi'd it if he had) but he is not to be underſtood of things that *ſeem* profitable; for over and over in all his Diſcourſes he ſtill makes *Utility*, and *Virtue* to be *Convertibles*, and repreſents it to the moſt peſtilent Error that ever enter'd into

into Human Life, the Opinion that divided them. And therefore he introduced a Repugnancy, betwixt *Appearances*, and *Truths*; not as *ſeparating* the *Profitable* from the *Honeſt*; but for our Caution, and Inſtruction, that we might judge betwixt them. We ſhall therefore diſpatch this remaining part without any help from others; and upon our own account, (as we ſay:) For ſince *Panætius* left This Subject, I have ſeen nothing yet that has given me any ſort of ſatisfaction.

Nothing can be beneficial, that is diſhoneſt.

WE are all of us apt to be moved upon any thing that preſents it ſelf unto us, under the appearance of Profit. But if upon looking narrowly into it, we find any thing that is diſhoneſt, or ſhameful, annexed thereunto; we are not to leave it then, as a thing *Profitable*, but as conſidering that *Utility*, and *Diſhoneſty* cannot ſtand together. For if there be nothing ſo *Contrary* to *Nature* as the *One*, or ſo *Agreeable* to it, as the *Other*; (for Nature affects what is Right, Convenient, and Conſtant, and deſpiſes the contrary) it is impoſſible that they ſhould both meet in the ſame Subject. Again; If we are born for *Virtue*; either (according to *Zeno*) *Virtue is to be deſired for it ſelf alone*, or (according to *Ariſtotle*) *it weighs down all other things*: then does it follow, of Neceſſity, that *Virtue* muſt be either the *Only*, or the *Supreme Good*. So that whether way ſoever it be taken, that which is *Good*, is certainly *Profitable*; and that which is *Profitable*, is certainly *Good*. Thoſe Men therefore are very ſhort-ſighted, that preſently lay hold of that which *appears Profitable*, and conſider it *apart* from that which *is Honeſt*. From Hence

Hence come Murthers, Poyſonings, Forgeries, Thefts, Publique Cheats, Oppreſſions, Squeezing of the People, or our Confederates: From Hence come the Intolerable Inſolencies of Men of over grown Fortunes; and finally, Ambition, and the Thirſt of Dominion; than which nothing can be more Runious, or Pernicious in a Free City. They take falſe Meaſures of the *Value* of things, without ſo much as dreaming of the *Puniſhment*; not the *Puniſhment* of the *Laws*, (for That they can with eaſe break through) but That of the *Conſcience*, which is the bittereſt of all. Wherefore this ſort of men ſhould be excluded Human Converſation, (as moſt Execrable, and Impious) even for barely deliberating whether they ſhould either follow That which they ſee to be *Honeſt*, or knowingly pollute themſelves with *Villany*. The very *Doubt* and *Deliberation* is *Criminal*, though without advancing to the Act it ſelf. Wherefore we ſhould never deliberate at all, where the very deliberation it ſelf is Shameful.

The great puniſhment is that of Conſcience.

AND then in all our *Deliberations*, we ſhould not entertain any Hope or Deſign, of Concealing, or diſguiſing Matters; for we ſhould take up This for a Maxim; (at leaſt, if we be ever the better for our Philoſophy) that *if we could carry things ſo Private, as that neither God nor Man ſhould diſcover us, we ſhould yet have ſuch a Reverence for our Selves, as not to let any thing of Injuſtice, Uncleanneſs, or Immodeſty, eſcape us.* *Plato*'s Fable of *Gyges*, is not impertinent to our purpoſe. The Story has it, that a Torrent having eaten a Hollowneſs in the Ground, *Gyges* went down into it, and there obſerv'd a Brazen

A Divine Precept.

The Fable and Moral of Gyges's *Ring.*

Brazen Horſe, with doors in his Sides. Upon the Opening of theſe doors, he diſcover'd the dead body of a Man, of a Prodigious Size, with a Golden Ring upon his Finger. *Gyges* boldly pluckt it off by Force, and put it upon his Own, and being the King's Shepherd, he went his way, and joyn'd himſelf with Other Shepherds. Finding, that upon turning the Stone of the *Ring, Inwards*, he became Inviſible to *Others*, and yet ſaw every thing *Himſelf*, and that upon turning it *back again* he became *Viſible*, as *before*; by the Advantage of this Ring he made his way to the Enjoyment of the Queen, and by her Aſſiſtance, Murther'd the King, his Maſter; and in a ſhort time remov'd all out of the way that he thought ſtood betwixt Him, and the Crown. All this Lewdneſs he Committed by the help of this *Ring*, and ſo made himſelf King of *Lydia*. Now if a Wiſe Man were the Maſter of ſuch a Ring, he would reckon himſelf no more Priviledg'd to do an Ill thing with it, than without it; for an Honeſt man conſiders the *Goodneſs* of the *Action*, not the *Privacy* of it. It is objected by ſome (that ſhew themſelves to be better *Men*, than *Philoſophers*) that this Story out of *Plato* is only a Tale; as if any Man would report it for a thing either True, or Poſſible: but ſee however the Force and Scope of this Ring, and of this Example. How many things are done out of Avarice, Ambition, Pride, Luſt, that no body knows of, or ſo much as ſuſpects? Suppoſe that this Impiety could be kept ſo ſecret, that neither God nor Man ſhould come to know it: Would you commit it? *'Tis a thing impoſſible*, (they ſay, whether it be ſo or not.) But what would they do (ſay I) if they could

do

do the thing, which they ſay they cannot? They return you the ſame ſenſeleſs Anſwer over again: they ſay 'tis *Impoſſible*; and there they ſtick: not at all comprehending the Drift, and Import of the Queſtion. For in asking what a Man would do if he could *Conceal* it, I do not ask whether he can *Conceal* it, or *no*: But I put the Queſtion, as if it were in Caſe of the *Torture*. If they make anſwer, that *if they were ſure to eſcape Puniſhment, they would do what they found moſt Expedient*, they confeſs themſelves to be *Criminals*; and if they *deny* it, 'tis a Conceſſion that *all evil things are to be avoided, even for Themſelves*. But to return now to my purpoſe.

The apearance of Profit oftentimes diſtracts us.

THERE fall out divers Caſes, that under an Appearance of Profit, many times diſorder our Thoughts, and trouble us in our Reſolutions: not as upon a Deliberation whether a man ſhould ſtrain a Point of *Honeſty* in regard of the *Greatneſs* of the *Benefit* in proſpect; (for That were *Mean*, and *Diſhoneſt*) but whether That which ſeems ſo *very Profitable* may be done without *Diſhonour*. It might look like an unjuſt thing in *Brutus*, the Depoſing of *Collatine*, his *Fellow-Conſul*, who in the Expulſion of the Kings, was both his *Partner* in the *Advice*, and his *Aſſiſtant* in the Execution: But when the whole Body of the Principals of the City had agreed together to extirpate the whole *Family*, and the *Relations* of that proud Prince, as well as the Name of the *Tarquins*; (which was a Reſolution of publique Advantage) This was ſo Honeſt, and Juſt an Action, that *Collatine* himſelf was Obliged to approve of the Proceeding: ſo

that this Utility was valu'd for the Honeſty ſake, without which, in truth, it had not been Profitable. But This did not hold in the Caſe of that Prince that Founded our City: For he was ſo wrought upon by the ſhew of Profit, that he kill'd his Brother upon the appearing Advantage of rather Governing Alone than with Company. He caſt off all Piety and Humanity, for the obtaining of that which ſeemed unto him to be Profitable, tho' it proved the clear contrary. The *pretended Honeſty* in the Action, was to puniſh the Affront of his Brothers leaping in ſcorn over the Wall: but it was neither Competent, nor likely. Wherefore under favour of either *Quirinus* or *Romulus*; (no matter whether) it was undoubtedly a Crime.

How far we may look to our ſelves.

AND yet we are not to neglect our own advantages neither; or part with any thing to Others, when we want it our ſelves. But every man ſhould attend his own Profit, as far as may be without Injury to Another. *Chryſippus* had many Witty ſayings, whereof this was one. *In the running of a Courſe*, (ſays he) *a man may be allow'd to ſtrive, and contend his Utmoſt: but to trip up his Antagoniſts Heels, or to lay hands upon him, this is a thing not to be done upon any terms. So for any man to get That which may ſerve for the uſe of Life, is very Fair, and allowable; but to take it away from Another, is not Lawful.*

Many Niceties in Friendſhips

IN Friendſhip, 'tis true, there are many Niceties as well in the not doing of any good Office which may Honeſtly be done, as in the doing of any thing for a Friend contrary to Juſtice.

Justice. But one short Rule will serve upon This whole Matter, and it is no hard one neither. Those things that seem Profitable; as Honours, Riches, Pleasures, and Other Circumstances of the like Kind; these things are never to be preferr'd before Friendship; But no Good man will do any thing for a Friend, that is either against the Commonwealth, his Oath, or his Word: No not if he were himself to be a Judge in his Friends Case; for he lays down the person of a *Friend*, where he takes up that of a *Judge*. I would have him wish that his Friend may have *Justice* on *his side*; and I would have him allow him all the Favour in point of *Time*, that the Law will permit; but when he comes to pass his *Sentence*, let him remember, and consider, that he calls God to Witness; or (as I suppose) his Own Conscience, the Divinest thing Heaven it self ever bestow'd upon a Mortal. It was therefore a Worthy Practise of our Ancestors; The never ask'd any thing of a Judge (and I wish we did so at This day) but upon Condition that it might consist with Justice. This Request has relation to those things which (as I said e'en now) a Judge may fairly allow to a Friend; for if a man must of Necessity do all things that a Friend would have him do, this is no longer a Friendship, but a Confederacy. Let me be understood only of Common Friendships: For among men that are Wise, and Perfect, there can be no such thing. The Story goes of *Damon*, and *Pythias*, (*Pythagoreans*) so great was the Kindness they had for one another, that when *Dionysius* had sentenced one of them to death, the Party Condemned only desired a few days respite

The Generous friendship of Damon and Pythias

reſpite to put his Affairs in order; and the Other became Surety (Body for Body) for his Appearance. The Priſoner return'd at his day, and the Tyrant fell into ſuch admiration at their *Generoſity*, and *Juſtice*, that he requeſted them to receive Him as a Third man, into that Friendſhip. Wherefore in all Friendſhips, where the Profitable and the Honeſt meet in Compariſon, we ſhould never conſider the Profit, but ſquare our actions according to the honeſty. But whereſoever any thing ſhall be required in *Friendſhip*, which does not ſtand with *Honeſty*, in that Caſe *Religion*, and *Faith*, muſt take place of *Friendſhip*. This is the Rule by which we are to make Choice of the Duty here in Queſtion.

Publique Miſtakes under the appearance of Profit.

WE are Liable alſo to many Publique Miſtakes under the Appearance of Profit; as our Countrymen were to blame in the Irrecoverable Deſtruction of *Corinth*. And the *Athenians* did yet worſe, in cutting off the Thumbs of the people of *Ægina*, only becauſe they were good Seamen, and they reckon'd that this might turn to their Advantage, and Security, becauſe of the Neighbourhood of *Ægina* to one of their principal Ports. But nothing can be *Profitable* that's *Cruel*; for we are to follow the Dictate of *Nature*, and nothing is more *Contrary* to *Nature*, than *Cruelty*.

Humanity to Strangers.

THEY do very ill alſo, that either Prohibit, or Baniſh Strangers from among them; as *Petronius* did of Old; and *Papius*, not long ſince. It is well enough not to ſuffer him that is *no Citizen*,

Citizen, to paſs *for a Citizen*, (according to the Law of our Conſuls *Craſſus* and *Scævola*, who were Wiſe men.) But it is undoubtedly moſt Inhuman, abſolutely to deny the Common Benefit of Protection, and Intercourſe in a City, to Strangers. Thoſe are Great and Remarkable Caſes wherein the *Shew* or *Colour* of *Publique Utility* is deſpiſed, in compariſon with *Honeſty*. We have in the Story of our Commonwealth, a World of Eminent Examples. How many times have we (and eſpecially in the *Second Punique War*, after that Miſerable Diſaſter at the Battle of *Cannæ*) ſhew'd greater Courage in our Diſtreſs, than ever we did in our Proſperity? There was not the leaſt ſign of Fear among us, nor any mention of peace; ſuch is the Power of Honeſty, that nothing of Profit can appear againſt it! The *Athenians*, when they were no longer able to reſiſt the force of the *Perſians*, came to a Reſolve of putting all their Wives, and Children into *Trœzen*; to abandon the City, and maintain the Liberty of *Greece* with a *Navy*. There was one *Cyrcilus* that advis'd them rather to ſtay in the City, and receive *Xerxes* into it; but they Ston'd him to death for his Counſel. He gave them the advice which he took to be moſt profitable; but it ceaſes to be *Profit*, when it ſtands in oppoſition to *Honeſty*. *Themiſtocles*, after his Victorious War againſt the *Perſians*, declar'd in Council that he had thought of ſomething that might be of great Advantage to the Commonwealth; but it was not convenient to be made Publique, and therefore deſir'd them to appoint ſome body to whom he might impart the matter in private. They named *Ariſtides*; and he

told him that the *Lacedæmonian* Fleet, which was laid up at *Gytheon* might eaſily be Fir'd by ſurprize, which would very much weaken the *Lacedæmonians*. *Ariſtides*, when he had heard it, came into the *Senate* where they were all big with Expectation, and made his Report that *Themiſtocle*'s Counſel was very *Profitable*, but not *Honourable*: wherefore the *Athenians* would not allow it to be *Profitable* neither, if it were not likewiſe *Honeſt*; and ſo rejected the propoſition, only upon the Report of *Ariſtides*, even without hearing it. How much did theſe people go beyond us: that ſuffer our *Pirates* to go *Free*, while our *Confederates* are *Tributaries*? Let it be taken therefore for granted, that nothing can ever be *Profitable* that is *Diſhonourable*; no, not in the very poſſeſſion of that which we account ſo to be. Nay it is a great Infelicity of Judgment, to Imagine that any thing can be *Profitable*, that is *Diſhoneſt*.

A ſcrupulous point of Honour.

BUT there fall out many Occaſions (as I have ſaid before) wherein the *Profitable*, and the *Honeſt* may fall in *Competition:* in which Caſe we ſhould conſider how far they ſtand in direct Oppoſition, and wherein they may be fairly reconcil'd: As for Inſtance, upon theſe Queſtions. An Honeſt man ſets ſail from *Alexandria* to *Rhodes* with a Lading of Corn; the *Rhodians* in great diſtreſs for want of it; and the Commodity bearing an Exceſſive price. This perſon knows that there are other *Alexandrian* Ships under way, and bound for the ſame Port, and with the ſame *Cargo:* whether or no ſhall he tell the *Rhodians* now, that there are other Mer-

Some nice Caſes of Conſcience.

Merchants coming with Relief, or ſay nothing of it, and make the beſt Market of his Corn that he can? We put this Caſe, ſuppoſing him to be a *Good* and a *Wiſe man*, and the matter to be under Deliberation. If he thinks it an *Ill* thing to *Conceal* this from the *Rhodians* he will not do it; but he makes ſome doubt whether it be *Ill*, or *No*. In Difficulties of This Nature, *Diogenes*, the *Babylonian*, (a Grave and Famous *Stoique*) is of One Opinion; and his Diſciple *Antipater* (a very acute man) is of another. *Antipater* will have all the Circumſtances laid open; ſo that the Purchaſer may not be kept Ignorant of any thing, which the Other knows. *Diogenes* ſays that *the Vender is bound to diſcover all the Faults*, ſo far as he is obliged to it by the *Civil Law*; and to manage his Bargain without Fraud. So that being to ſell the Commodity, he may without Deceit make the beſt on't. *Here* (ſays he) *I have brought my Corn; I have run the Riſque on't, and I ſet no higher a rate upon the Commodity than Others do; nay perhaps I offer it Cheaper: If you can have it any where elſe, where's the Injury?* Now *Antipater*, on the other ſide, Reaſons it thus. How is That? (ſays he) It is our Duty to Conſult the Good of Mankind, and to ſerve Human Society; and we came into the World under That Obligation. We have Principles of Nature, which we are bound to Follow and Obey; and we are to account nothing *Profitable to our ſelves*, that is not ſo to the *Publique*: And likewiſe, to account of the *Publique Profit*, as our *Own*. Shall we conceal That then from a *Society* of Men, which ſo much concerns their *Commodity*, and *Supply? Diogenes* will

reply (perhaps) that it is one thing to *Conceal* a matter, and another thing not to *Tell* it: Do I tell you (at this inſtant) what is the Nature of the Gods, or the end of Good men; which are things much more Profitable to be known, than the price of Wheat? And yet you will not ſay that I Conceal This from you. But it is not abſolutely neceſſary for me neither to tell you every thing which may be profitable for you to hear. But the Other will tell you *Yes, it is neceſſary*; if you remember that men are naturally link'd together in *Society*. Well (ſays the Other) I do not forget it: But will you have it to be ſuch a Society then, as that no man ſhall have any thing particular in it of his Own? If it comes to That once, there's no longer any *Buying* and *Selling*, but only *Giving*. You ſee in this whole Diſpute, that it is not ſaid, tho' This or that be *Diſhoneſt*, I will yet do it, becauſe it is *Expedient*: But it muſt be ſo *Expedient*, that there be nothing *Diſhonourable* in it. Now (on the Other hand) out of that very Conſideration that it is *Diſhonourable*, it is therefore *not to be done*. Suppoſe an Honeſt man has a mind to put off his Houſe for ſome fault or inconvenience in it, only known to himſelf: As a *Contagious Air*; (for the purpoſe) tho' it may (perhaps) paſs for *Healthful*; all the Rooms annoy'd with Vermin, Ill-built, or Ruinous, which is only known (as I ſay) to the Maſter of the Houſe. The Queſtion is, if he Conceals theſe faults to get a better Rate for his Houſe than he could otherwiſe have done, whether he does *well*, or *ill*, in That *Concealment? Antipater* will have it to be very *Ill done*, and near the

Caſe

Caſe of *not ſetting a man Right that's out of his way.* A Crime which was puniſh'd at *Athens* by a Formal Solemnity of Publique Execrations. Is not This the Suffering of the Purchaſer to ruine himſelf, and to fall into the worſt of Snares, by a Miſtake? Nay it is worſe yet, than the *not ſhewing of the way*, for one man to lead another knowingly and wilfully into an Errour. *Diogenes* asks, on the Other ſide, who forc't you to buy it? Nay he did not (ſays he) ſo much as Adviſe you to't. That which did not pleaſe the One, he expoſed to ſale, and the Other bought that which he had a mind to. If he ſhall not be taken for a Cheat, that ſets up a Bill of a very good Farm to be Let or Sold, and well built, and in repair, tho' it be neither the One, nor the Other, much leſs ſhall he be accounted one, that does not ſo much as Commend his Houſe; for where the Purchaſer uſes his own Judgment, what Fraud can there be in the Seller? But if we are not obliged, in all Caſes, to make good every word we ſay, how ſhould we be oblig'd to make good That which we do not ſay? Nor can any thing be more Ridiculous than for a Merchant to publiſh the Faults of the Commodity he expoſes to Sale. What would be more ſenſeleſs than to make Proclamation by a Common Cryer, *Here's an Infected Houſe to be Sold?* Now ſo it falls out, that in ſome doubtful Caſes, the *Honeſty* of the Action may be defended, on the One hand, and the *Benefit* of it ſo qualifi'd on the Other; that it may not only be *Honourable*, to do that which appears *Profitable*, but even *Diſhonourable*, to *Omit* it. This is a Point that comes often into queſtion betwixt things *Profitable* and *Honeſt*.

THESE

Reſolutions upon the former Caſes.

THESE Difficulties muſt be ſet right: for it is not our *Buſineſs* to ſtart a queſtion, but to give a Reſolution. It is my Opinion, that neither in the Caſe of the *Rhodian Corn-Merchant*, nor in That of the *Houſe* offer'd to *Sale*, the *Concealment* there ſuppoſed was *Juſtifiable*. For it is not properly the *Concealing* of a thing, to ſay nothing of it; but the keeping of another man, for our own advantage, in Ignorance of that which he is very much concern'd to know. What kind of a Concealment This is, and the Quality of the man that uſes it, who does not diſcern? This is not the Practice undoubtedly of an Open, a Frank, a Sincere, a Juſt or a Good man: but rather of a Shifting, a Cloſe, a Deceitful, a Malicious, a Sly ſhuffler, and of a very Jugler. How can any man expect to get by the Bargin, that wears theſe foul Names, and lies under all theſe Reproaches.

A Pleaſant Cheat.

BUT if the ſaying *Nothing* in this Caſe be ſo Blameable; what ſhall we think of them then that ſpeak *Falſe*? *Caius Cannius* (a Knight of *Rome*, and one that wanted neither Wit nor Learning) going ſometimes to *Syracuſe*, not upon Bus'neſs (as he was wont to ſay) but for his diverſion; he gave out that he had a great mind to buy ſome Gardens there, where he might enjoy his Friends when he had a mind to't, without interruption. When this came to be talk'd of there was one *Pythius*, in *Syracuſe*, that drove the Trade of a *Banker*. *I have Gardens here* (ſays he) *tho' not to be Sold, but however if* Cannius *pleaſes, he may uſe them as his*

his Own? And so he invites *Cannius* to those Gardens, the next day, to Supper. Upon *Cannius*'s promise to come, *Pythius* (whose bus'ness gave him a great Interest there, among all sorts of people) sent for the Fishermen; and directed them to meet next day, and Fish just before his Gardens; and so gave them their Lessons what to do and how to behave themselves. *Cannius* came at his time, where he found a Magnificent Entertainment that *Pythius* had provided for him. There were a great many Boats before the Gardens, and every man brought the Fish he had taken, and laid them at *Pythius*'s Feet. What's the meaning of all this (says *Cannius*) so many Fishes, and Boats? *Pythius* told him, there was no great wonder in't; For there is not any Fish (says he) in *Syracuse* which is not to be had in this place. They take in their Water here, and the Town cannot be without This Convenience. This set *Cannius* agog upon the Purchase, and nothing would serve but *Pythius* must sell him the place; He seem'd, at First, very unwilling to part with it; but without more words they came at last to an Agreement: *Cannius* was a Rich man, and presently struck up a Bargain (for the Gardens, and every thing that belong'd to them) with *Pythius*, at his own price: Security was given for the Mony, and the bus'ness finish'd. *Cannius* invited some of his Familiar Friends thither the next day: and he himself coming betimes, and finding no Boats there, enquir'd of the Neighbourhood whether the Fishermen kept Holy day that day, because he saw none of them There. Their Answer was, that They knew nothing of any Holy-day, nor of any

any Fiſhermen that us'd to be There: Inſomuch that they wonder'd what brought them thither the day before. This put *Cannius* into a Rage: But what Remedy? For my Friend and Colleague *Aquilius* had not as yet made any Proviſion againſt *Dolus Malus*, or *Couzenage*. Upon my Demand to *Aquilius* what was intended by that ſame *Dolus Malus*, he told me, that it was *the pretending of one thing, and doing another.* Which truly was a full and Clear Definition of it, and worthy of a Wiſe man. Wherefore *Pythius*, and all like him, that *Pretend one thing*, and *do another*; are to be accounted *Perfidious*, *Wicked*, and *Deceitful*; So that nothing can be *Profitable* to us, that is polluted by ſo many *Crimes*. But if *Aquilius*'s Definition be True, there muſt be no Feigning or Diſſembling allow'd of in Human Society: And a Good man will neither do the one nor the other, either to Buy or Sell, to more Advantage. And That Deceit was puniſhable alſo by the Laws: As in the Caſe of *Guardianſhip* by the *Twelve Tables*. And ſo was the *Circumvention* of *Minours* puniſhable by the *Latorian Laws*. And ſometimes by *Arbitration*, even *without a Law*; where the Queſtion was matter of Faith, and Truſt. But of all other Judgments the Words that are uſed in the *Formulary* of an *Arbitrement* upon a *Marriage-Agreement* are moſt remarkable: As * *MELIUS*, *ÆQUIUS*, the *Better*, the *Juſter*: and in matters of *Contract*, or *Confidence*, *INTER BONOS BENE AGIER*; *Fair Dealing among Good Men.* Can there be any Mixture of *Fraud* now in *BETTER*, and *JUSTER*? Or what place is their for *Colluſion*, or *Iniquity*, in *Fair Dealing among Honeſt Men*?

* *Words of Form.*

NOW

NOW the *Dolus Malus*, or Deceit appears either in *Simulation*, which is a pretence of ſomething that is *not*; or *Diſſimulation*, that is to ſay, a *Diſguiſe*, or *Concealment* of ſomewhat that *Is*. Wherefore there muſt be no *Lye* admitted in any Bus'neſs, or Contract; nor ſhould there be any Underhand ſubſtituting of a Buyer, or a Seller, to enhance, or to bring down the price; but Both parties ſhould ſay *at a Word* what they will *Give*, or *Take*. *Q. Scævola*, the Son of *Publius*, being upon a Purchaſe, bad the Proprietor tell him in One Word what he would have for the Eſtate: He did ſo: And *Scævola* told him he had underualu'd it, and ſo gave him *Two Thouſand Crowns* more than his Bargin. There is not any Man but will confeſs that This was the part of a *Good man*, tho' in the Opinion perhaps of ſome People, not of a *Wiſe Man*: As if the Other had ſet it lower than he could afford it. This is a miſchief therefore, that *Some* Men are accounted *Good*, and *Other* men *Wiſe*, as if they could be *ſeparated*. *Ennius* ſays that a Man's *Wiſdom* ſerves him to little purpoſe, if it be not *Profitable* to *himſelf*. This may be true enough, if it were but agreed with *Ennius* what it is to be *Profitable*. I find *Hecaton* the *Rhodian* (*Panætius*'s Scholar) telling *Q. Tubero* in his Books of *Offices*, that *It is the part of a Wiſe Man to do nothing againſt Publique Cuſtoms, Laws, and Inſtitutions; and withal, to take good heed to his Fortune, and Family*: For we ſhould not propound to be Rich, only to our Selves, but to our Children, Relations, Friends, and chiefly, for the Service of the *Republique*. For the

Simulation and Diſſimulation.

A Generous Scruple of Scævola's.

the Eſtates and Proviſions of particulars, are the Wealth of the City. The Proceeding of *Scævola* above-mentioned would never ſuit with *Hecaton*: For he only ſays that he would not do any thing for his own Profit that were Unlawful: and truly he deſerves little Thanks, or Commendation for his pains. But allowing both *Lying*, and *Diſſembling* to be this ſame *Dolus Malus*, or *Deceit*, there are very few things clear of That Fraud. Or if he be only the Good Man, that obliges as many as he can, and hurts no body; ſuch a Good man will not be eaſily found. It can never be *Profitable* to do an *Ill thing*; becauſe it is always *unallowable*, and *ſhameful*. And it muſt ever be *beneficial* to be a *Good Man*, becauſe it is always *Honeſt*,

Concealments puniſhable in Bargains for Eſtates.

IT is an Ordinance of the *Civil Law* in the Matter of *Eſtates*, that the *Vendor* ſhould ſtill tell the *Purchaſer* the *Defects*, or *Inconveniences* of the *Eſtate*; for it being ſufficiently provided by the *Twelve Tables*, that every Man ſhould make good what he promiſes or declares by *Word of Mouth*, upon the penalty of *Double Damages* for *Denying* it. The Civilians have alſo ſet a Puniſhment upon *Concealments* too, by enacting, that if the Seller of an Eſtate knew any Fault or Errour in it, without expreſly acquainting the Purchaſer with it, he ſhould be obliged to make it good. As in the caſe of the *Augurs Tower*; where they were to take their Obſervations from the Flight of Birds. *Titus Claudius Centimalus*, having ſome Houſes upon the Hill *Cælius*, the *Augurs* commanded him to pull them down, becauſe they hinder'd their proſpect,

ſpect. *Claudius* expos'd Thoſe Houſes to Sale, and ſo put them off; and *Publius Calpurnius Lanarius* was the Purchaſer. The *Augurs* found the ſame fault ſtill with the Houſes, when they were in His Poſſeſſion; ſo that he pull'd them down. And coming afterwards to underſtand that *Claudius* had made ſale of thoſe Houſes, after that the *Augurs* had appointed the demoliſhing of them; forc'd him upon an Arbitration, what in point of Conſcience was to be done in That Caſe. *Marcus Cato* paſt the Sentence, (the Father of This *Cato* of ours) For as we denominate Others from their Fathers, we ſhall make mention of the perſon that gave this Light to the World, as accounting from the Son.) The Sentence was This, That ſince upon the Sale of That Eſtate, he had not told the Other of the Inconvenience which he knew it was expos'd to; he ſhould Indempnifie the Buyer of it; concluding that the Proprietor was bound in Conſcience to tell the Purchaſer what damage might enſue upon it. Now if This was a Juſt Judgment, it was not Warrantable either in the *Corn-Merchant*, or in him that ſold the *Infected Houſes*, to conceal as is above ſuppoſed. But it is not poſſible for any Law to reach all the various Caſes of theſe *Concealments*: And yet however, ſo far as they go, they are diligently obſerv'd, *Marcus Marius Gratidianus* ſold to *Caius Sergius Orata* thoſe very Houſes which he himſelf had bought of him but a few years before. Theſe Houſes paid a Duty to *Sergius* (which was out of his mind.) But *Marius* made no mention of it in the Conveying of his Right. The Cauſe was brought into the Court; *Craſſus* was for *Orata*, and

and *Anthony* for *Gratidianus*: *Craſſus* inſiſted upon the *Law*, becauſe the Seller knew that he ought to have acquainted the Purchaſer with this Incumbrance, but did not do it. *Anthony* inſiſted upon matter of *Equity*, becauſe That Incumbrance, was not unknown to *Sergius*, who ſold the Houſes, and ſo there was no need to ſay any thing of it; neither could he be ſaid to be deceived, that knew what Title he had bought. Now to what End is all This, but to ſhew, that our Forefathers were not pleas'd with Wiles, and Shifts?

Laws and Philoſophers provide ſeveral ways againſt Fraud.

BUT Laws and Philoſophers provide againſt Frauds ſeveral ways: The Laws regarding only matter of *Overt Act*, whereas Philoſophers judge according to *Equity*, and *Reaſon*: which Reaſon does it ſelf require of us, that we do nothing perfidiouſly, or with Falſe Pretence, or Deceit. But ſhall we call it a Treachery to contrive a Pitfall, or ſet a Toyl, without either driving or hunting any thing to it? Well, but the Beaſts many times fall into it, without a Purſuer. He that offers a Houſe to Sale, what is his *Bill*, but a *Snare* laid for the Purchaſer? His Houſe is Faulty, and he would fain put it off, and ſomebody is caught at unawares. Now tho' I underſtand that according to depraved *Cuſtom*, and *Manners*, this is not accounted *Diſhonourable*; and that there is neither *Law*, nor *Civil Right* againſt it: It is nevertheleſs yet forbidden by *the Law of Nature*. For, as I have often ſaid already, and muſt ſay oftner, *Society*, in the *largeſt Extent*, is that which is *Common to all men*; next under That is the *Society* of thoſe of *the ſame Nation*,

Nation, and after That, of the *ſame City*. Wherefore our Fore-fathers diſtinguiſh betwixt the *Law of Nations*, and the *Law Civil*. For the *Civil Law* is not conſequently the *Law* of *Nations*, but the *Law* of *Nations* does neceſſarily comprehend the *Civil*. Now to ſay the Truth, we have not among us any ſubſtantial or expreſs Image of the *True Law*, or *ſincere Juſtice*: So that we are fain to make uſe *of ſhadows*, and *Figures*; and it were well if we could keep up, even to Them too: For they are Tranſlated out of the *beſt Originals*, of *Truth* and *Nature*. How glorious is that Proviſional Condition for the making of good Contracts! *Provided that by your means, and depending upon your Honeſty, I may not be deceived and brought into a ſnare.* And then that Golden Sentence, *We muſt live Honeſtly among good men, and without Fraud.* But then who are the *Good men*, and what it is *to do well*, is a Great queſtion.

The Law Civil, and the Law of Nations.

Q. Scævola the High Prieſt was wont to aſcribe a very great force to all thoſe Arbitrations that were grounded upon *Good Faith*; Accounting the very *Name* it ſelf to be of a Large Extent: As having a reſpect to *Guardian-ſhips*, *Societies*, *Truſts*, *Mandates*, things *bought*, or *ſold*, *hired*, or *let*, relating to the Community, and Intercourſe of Life. He muſt be a great Judge, that in theſe Caſes can determine (eſpecially meeting in moſt of them with Contrary Opinions) how One man is to behave himſelf towards Another, under theſe Circumſtances. Wherefore all Tricks and Artifices ſhould be avoided; And That *Craft* alſo which impoſes upon the World for *Wiſdom*; how far from it ſoever. For *Prudence* is placed

Of Good Faith.

cest in the *Choice* of *Good*, or *Evil*; but *Craft* prefers *Evil* before *Good*; at least if things that are *Dishonourable* be *Evil*. And 'tis not only in *Lands*, and *Honses*, that the Civil Law, in Conformity to that of Nature, forbids Fraud, and Circumvention; but even in the very dealing for *Slaves*, the Seller should act as frankly as in Other Cases. For he that is presum'd to know whether the *Slave* be *Healthful*, *Honest*, a *Fugitive*, or the like; the *Ædiles Law* makes *That Master* answerable for the *Servant*. But this does not hold in the Case of an *Heir* that found such a *Slave*, or *Servant* in the *Family*. From hence it may appear, since *Nature* is the Fountain of *Justice*, that it is also according to Nature, that no man should make Advantage to himself of another mans Ignorance. Nor is there any greater Pest in Human Society, than a perverse *Craft*, under the Masque of *Simplicity*: And from thence proceed those Inumerable Cases, where the *Profitable* comes in Concurrence with the *Honest*. For, where's the man that would stick at any *Injustice*, if he might but hope for *Impunity*; or come off, under a pretence of *Ignorance*? Let us examine the Matter if you please; and in Those Instances where the Common people, perhaps, are scarce sensible that they do amiss: For we do not speak in This place, of *Murthers*, *Poysonings*, *Forgeries*, *Robberies*, or *Embesilments* of the *Publique Treasure*, which should rather be suppress by *Prisons*, and *Fetters*, than by *Words*, and *Philosophical Precepts*: But let us here rather consider what we find commonly to be done, even among those that have the Reputation of *Honest* men

No Pest like Craft under the Masque of Simplicity.

men. There were ſome people that brought out of *Greece* to *Rome* a forg'd *Will* of *Q. Minutius Baſilius*, (who was a very wealthy man) and to make the bus'neſs paſs the better, they put into the Teſtament, *M. Craſſus*, and *Q. Hortenſius*, two of the moſt conſiderable men of the City; as *Joint-Heirs*, together with *Themſelves*. They did, Both of them, ſuſpect it to be a *Counterfeit*; and yet having no hand in it themſelves they were well enough content, to make advantage of Other peoples Wickedneſs. And what then? Is it ſufficient that they themſelves had no hand in it? I am of Another Opinion; altho', for the *One* of them, *I lov'd* him while he was alive, and I do not *hate* the *Other* now he is Dead. But when *Baſilius* had made his Siſters Son (*Marcus Satirius*) his *Heir*, and would have had him take his *Unkles* Name upon him; (I ſpeak of that *Satirius* that to the Shame of the Age had the Patronage of the *Picenians*, and *Sabines*) it was a moſt unreaſonable thing that the Chief men of the City ſhould carry away the *Teſtators Eſtate*, and leave nothing to the Right Heir but his *Name*. Now if he ſtands guilty of an *Injuſtice*, that neither *keeps off* an Injury from his Friend by way of *Prevention*; nor *Repulſes* it when he may, (as we have ſaid in our Firſt Book) what ſhall we think of him that does not only not Repel an *Injury*, but even Helps it on and promotes it? Nay, for my Own part, let the *Inheritance* be never ſo *Lawful*; yet if it be gain'd by *Craft*, *Flattery*, *Servile Offices*, or *Falſe Pretences*; even That *Lawful Succeſſion* I cannot approve. But in ſuch Caſes men are many times extremely miſled, in taking One

A Caſe of Conſcience about a Forgery.

thing to be *Honeſt*, and Another *Profitable*; for the ſame Rule holds in both; and He that is not ſenſible of This, lies open to all ſorts almoſt of *Fraud*, and *Iniquity*. For whoſoever ſays thus to himſelf, *This is Honeſt*, 'tis true, but the *Other* is *Expedient*; he takes upon him to *divide* thoſe things by a *Miſtake* that are *coupled* by *Nature*; which opinion is the fountain of all Deceits, Crimes, and Evil Deeds. Wherefore if a Good man, for the very holding up of a Finger, could get himſelf made Heir to a Conſiderable Eſtate, which he has no Title to; he ſhould not do it, tho' upon a Certainty that no man could ever ſo much as ſuſpect him for it. But if *M. Craſſus* could get an Eſtate upon the ſame Terms, upon my Credit he would leap out of his skin at it. But a *Juſt*, and ſuch a one as we can allow for a *Good* man, will never agree to the taking of any thing away from *Another*, and transferring it to *himſelf*; and whoever wonders at This, does as good as confeſs himſelf Ignorant of what a good man is.

No Dividing of what Nature has Coupled.

Who is a Good man.

BUT he that will throughly examine the Secrets of his Own Soul, will be able to tell himſelf that only He is a *Good* man, who does as much good to *Others* as he can, and harms *no body* without ſome Injurious provocation. How's That? He that ſupplants the Right Heir, to get himſelf into his place, has not that man as much to anſwer for as if he had remov'd him by Poyſon? But what (will ſome ſay) *may not a man Do that which is Profitable and Expedient for him?* Yes, yes, If he will take This along with him, that it is not poſſible for any thing to be *So*, that is

is *Unjuſt*. He that has not learn'd This Leſſon, can never be a *Good* man. I remember, when I was a Boy, I heard my Father ſpeak of *Fimbria* the *Conſul*: who was appointed Judge in the Caſe of *Marcus Lucïatius Pythias*, (a Knight of *Rome*, and a very *Honeſt man*) who undertook, upon the Forfeiture of a Sum of Mony, to prove himſelf a *Good* man: but *Fimbria* did abſolutely refuſe to paſs Judgment in That matter; leſt he ſhould either derogate from the Reputation of a perſon ſo much Eſteemed, if he gave it againſt him, or appear on the other ſide, to pronounce any man to be Good, conſidering the Infinite Circumſtances of Qualities, and Offices to make him ſo. So that neither *Fimbria*'s *Good man*, nor *Socrates*'s, will allow any thing to be *Profitable* that is not *Honeſt*: And ſuch a man will not only fear to *Do*, but not dare ſo much as to *Think* any thing which he would not frankly own in Publique. Is it not a Shame now, for *Philoſophers* to *Douht*, where the *Common people* themſelves are *Reſolv'd*? For the Old Thredbare *Proverb* is *Their*'s; when they would expreſs a man of an exact Sincerity and Juſtice, *You may play at** Love *with him in the dark*, they ſay; and what is the meaning of This, but to teach us, that nothing can be *Expedient* that is not *Honeſt*, tho' he might gain it, and the World never the Wiſer for't? In the Moral of this *Proverb*, we are taught, that neither *Gyges*'s way is to be endur'd, nor ſo much as a Finger to be mov'd, (as in the caſe formerly ſuppoſed? tho' a man might make himſelf Maſter of the whole World by ſo doing. For whatſoever is *Shameful*, and *Diſhonourable*, let it be never ſo *Secret*, nothing can

* *A little Play with the Fingers.*

make it *Honeſt*; and that which is *not Honeſt*, it is as Impoſſible to render it *Profitable*, in a *Repugnancy* and *Oppoſition* to *Nature*.

BUT where Criminals find great *Rewards*, there is alſo a great *Temptation* to *offend*. When *C. Marius* appeared out of all hope of the *Conſulſhip*, and (having lyen ſtill, for ſeven years after his *Prætorſhip*) no man imagin'd that he would ever have offer'd at it: *Q. Metellus* (a great man, and an Eminent Citizen) ſent *Marius* (being his Lieutenant) to *Rome*. Where *Marius* publiquely charg'd his *Principal* before the People, with prolonging the War, and told them that if they had made Him *Conſul*, he would in a very ſhort time have deliver'd up *Jugartha*, either Alive or Dead, into the Power of the people: whereupon they made him *Conſul*. But This was a Proceeding contrary to *Faith*, and *Juſtice*; by a falſe Suggeſtion to draw an Envy upon ſo Brave a man, and ſo Famous a Citizen: Eſpecially *Marius* being *Metellus's Lieutenant*, and by his order ſent to *Rome*. Neither did our Kinſman *Marius Gratidianus* in his *Prætorſhip* diſcharge the Office of a *Good* man. The *Tribunes* of the Common people Conſulted the College of *Prætors* about ſome Common Standard for the Valuation of their *Moneys*, which were then ſometimes up, ſometimes down, at ſuch a rate, that no man knew what he was worth. They joyn'd unanimouſly in a *Decree*, with a *Penalty* upon any man that ſhould not ſubmit to't; and ſo they *Adjourn'd* for That *Morning*, reſolving to meet again *After noon* for the publiſhing of it. When they were gone, ſome, one way,

A Mean Action of C. Marius.

way, ſome another; *Gratidianus* ſtept preſently from the *Bench* to the *Tribunal*; and there made *Proclamation* by *Himſelf alone* of that which was the *Common Act* of the *Court:* which you will find (if you obſerve the Story) to have given him great Reputation; the people ſetting up his *Statues* every where up and down, with *Incenſe*, and *Tapers*: In one word, no man ever render'd himſelf more *Popular*. Theſe are Points that may puzzle a man ſometimes in his Deliberations; eſpecially when the Matter is but ſmall, wherein any Violence is offer'd to Juſtice, but yet the Conſequence ſeems to be of great Importance. It did not appear to be ſo very foul, for the *One Marius* to prepoſſeſs himſelf of the Favour of the People, by preventing his *Colleagues* and the *Tribunes*: And then it was, in appearance, a matter of great Advantage to the *Other Marius* to advance himſelf to the *Conſulſhip* by the means he had propounded. But there is *One General Rule* that I would have you take ſpecial Notice of; See *Firſt* that what you account *Profitable*, be not *Diſhonourable*; and *Then* if it be *Diſhonourable*, let nothing perſwade you that it is *Profitable*. But what then? Shall we pronounce either the *One Marius* or the *Other* to be an *Honeſt man*? Set your Wits at work, and try, and conſider with your ſelf what is the *Image*, the *Character*, and the *Notion* of a *Good man?* Will a *Good man* tell a *Lye*, *Calumniate*, *Supplant*, or *Deceive?* Certainly nothing leſs. Is there any thing then on the Other ſide, ſo *Profitable* or ſo *Deſirable*, as that a man would forfeit the Reputation and the Glory of a *Good* and a *Wiſe man* to gain it? Can

Small matters may be of great Importance

A Good man will not do an Ill thing.

That thing which we call *Profit*, bring us any Advantage to Countervail what it takes *from us*, in depriving us of the very *Name* of *Good men*, and diveſting us of *Faith*, and *Juſtice?* What difference is there betwixt the turning of a *Man* into a *Beaſt*, by a *Real Metamorphoſis*, and the bearing the *Figure*, and *Fierceneſs* of a *Brute* in his *Mind*, under the *Shape* of a *Man*? They that neglect and make light of all things that are *Honeſt*, for the Acquiring of *Power*, do they not do the ſame thing with *Pompey* that marry'd *Cæſar*'s Daughter to make himſelf *Great*, under the Boldneſs and Protection of his *Father in Law*? But he lookt upon't as a thing Advantageous to himſelf, to augment his *Own* Power by the envy that was born to the Other: but how *Unjuſt* This was to his *Countrey*, and how *Diſhonourable* to himſelf, he did not conſider. His Father in Law had often in his Mouth thoſe *Greek* Verſes of the *Phœnicians* out of *Euripides*, which I'll tell you as well as I can, not ſo gracefully perhaps, but ſo as to be Underſtood.

To get a Crown, *a man would* break *a* Truſt,
If break't at all: *Every where elſe*, *be* Juſt.

IT was a Lewd and Horrible thing done of *Eteocles* (or rather of *Euripides*) to make That the *Exception* of a Crime, which of all Crimes is it ſelf the moſt *Abomniable*. But what do we talk of Petty things, as Inheritances, Traffiques, Fraudulent Bargains? What do you think of Him rather, that having the Ambition to make himſelf the Maſter of the People of *Rome*, and the Empe-

The Ambition of Julius Cæſar.

Emperor of the World it ſelf, accompliſh'd his Ends? No man in his Wits will pretend to juſtifie This Ambition: for in ſo doing he paſſes an Approbation upon the Subverſion of our *Laws* and *Liberties*; and reckons, as a point of *Honour*, that *Ignoble*, and *Deteſtable Oppreſſion*. But he that confeſſes the Unlawfulneſs of any mans Uſurping a Dominion over a City that both has been Free, and ought ſo to be; and yet ſuppoſes it a thing Profitable to him that can compaſs it; I would ſpare no Reprehenſion; nor, in truth, any Reproach, to reclaim ſuch a man from his Error: For (I appeal to the Immortal Gods) what *Profit* can any man find in the Foul and Execrable *Deſtruction* of his *Countrey*; albeit he, that is Guilty of it ſhould come afterwards to be ſtil'd the *Father* of it, by the *oppreſſed People*? *Utility* ſhould therefore be guided by *Honeſty*; and in ſuch manner, that tho' the *Words differ*, the *Thing* ſhould be ſtill the *ſame*. I do not find any thing more *Profitable*, in the Opinion of the *Common People*, than *Power*, and *Empire*: Neither, when I look narrrowly into the Matter, do I find any thing more *Unprofitable* to him that *Unjuſtly attains it*. For what *advantage* can it be to any man, to live in *Anxiety*, *Carefulneſs*, *Fears*, Day and Night; and to lead a Life that is beſet with *Snares*, and *Dangers*? There are more treacherous, and unfaithful men in a Kingdom (ſays *Accius*) than there are good. But of what Kingdom does he ſpeak? even of That which is reported unto us of *Tantalus* and *Pelops*; a Kingdom that proceeded by a Lawful Deſcent. How much greater then is the Number of the Unfaithful to That Prince, who having oppreſt

Utility ſhould be guided by Honeſty.

oppreſt *Rome* it ſelf by a *Roman Army*, and a City, not only *Free* in its own Conſtitution, but giving Laws to others; brought That City, at laſt, into ſubjection to himſelf? How ulcerated a Conſcience do you think This man muſt needs have? What wounds in his Soul? Or how is it poſſible that This mans Life ſhould be Profitable to himſelf, when ſuch was the Condition of it, that Poſterity will ever have a Veneration, and Eſteem for thoſe that took it away?

NOW If thoſe things that carry the Faireſt Appearance of *Profit*, fail yet of being what they ſeem to be, becauſe they are full of Shame and Diſhonour; This, methinks, ſhould Convince any man, that nothing can be *Profitable*, that is not likewiſe *Honeſt*. Now as This has, in many Caſes, been determin'd; ſo moſt remarkably, by the Senate of *Rome*, and by *Caius Fabricius*, in his ſecond *Conſulate*: For when King *Pyrrhus* made War upon *Rome*, and the Quarrel was *Empire* too, and That with a *Powerful*, and a *Generous Prince*; there came a *Fugitive* from *Pyrrhus* into the Tents of *Fabricius*; and promiſed him, upon Condition of a Conſiderable Reward, that he would convey himſelf back, as privately as he came; and Poyſon the King. *Fabricius* order'd this man to be carry'd back to *Pyrrhus*; and the *Senate* applauded the Reſolution. Now if a man ſhould regard the *Appearance*, and *Opinion* of *profit*, This one *Fugitive* might have put a Period to That hazardous War, in the removal of the moſt Conſiderable Enemy of the Empire. But where the point in Controverſie was *Honour*, it would have been a Scandalous and

Fabricius's Generoſity to Pyrrhus.

and an Impious practice to have encountered a Noble Enemy with *Baseneſs*, and *Treachery*, inſtead of *Reſolution*, and *Virtue*. Now which was the more Profitable, either to *Fabricius* (who was as Eminent in *Rome*, as *Ariſtides* was in *Athens*) or to our *Senate* (that never ſeparated Profit from Honour) to ſubdue an Enemy by *Arms*, or by *poyſon?* If *Empire* be deſirable for *Glories* ſake, let there be no *Treachery* or *Injuſtice* in the Attempt: For therein can be no *Glory*. And we muſt have a care too how we compaſs *Wealth it ſelf*; for it can never be *Advantageous* to us with *Infamy*. And therefore it was no Profitable Advice, that of *I. Philippus* (the Son of *Quintus*) to Tax thoſe Cities over again, which *L. Sylla* had diſcharg'd, for a Sum of Mony, by a *Decree* of the *Senate*: And This too, without their Mony again, which they had already paid for their *Liberty*. The *Senate* however took his Counſel, to the Scandal of the Empire. At this rate there's more *Faith* to be found among *pyrates* than among *Roman Senators*. Well! But the Revenue was increas'd, and it was therefore Profitable. But how long ſhall we dare to call any thing *profitable* that is not *Honeſt*? How is it poſſible that *Hatred*, or *Infamy*, ſhould ever be *profitable* to any Government, that muſt ſupport it ſelf by its *own Reputation*, and the *good will* of its *Confederates*? Nay, I have had many a diſpute, upon this Point, with my Friend *Cato* himſelf, for inſiſting too rigorouſly upon the Intereſt of the *publique Treaſury*, and *Revenue*: He was too hard methought to the *Officers*; for we ought to be Bountiful to the *One*, and treat the *Other* as we were wont to treat our

Wealth it ſelf may be Unprofitable.

our *Colonies*: And ſo much the rather, becauſe the Connexion of the *parts* did much contribute to the preſervation of the *Whole*. And *Curio* did very Ill too; who, tho' convinced that the *Tranſpadans* were in the Right, ſtill concluded, *Vincat Utilitas*, *Let* Utility *carry it*. Now he ſhould rather have ſaid that it was not *Juſt*, becauſe it was not *profitable* to the *Commonwealth*, than allowing it to be *profitable*, to conclude that it was not *Juſt*.

Inſtances of Good *and* Profitable *in Competition. Their* Servants *were* Slaves.

IN *Hecaton's Sixth Book* of *Offices*, we find a great many Queſtions to our purpoſe. As for Inſtance, he puts the Caſe, *Whether in a great Scarcity of* Corn, a Good man *be not oblig'd to maintain his Servants?* He Reaſons it *Pro* and *Con*; but at laſt, concludes the *Duty* with a regard rather to *profit*, than to *Humanity*. He puts another Queſtion, *Whether, in the Extremity of a Storm at Sea, a Man ſhould rather throw over a Serviceable Horſe, or a Servant of little value?* And here is private *Intereſt* draws him *One* way, and *Humanity*, *Another*. And again, *Suppoſe that, upon a* Shipwrack, *a* Fool *ſhould get hold of a* Plank; *whether or no may a* Wiſe man *take it from him, if he can?* He's upon the *Negative*, becauſe the thing is *Unjuſt*. But what if it were the *Maſter* of the Ship? Shall not he take his *Own*? No, by no means: He may as well throw a Man over-board, that is at Sea in *his Ship*, becauſe the *Ship* is his *Own*: For till they come to the End of the Voyage, the *Ship* is rather the *Paſſengers* than the *Maſters*. *But what if there ſhould be but* One Plank, *and* Two men *equally* Wiſe, *and* Deſerving, *in danger to be Drown'd?*

Whe-

Whether ſhall Neither *of them take it, or ſhall* Either *of them yield it to the* Other? I would have it yielded to him that may do moſt Good; either in the *Republique*, or in his Own *particular*, by *Living. But what if they be* both alike? I would have no Contention; But let the One render to the Other as if the point had been decided by Lot. *What if my* Father *ſhould Rifle a* Church, *or Dig a paſſage under ground to Rob the Treaſury*? Whether or no ſhould the *Son* give an Information of it to the *Magiſtrate*? This were an Unhappy Caſe; but I would however *Defend* my *Father*, if he were *Accuſed. But is not my* Duty *to my* Country *above* all other Duties? Yes, it is. But then my *Country* it ſelf is concern'd, that the people in it ſhould bear a Reverence to their *Parents. But what if a* Father *ſhould Deſign the betraying of his Countrey; or the getting of the* Government *into his own hand? Shall the* Son Conceal *it*? I would have him earneſtly deſire his *Father* to *deſiſt*; and if That will not do, he's bound to Accuſe him. But I would have him threaten him Firſt; and, in the Concluſion, if he finds his Countrey in danger, he is to value the ſafety of it before That of his *Father*. He puts another Queſtion, *if a* Wiſe, *and* Good man, *ſhall by over-ſight take* Falſe mony, *whether or no may he put it off again in payment, after he knows it to be* Counterfeit? *Diogenes* ſays he may: *Antipater* is againſt it. With whom I do rather agree of the Two. *Suppoſe a man ſells a Piece of Wine, knowing that it will not keep; Is he bound to tell this or no? Diogenes* ſays he needs not; but *Antipater* ſays that a Good man will tell it. Theſe are the Propoſi-

Caſes of Conſcience.

tions

tions in Controverſie, among the *Stoiques*. *In the ſelling of a* Slave, *whether or no am I bound to diſcover all his faults?* Only thoſe which the *Civil Law* obliges me to diſcover, or to take him again. But for diſcovering him to be a *Lyer*, a *Gameſter*, a *Thief*, a *Drunkard*; *Some* are *For* the telling of it, and *Others* not. *What if a man ſhould ſell* Gold, *believing it to be* Copper? *Is* a Good man *that knoweth it to be* Gold, *bound to tell him it or no? Or whether can any man Juſtifie the buying of That for* One Peny *which is worth* a Thouſand? I have now clear'd my own Opinion; And what are the Points in Controverſie among the Philoſophers before-named.

Conſcience in Contracts.

WE come now to conſider how far *Thoſe Offices* and *Contracts* are to be obſerv'd, that are neither Extorted by *Force*, nor (as the Law has it) *Dolo malo*, or by *Circumvention*. *I have a Remedy given me for the* Dropſie, *upon This Condition, that if it Cures me, I am never to uſe that Medicine again: Within a few years, and after I have been once Cur'd of it, I relapſe into the ſame Diſeaſe, and the perſon with whom I contracted will not give me leave to make any further Uſe of it: What am I to do in This Caſe? It is an* Inhumanity *in him to* refuſe *me*; *beſides that my Uſing of it does Him no Hurt*: In this Caſe, we muſt Conſult the Means of *Life*, and *Health*. Well! *Suppoſe a Wiſe man ſhould be made* Heir to a great Eſtate, *upon This Obligation from the* Teſtator, *that before he touches one peny of the Profits of it, he ſhould dance publiquely before a Court of Juſtice, or in the Market place? He promiſes accordingly ſo to do; and without paſſing*

That

That promiſe, he could never have been entitled to that Eſtate: Should he do it or no? I could wiſh he had not promis'd it; and my Opinion is, that it would better have become his Gravity not to have done it; but in regard that he has paſt his Word, if he accounts in a *Shameful*, and *Diſhonourable* thing to diſcharge That Condition, he may break his word with a better Grace by making *no Benefit* of the *Eſtate*, than *Otherwiſe*; unleſs peradventure the Benefits of it might be converted to ſo Great and Publique an Advantage, that it would be no longer *Diſhonourable* ſo to do, as being *Profitable* to his *Country*.

Some Promiſes better broken than kept.

Neither is a man (*always*) bound to keep thoſe Promiſes that are of no Advantage to thoſe to whom the Promiſe is made. *Phœbus* (to come back to Fables) having promiſed his Son *Phaeton* a Grant of whatever he ſhould ask; *Phaeton* demanded the Government of his Fathers Chariot; he had his Deſire, and in his full Carrier *Jupiter* caſt him down with a Thunderbolt. Had not this *promiſe* of his Father's now been better *broken* than *kept*? And then the Promiſe that *Theſeus* extorted from *Neptune*, what became of it? *Neptune* accorded to him *Three wiſhes*: *One* was the Deſtruction of *his Son Hippolytus*, upon a ſuſpicion of his Familiarity with his own Mother-in-Law, and the Granting of That Wiſh was the greateſt Affliction that ever came near to *Theſeus's* Heart. And what was *Agamemnons Vow* to *Diana*, in promiſing her the moſt beautiful Creature that ſhould be born within his Dominions that year? which proved to be his own Daughter *Iphigenia*; whom he accordingly

cordingly ſacrific'd, as the faireſt Creature which That year produc'd. How much better had it been if This Promiſe had never been made, than ſo horrible a Crime admitted? Wherefore ſometime we ſhould not paſs a Promiſe: Nay a *Depoſitum* it ſelf is not in all Caſes to be reſtor'd. A man leaves a Sword in Truſt with me when he's *Sober*, and calls for't again when he's *Mad*; Now to *Reſtore* it, in ſuch a Caſe, were a *Crime*, and the *Refuſal* of it, a *Duty*. *What if I ſhould lay up Mony for him, and then find that he's about to make War upon his Country? Shall I render it?* I think not; becauſe it is againſt the *Republique*, which we ought to prefer. So many things that ſeem *Honeſt* enough in *their Own Nature*, are yet made *Unwarrantable* by *Time*, and *Occaſion*: to make good a Promiſe, ſtand to a Bargain, deliver up a Truſt; when it comes to be rather *Hurtful* than *Profitable*, becomes *Diſhoneſt*. This is enough ſaid of thoſe *Utilities* againſt *Juſtice* that are cover'd with a *pretext* of *Reaſon*. But as we have drawn all Duties from the four Fountains of Duty in our Firſt Book, we'll keep ſtill to our Subject; and Shew, how thoſe things that *ſeem* to be *profitable*, and *Are* not, ſtand in the greateſt Oppoſition to Virtue. Here is enough ſaid of *Prudence*, and of the *Counterfeit* of it, which is *Craft*: and likewiſe of *Juſtice*, which can never fail of being *profitable*.

Of Fortitude. THE *Two remaining parts* of *Honeſty* follow, the *One* is ſeen in the *Greatneſs* of an *Excellent Mind*, the *Other* in a Conformity and Moderation of *Continence*, and *Temper*. It ſeemed *profitable*

ible to *Ulysses*, the Counterfeiting himself *mad*, to avoid the War, as the *Tragœdians* would perswade us. (For there appears no such suspicion of him in *Homer*, who was an Emient Author.) This was no *Honest* Counsel, but it may be said perhaps, that it was a *Profitable* one, to stay at Home, and Govern, in an Easie, Lazie Life at *Ithaca*, with his Wife, his Son, and his Relations, but do you Imagine, that in *daily Labours*, and *Hazards*, there can be any *Dignity* that is to be compar'd with *This Tranquillity of Life?* And yet I cannot but have a Contempt for such a *Retreat*, because those things that are not *Honourable*, I cannot allow to be *Advantageous*. But what do you think the World would have said of *Ulysses* if he had gone on in that Disguise; who notwithstanding all his *Brave Exploits* in the *War*, did yet suffer these reproaches from *Ajax*, in the *Tragedy*?

He that contriv'd the Oath, and made us take it,
Was th' only man, himself, you know, that brake it:
Playing th' Mad, Driv'ling Fool, under That Blind
To sleep in a whole skin, and stay behind:
And the bold Cheat had past, without all doubt,
But for sly Palamede *that found it out.*

NOW it was much better for him, to encounter, as he did, not only Enemies, but likewise Seas and Tempests; than to abandon *Greece*, which was then by one Consent carrying a War among the *Barbarians*. But to pass over things Fabulous and Foreign. Let us now come to our

The Case of Regulus.

own Country, and Affairs. *Marcus Attilius Regulus*, in his second *Consulship*, when he was surpriz'd, and taken prisoner in *Africa*, by *Xantippus* the *Lacedæmonian*, a Commander under *Hamilcar* the Father of *Hannibal*: (who was then General) he was sent to the Senate, under an Oath of rendring himself again at *Carthage*, unless certain *Carthaginian Noblemen* should be releas'd in exchange. Being come to *Rome*, he had before him a fair Colour of *Profit*, but as the Story makes it out, he found it *Vain*, and *Idle*. The condition of it was, that he might stay in his Country, live at home with his Wife and Children, suffering the Calamity he was fallen into as the Common Fortune of the War, and still retaining the Honour of his *Consulary Dignity*. Will any man deny these things to be *Profitable*? or what shall we say, when *Courage*, and *Magnanimity* oppose it? What Greater Authority or Security would a man desire? For it is the Property of these Virtues not to fear any thing; to despise all accidents; and to reckon nothing Intolerable, that can befal a man.

His Honour and Justice.

BUT what did he do? He came into the Senate; told them his Business; but refus'd to give his Opinion; for so long as he was under an *Oath*, he was in the Condition of a *Prisoner* to an *Enemy*, and not of a *Senator*: But (like a Fool as he was (as some will say) and one that stood in his own light) that which he did speak was against himself: He would not allow it to be the *Roman Interest* to exchange their Prisoners; for the *Carthaginians* were young men (he said) and good Soldiers, but himself wasted with Old age.

age. His Authority prevailing, the Prisoners were detained, and himself return'd to *Carthage*, without any regard to the Affection he had either for his Country, or for his Friends; He was not Ignorant neither, to how cruel an Enemy, and to what exquisite Torments he expos'd himself, by his Return; only he was resolved not to violate his Oath. When they had *Tortur'd*, and *Watch'd* him even to death; his Condition was yet more Honourable, than if he had ended his days in his Own house; a *decrepit Captive*, and *Forsworn Senator*. But what a Fool was he, not only not to agree to the remitting of their Prisoners, but also to dissuade it? But what? shall we call *That*, *Foolish*, that conduces to the *Good* of the *Commonwealth*? Or can any thing be *Profitable* to any *Member* of the *Publique*, that is not so to the *Whole*? It is a subversion of the *Fundementals* of *Nature*, to divide *Profit* and *Honesty*, for we do all of us desire that which is *Profitable*: It is an Attractive that draws us to it, whether we will or no. Is there any man that avoids it; or rather that does not vigorously pursue it? But since *Profit* is not any where to be found, but in that which is *Praise-worthy*, *Honourable*, and *Honest*, therefore do we account these Considerations as most Noble, and Excellent; intending under the name of *Profit*, what is rather necessary than Splendid.

BUT what is there, you'll say, in an *Oath*? are we afraid that *Jupiter* should take offence at us? Now This is a point common to all Philosophers, that *God* is neither *Angry* with us, nor *Hurts* us: and not only to those that take God himself,

The Sacredness of an Oath.

himſelf to be *Idle*, and wholly careleſs of us, but to thoſe alſo that will have God to be always in *Action*, and doing of ſomething: But what greater harm could even an Angry *Jupiter* do to *Regulus*, than *Regulus* did to *Himſelf*? So that there was nothing of *Religion* in the perverting ſo great a *profit*. Was it leſt he ſhould do a *mean* thing? Firſt, of *Two evils* (we know) we are to chuſe the *Leaſt*. But was that Diſhonourable Propoſition then an Evil Equal to the Torment? And *then*, That of *Accius*: *Haſt thou broken thy Faith? To any man that does not believe me, I neither have given, , nor Do give it.* Now tho' this was ſpoken by a Wicked King, it was yet well enough ſaid: And moreover; as we ſay that ſome things appear *profitable*, which are *not* ſo; ſo do they ſay on the Other ſide, that ſome things *appear Honeſt* too, which are *not* ſo: As in this caſe of *Regulus*'s returning to the *Torment*, to ſave his *Oath*: For it is rendred *Diſhonourable*, becauſe it was done under a *Force*, and by an *Enemy*, and ſo ought not to be made good. And they go further, that whatſoever is *very profitable*, becomes *Honeſt* upon That Conſideration, tho' it was not ſo before. This is it which is commonly urg'd againſt *Regulus*. But let us *examine what it amounts to*. *Jupiter* was not to be fear'd, leſt he ſhould *hurt* us in his *Anger*; becauſe he does not uſe to be either *Angry* or *Miſchievous*. This Reaſon lies as ſtrong againſt all other Oaths, as againſt This of *Regulus*. But the queſtion is not in an *Oath*, the *fear* of being *puniſh'd* for *breaking it*, but the *Conſcience* and the *Obligation of* keeping it. Now an *Oath* is a *Religious Affirmation*; and whatſoever

ver we promiſe poſitively, as in the preſence of *God*, we muſt keep it: for this does not concern the Anger of the Gods, which is none at all; but it belongs to *Faith*, and *Juſtice! It is a glorious Exclamation of* Ennius.

O Holy Faith! the Tye o'th' Gods;
And fit to have thy Manſion in their Bleſt Abodes.

HE therefore that violates his *Oath*, profanes the Divinity of *Faith* it ſelf, to which our Forefathers aſcribed *Divine Honours*; placing her in the *Capitol*, as (*Cato* tells us) next unto *Jupiter himſelf. But even an Angry* Jupiter (you ſay) *could not have hurt* Regulus *more than he did himſelf.* That were true, if there were no evil but *Pain*: But we have the Authority of the greateſt Philoſophers for it, that Torment is ſo far from being the *Greateſt Evil*, that it is *None at all.* And let me recommend *Regulus* to you upon this point, as no Ordinary Teſtimony; Nay, perhaps none more convincing. For what nobler Inſtance can be deſir'd, than to ſee ſo Illuſtrious a *Roman* ſubject himſelf voluntarily to the *Torture*, rather than forego his *Duty*? for in ſaying the *Leaſt* of *Evils*, it is meant by ſuffering rather *Diſhonourably*, than *Miſerably.* Is there any *Greater Evil* than a *Shameful Diſhoneſty*? How offenſive is it to the *Eye*, and Deformity of the Body? But how much greater then ſhould we account the *Pravity*, and *Corruption* of a *Polluted Mind*? Wherefore they that argue theſe things with the greateſt Generoſity and Vigour, as the *Stoiques*, pronounce

Pain is no Evil.

That Only to be *Evil* which is *Shameful*: Nay, the *Peripatetiques* themſelves (who are not ſo Maſculine as the other) make no difficulty of unanimouſly pronouncing it to be the *Greateſt Evil*. As for that ſaying, *I have neither given, nor do I give, my Faith to a Faithleſs man*: It was well enough ſaid of the Poet, in the Caſe of *Atreus*; becauſe it was accommodate to the *perſon*: But if they take up This once for granted, that a man is not oblig'd to *keep Faith* with him that has *no Faith*: let them have a care not to make uſe of that Shift as a Cover for Perjury.

A Pagan Diſpenſation.

AS to the Rights and Cuſtoms of *War*, and keeping *Faith* with an *Enemy*, they are points we muſt be very *Tender of*: For whatſoever we ſwear, upon a full Perſwaſion in our Minds that it ought to be done, That muſt be obſerv'd: But Otherwiſe, a man may diſpenſe with what Obligation without *Perjury*. As if a man that lies at the mercy of common *Thieves*, ſhould promiſe them a certain Sum of Mony for the ſaving of his *Life*: 'Tis no deceit, the receeding from it, tho' I had given my Oath for the performance: for we are not to look upon *Pirates* as *Open* and *Lawful Enemies*; but as the Common *Adverſaries* of *Mankind*. For they are a ſort of men with whom we have neither *Truſt*, nor *Oath* in Common. For *Perjury* is not the *Swearing falſe*, but the not *performing* of That which we ſwear, with an *Intention* to do it; as may be gather'd from the very form of our Oath. It was wittily ſaid of *Euripides*, *I ſwore with my Tongue, but not with my Heart.* But it was not for *Regulus*, however to embroil the

the Conditions, and Rules of *War*, with *Perjury*; having to do with a *Juſt*, and a *Lawful Enemy*; in which Caſe, all the Rights and Laws of Arms were admitted betwixt them in Common. For if it were otherwiſe, the Senate would never have ſent and deliver'd up ſo many famous men in Chains to their Enemies. Which was the Caſe of *Titus Veturius*, and *Spurius Poſthumius*, in their *Second Conſulſhips*: Who when they were beaten at *Caudium*, and our Legions diſarm'd, for concluding a Peace with the *Samnites*, were deliver'd up to them as their Priſoners, becauſe they had done it without the *Order*, and *Conſent* of the *People*, and *Senate*. And at the ſame time *T. Numitius*, and *Q. Melius*, who were then *Tribunes* of the *Common people*, were deliver'd up likewiſe, to Evacuate the Peace concluded, becauſe it was done by Their Authority; and *Poſthumius* himſelf, that was deliver'd up, was the man that adviſed and propounded it. And the ſame thing was done many years after, by *C. Mancinus*, who having made a League with the *Carthaginians*, without the Authority of the *Senate*, perſwaded the repreſenting of it to the People, himſelf, that he might be deliver'd up to the Enemy; which propoſition being ſo recommended, by *L. Furius*, and *Sextus Attilius*, was accepted, and he accordingly deliver'd up. This was more Honourable yet, than that of *Q. Pompeius*, who in the ſame caſe, upon his ſupplication that ſuch a *Decree* might not be paſt againſt him, prevail'd, *and was diſcharg'd*. Here, that which ſeem'd *Profitable*, was more conſider'd than the *Honeſt*; but in the *Other Example*, *the falſe Appearance* of *Profit*, was overcome by a

The Rigour of the Roman Diſcipline.

Dignity of *Honour*, and *Virtue*. But in the Caſe of *Regulus*, the Promiſe was made under a Force, and he was not oblig'd to Perform it. As if any Force could work upon the Mind of a Valiant man: Why did he go to the Senate then, expreſly to move againſt himſelf, and diſſwade the Releaſe of the Priſoners? This is to reprehend the moſt Generous point in the whole caſe, he would not reſt upon his own Opinion; but undertook the Cauſe, that the Senate might paſs judgment upon it; wherein if he had not interpoſed, the Priſoners had been certainly reſtor'd to the *Carthaginians*; and then, *Regulus* might have continu'd ſafe in his own Country. But as he did not account that courſe *Profitable* to his *Countrey*, ſo he took the *Honeſter* Part, in chuſing rather to ſuffer, and undergo what he did. Now as to their ſaying, that when a thing is very *Profitable*, the advantage juſtifies it, tho' it were not *Honeſt* otherwiſe: Let me tell you, that it muſt *Be* ſo, and not be *Made* ſo: For there is nothing *Profitable*, which is not *Honeſt*, and it is not *Honeſt*, becauſe it is *Profitable*, but it is *Profitable*, becauſe it is *Honeſt*. So that out of many Wonderful Examples, a man ſhall hardly find a greater, or a more laudable Inſtance than This. For in the whole Character of *Regulus*, the moſt Worthy and Generous part of it was his Opinion for the detaining of the Priſoners. For as to his Return, tho' we wonder at it now adays, he could not yet at That time do otherwiſe: So that it was the Glory of the *Age*, rather than of the *Man:* For our Fore-

The Tye of an Oath. fathers lookt upon the Tye of an Oath as the moſt Sacred Obligation in Nature. And this we find

in

in the *Twelve Tables*; the Laws which we call *Sacratæ*, ſhew as much: And ſo do our *Leagues*, by which we are ty'd to keep Faith, even with an Enemy; and ſo do the *Orders*, and *Penalties* of our *Cenſors*; who were not ſo ſtrict in any thing, as in the bus'neſs of an *Oath*. *Lucius Manlius* (the Son of *Aulus*) in his *Dictatorſhip* was ſummon'd by *M. Pomponius*, the *Tribune* of the *Common people* for Exerciſing the Power of a *Dictator*, ſome days beyond his time; And was further accus'd for Baniſhing his Son *Titus* (who was afterward called *Torquatus*) out of the Town, and Commanding him to live in the Country. The Young man, hearing that his Father was in trouble about it, is ſaid to have gone preſently to *Rome*; and the next morning by day-light, to *Pomponius*'s houſe. To whom it was ſuggeſted that *Torquatus* being very Ill us'd, had probably brought him ſome Complaint againſt his Father. *Pomponius* preſently left his Bed, turn'd all people out of the Room, and ſo order'd the young man to be brought unto him. He was no ſooner in the Chamber, but *Titus* drew his Sword, and ſwore that he would immediately kill him, if he did not preſently give him his *Oath*, that his Father ſhould be diſcharg'd: *Pomponius*, upon the apprehenſion of his preſent danger, paſt his *Oath*, and afterward reported the matter to the people; telling them he was forced to deſiſt, and the reaſon of it: Whereupon *Manlius* was let go. Such a Veneration had they in thoſe times for the Tye of an Oath! This *Titus Manlius* is the man, who having kill'd a *Frenchman* in a *Duel* upon a Challenge, at the River *Anien*, and taking from him a *Chain*, which

which the *Latins* call *Torquis*, took the *Sirname* of *Torquatus*. In his *Third Conſulſhip* the *Latins* were routed and diſperſed at *Veſeris*, near the Mountain *Veſuvius*. He was a man of the higheſt rank of Brave men, and not more eminently Indulgent to his Father, than he was afterward ſevere to his Son.

The Severity of the Romans in caſe of Perfidy.

BUT as *Regulus* was to be commended for keeping of his Oath, ſo were thoſe *ten men* after the Battle of *Cannæ* as much to be deſpiſed. *Hannibal* ſent them to the Senate, upon an *Oath* to render themſelves again in the Camp of the *Carthaginians*; if they could not obtain ſuch an exchange of Priſoners as was propounded. But this Story is variouſly reported: *Polybius* (an Author of ſingular Credit) ſays that *Nine* of the *ten Noblemen* that were ſent, delivered themſelves up without prevailing for the *Exchanges*, but that *One* of the Ten never went back again; Having Returned to the Camp, ſo ſoon as he was out of it, upon pretence that he had left ſomething behind him; by which *Return*, he would underſtand himſelf to be diſcharg'd of his Oath: But without reaſon; For the *Fraud encreaſes* the *Iniquity*, without *diſſolving* the *Perjury*. Wherefore it was a fooliſh piece of Cunning, and a moſt perverſe Imitation of Prudence. Hereupon the Senate decreed that this ſhifting Jugler ſhould be ſent bound to *Hannibal*. But the moſt glorious thing of all was This, *Hannibal* had 8000 Priſoners; not taken in the Battle, or that had run any hazard of their lives, but they were only ſuch as were left in the Camp, by the *Two Conſuls*, *Paulus* and *Varro*. They might have been

been redeem'd for a ſmall Sum of Money: but the Senate would not agree to't: for a Leſſon to the *Roman Soldiers* that they muſt either *Conquer*, or *Die*. This reſolution being made known to *Hannibal*, went more to the heart of him than any thing elſe (as the ſame Author has it) too ſee that the Senate and People of *Rome* in their greateſt Adverſity, ſhould ſtill uphold ſo generous a Reſolution. So that things *ſeemingly Profitable* are ſtill overcome by things that are *really honeſt*. Now *Acilius* that wrote the Story in *Greek*, reports it, that there were more of them went back to *Hannibal*'s *Camp*, under the ſame Colour, to deliver themſelves from their Oath; and that they were branded for it with all ſorts of Ignominy by the *Cenſors*. We ſhall now put an end to This matter; for it is clear, that whatſoever is done with a Timorous, Abject, Mean, and Broken Mind, cannot be Profitable, becauſe it is Flagitious, Diſhonourable, and Shameful: as this Action of *Regulus* would have been, if he had rather conſulted his *Own Intereſt*, than that of the *Publique*, in the buſineſs of the Priſoners; or rather choſen to have ſtaid at home.

THE Fourth part yet remains, conſiſting in *Decency*, *Moderation*, *Modeſty*, *Continence*, and *Temperance*. Now can any thing be *profitable*, in oppoſition to this Catalogue of ſuch Virtues? But *Ariſtippus*'s *Cyrenaiques*, and the *Annicerian Philoſophers* place all *Good* in *pleaſure*, and account *Virtue* to be therefore *Laudable*, for the *pleaſure* it produces. As theſe grew out of date, *Epicurus* came on; the Supporter, Improver, and *Of Temperance.*

and in a manner, the Author of the ſame Opinion. With theſe we muſt contend (as they ſay) for Life; If we are reſolv'd to defend, and to maintain the Cauſe of Honeſty: For if not only *Utility*, but all *Happineſs of Life* reſts in a *Sound Conſtitution* of *Body*, or in the ſearch and hope of ſuch a Conſtitution (as *Metrodorus* will have it) This *Utility* certainly (and in the higheſt degree too (for ſo they underſtand it) will be found to claſh with *honeſty*. For firſt, what Province ſhall we aſſign to *prudence?* If the ſearch and enquiry after Delights; How wretched a *thing* is *Virtue*, when it comes to ſerve *pleaſure?* But what is the *Office* of *prudence*? To judge learnedly of *pleaſure*? Suppoſe that nothing could be more *Delightful* than That: There is nothing yet to be imagin'd, that is more *Diſhonourable*. Now for him that pronounces *pain* to be the greateſt of *Evils*; what place is there in ſuch a Mind, for *Magnanimity*, that Exerciſes it ſelf in the Contempt of *Labours*, and *pains?* For tho' *Epicurus*, in many places ſpeaks Generouſly enough (as he does in This) of *pain and Affliction*; We are not yet ſo much to conſider what he ſays, as what may be reaſonable for him to ſay, upon the Foundation of Terminating all *Good* and *Ill*, in *pleaſure* and *pain*: As to hear him now ſpeak of *Continence* and *Temperance*; he ſays many very good things in ſeveral places; but yet he's gravell'd; (as we ſay) For how can any man commend *Temperance*, and yet place our *Chiefeſt Good* in *pleaſure?* For *Temperance* is the *Enemy* of *Senſual pleaſures*, and our *Appetites* are the *Servants*, and *Followers* of them. And yet in theſe Three kinds, they

Epicurus places *Good and Ill in Pleaſure and Pain.*

they ſhuffle as well as they can, and their Evaſions are not without ſome Colour. They make *prudence* to be the skill of ſupplying or procuring *pleaſures*, and keeping away *pains*: And then they make a ſhift too, to acquit themſelves. in the point of *Fortitude*: which they ſay enables us to contemn *Death*, and to endure *pain*. And in ſpeaking of *Temperance*; tho' they are not clear, yet they extricate themſelves after a faſhion; for they ſay that the *Greatneſs* of *pleaſure* ariſes only from an *Abſence* or *Detraction* of *pain*. And as for *Juſtice*, it is with Them, either *Tottering*, or rather *Grovelling* upon the *Ground*; and ſo are all thoſe Virtues that are exercis'd in Common, and in the Society of Mankind. For there can neither be any Goodneſs, Liberality, or Gentleneſs (any more than Friendſhip) if theſe things be not deſirable for *Themſelves*: or elſe deſirable only in relation to *pleaſure* and *profit*. But let us bring the matter into a Narrow Compaſs: For as we have laid it down, that nothing can be *profitable*, in Oppoſition to *honeſty*, ſo we do here affirm that all Pleaſure is directly contrary to it. Concerning which point, I reckon *Calliphon*, and *Dinomachus* to be the more to blame, in thinking to put an end to this Controverſie, by coupling *pleaſure*, with *honeſty*, as if it were a *Man*, with a *Beaſt*. Whereas Virtue does not admit of that Conjunction, but deſpiſes and rejects it. And then for the end of *Good* and *Evil men*, which muſt be *Simple*: it cannot be *Temper'd*, and *Compounded* of *diſagreeing things*. But of this elſewhere more at large: And it is a weighty buſ'neſs. But to my purpoſe now in hand. Concerning

cerning any matter to be determin'd in the Case of a *Concurrent Opposition* betwixt *profit*, and *honesty*, we have said enough already. But if *pleasure* shall be said to carry some shew of *profit* also, there can be no Conjunction of it with Honesty. For allowing the most we can to *pleasure*, it does but serve us for *Sawce*, without any Profit in it at all.

IN This Book (my Son *Marcus*) your Father makes you a *Present*: in *My Opinion* a *Great* one: but it is to *You* according as you *Take* it. And yet however, you may allow These Three Books of Mine, an Entertainment in your Study, among the Commentaries of *Cratippus*. If I my self had come to *Athens* (as I had done, if my Country had not Commanded me back, even when I was half way through) you should sometimes have been your Fathers Disciple too. So that I am now fain to speak to you in these Writings. Bestow as much of your time upon them as you can: and what you have a mind to do, you may do. When I shall understand that This Study pleases you, I hope it will not be long before I be with you my self. And however, at this distance, though in absence, I shall still be speaking to you. Wherefore my *Cicero* farewel: And assure your self that you are exceeding dear to me: And yet much dearer you will be, if I shall find that you take delight in these Memorials, and Precepts.

THE END.

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